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The Dream Is Over: The Crisis of Clark Kerr’s California Idea of Higher Education is 
a longer version of the three Clark Kerr Lectures on Higher Education delivered 
on September 30, October 2, and October 7, 2014, at the University of California 
Berkeley. I hope that the book is a more considered and evidenced version of the 
argument made in the fifty-minute lecture format. The Dream Is Over, which is 
first of all about the sixty-year trajectory of higher education in California and 
the United States, was written from another country but within an early-twenty-
first-century global higher education order shaped in a number of ways by public 
higher education in California. California is where American higher education 
reaches its high point, and the United States has dominated worldwide higher edu-
cation since World War II: only now is the rest of the world just starting to catch 
up. Most of the world’s top twenty universities are American, and a number are 
located in California. All of us who work in higher education in some sense live 
in California, identifying with its goals and drawing from its fecund freedoms, its 
vision of growth and opportunity. In examining higher education in California, we 
reflect on our own deeper beliefs and ideals.
The development of the California Idea of higher education was long in com-
ing. It had its roots in the larger “California Idea,” the recurring movements of 
California Progressives and their agenda for democratic prosperity, as outlined by 
John Douglass in his account of the century leading up to the 1960 Master Plan. 
Douglass’s clear historical account,1 which is recommended to all readers, has been 
one of the foundations of this book. When it came to the systematic implementa-
tion of the “California Idea” in higher education, the process was led by University 
of California president Clark Kerr, the main architect of the 1960 Master Plan for 
Higher Education, the most important American university president since World 
War II, and a thinker and writer on higher education whose work is still widely 
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read. The Dream Is Over considers where Clark Kerr’s notions about the public 
research university (the “multiversity”) and his commitment to a socially inclusive 
higher education system, dedicated to equality of opportunity and excellence at the 
same time, continue to be relevant—and where these notions might have become 
tarnished or rendered obsolete by time. It will argue that while the California Idea 
of higher education, like all policy-oriented forms, has flaws and limitations, it also 
contains virtues that have been allowed to deteriorate.
The Dream Is Over argues in part 3 that public higher education in California 
has become trapped within a high individualist politics that ignores and negates 
the social conditions in which individual freedoms are nurtured and expressed. 
These conditions include the role of government, which ought to be (and often 
is) a positive and not a negative influence in society. But in today’s California and 
United States, as elsewhere in the English-speaking world, many regard taxation as 
a form of theft, markets are used to value the public good in the social sectors, and 
wealth and educational power are rapidly concentrating at the top, without regard 
to those in the middle and at the bottom. The imagined society of the early 1960s, 
that of a higher education–led meritocracy grounded in equality of opportunity, 
serving enterprise and justice in equal measure, is over. Hence the bracing title. To 
find a way forward, we must first acknowledge the situation as it is. The book con-
siders future developments in the circumstances, both rich with possibilities (es-
pecially at global level) and troubled in values, in which Californian and American 
public higher education now find themselves located.
The book has been organized in three parts, each an expansion of one of the 
Kerr lectures. Part 1 reviews Clark Kerr and the 1960 Master Plan in their time; 
discusses scholarly works by Clark Kerr, Martin Trow, and Bob Clark that are part 
of the Californian contribution to worldwide higher education; and opens discus-
sion of the trajectory of the California Idea of higher education within California. 
Part 2 explores the passage of the California Idea across the world, in the spread of 
educational capacity and research science in the last two decades, and the rise of 
new university powers, especially in China and other parts of East Asia. Though 
the university has many national variations, all local and national institutions are 
part of a global research system and common patterns of higher education. The 
imprint of Clark Kerr’s multiversity is visible everywhere. The more plural higher 
education world also poses challenges and opportunities for American institu-
tions. Part 3 brings the discussion back to California and the United States (while 
remembering that what happens in the United States has global implications). Re-
markably, the California Idea of higher education has had a great effect across the 
world but is losing traction at home. Part 3 reviews the rise of the antistate and 
antitax politics in California, Proposition 13 and the consequences for the Mas-
ter Plan, the growth of social and economic inequality in the United States, the 
“steeper” vertical stratification of higher education, the weakening of equality of 
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opportunity, problems in the relationship between higher education and the labor 
markets, and the limits on social mobility in American (and English-speaking) 
society. The epilogue more briefly considers the future: briefly, because we do not 
know the future, and social science engages in prediction at its peril. Yet this open-
ness, and the scope it gives us for agency, is always our best hope.
The Clark Kerr lecture series is a settling challenge to those of us asked to par-
ticipate. It invites us to consider our words with more than the usual care and to 
summon whatever it is, if anything, that might be distinctive in what we say. My 
concern was always to be worthy of the invitation—and its name. It was an honor 
and a pleasure to spend time at the University of California, and I now understand 
a little better the lifelong hold that it exerts on some of my friends. I have benefited 
from the generous hosting, counseling, and continued collaboration of a group 
of people in and around the Center for Studies in Higher Education (CSHE) at 
Berkeley. The weeks at Berkeley were full of good talk and fine stone buildings. 
Above all I sincerely thank Jud King, who has been a fine adviser and a produc-
tive colleague, Sheldon Rothblatt, for his generous engagement with the draft ma-
terials, and also Carol Christ, John Douglass, Patricia Pelfrey, and Neil Smelser, 
Richard Atkinson at San Diego, and Wyatt R. “Rory” Hume. Most of those named 
read one or more parts of the text. So did Mike Shattock in the United Kingdom. 
I am very grateful for all comments, while carrying sole responsibility for the nar-
rative and interpretations herein. I also thank Diana Baltodano, Meg Griffith, and 
Christine Herd, who kindly helped with the visit in 2014. It was good to spend 
time at CSHE.
The Dream Is Over was developed in several disciplines and draws on many the-
ories and experiences, bodies of commentary, reflective scholarship, and empirical 
research, as indicated in the bibliography. The book is a synthesis. It is sustained 
by its own assumptions, organization, and judgment, while working also with the 
writings of many others: sometimes integrating their insights into the synthetic 
picture and sometimes bouncing off them in disagreement (the book continues 
a lifelong preoccupation with the critique of public choice theory). I deeply ap-
preciate the opportunity to engage with this range of scholarship. Again, none of 
the many scholars cited or quoted in this book are responsible for what is stated 
here. At least some will disagree with my interpretation of their words and findings, 
though I trust the text is accurate in matters requiring the “impartial spectator,” to 
use Adam Smith’s phrase. Much of the recent research on the political economy of 
inequality and on social stratification in the United States and China—we need to 
bring studies of China into the core of social science, given the long-term global 
importance of that country—was new to me when I began preparing the Kerr Lec-
tures. Research on social stratification, combining sociology and political economy 
and using both quantitative and qualitative techniques, constitutes a useful direc-
tion for higher education studies.
xiv    Preface
Preparation of The Dream Is Over was also informed by conversation with Glyn 
Davis, a Berkeley alumnus, who is vice-chancellor at the University of Melbourne 
in Australia, where I worked until 2013, and by the ongoing discussion with my 
father, Ray Marginson. As vice-principal at Melbourne from 1966 to 1988, Ray 
Marginson was another of the builders of public higher education, in Australian 
higher education in the 1960s and 1970s when the world was wide, public invest-
ment increased at a rate never seen before or since, and the first system of mass 
higher education, with broad-based research capacity, was established. The world 
is still wide but the main arc of creation in higher education has swung to China, 
South Korea, and Singapore—and maybe to Latin America, Central and Eastern 
Europe, India, and the Middle East (though new things can happen anywhere). In 
these zones, not coincidentally, states are in the forefront. When Anglo-American 
societies rediscover their states as constructive instruments, rather than seeing 
their public officials as people working behind the back of the common good for 
solely selfish ends (as public choice theory sees it), those societies will again move 
forward. The modern Anglo-American higher education systems were mostly 
formed in 1955–1980, when democratic society charged government, not markets, 
with the erection of public infrastructure and better systems of institutional provi-
sion. The systems, especially, broke new ground. Both the infrastructure and the 
systems will last much longer than the 1960s dreams that inspired them. If the task 
had been left to markets, we would be still waiting. We work within the halls built 
by the postwar generation, first in their heads and then in the world. Clark Kerr 
was the foremost of the builders. There were many others.
Writing the book had its golden moments. It is a pleasure to work with the 
rhythm of words in this way, assembling a lattice of thought, testing it against 
observation and reading and memory and inner synthesis, while one’s sense of 
the world inches slowly forward. Mostly the outcome on the page falls short of 
the thing we glimpse at the edge of imagination. Sometimes it all springs into 
view. The weeks on the last third of the draft were good, as months of preparation 
began to bear fruit. However, it has been difficult to create a book-length study of 
higher education at the desired level of originality, amid other demands, and at a 
time of transition and loss. I thank colleagues at the University College London 
Institute of Education for their forbearance, particularly during the main writing 
in mid 2014. I am deeply grateful to my wife, Anna Smolentseva, and family. At the 
time of the Clark Kerr lectures, Ana Rosa began a fulfilling humanities degree at 
Goldsmiths College in London. I dedicate The Dream Is Over to her with love and 
respect and wish her more great university years.
PART ONE
A City upon a Hill
Clark Kerr and the California Idea of Higher Education
Today the eyes of all people are truly upon us—and our governments, in 
every branch, at every level, national, state and local, must be as a city upon 
a hill—constructed and inhabited by men aware of their great trust and their 
great responsibilities.
—John F. Kennedy, January 9, 1961, address to the General 




The later 1950s and the 1960s were an extraordinary time, especially in the United 
States. The period climaxed in the explosion of ideas, identities, popular culture, 
and political rebellion in the second half of the 1960s. That great outpouring of 
civil energy in America, brilliant and sustained, has tended to block from view 
the decade before, which was marked by rising expectations and all-round cre-
ativity in many spheres, including universities, research, ideas, and government 
itself. State action did not carry the stigma it later acquired. The memory of World 
War II was still green, helping to maintain the potential for ambitious collective 
solutions. American society was on a highway somewhere between, on one hand, 
the war years with their sleeves-up common commitments, improvised plans, 
and governmental management of resources and population and, on the other 
hand, the emerging social movements, higher aspirations, and larger personalities 
breaking out in many quarters. It was the time of the civil rights movement and 
the time of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society. Both government and critics wanted 
to make a better world. Both believed that this was possible. In higher education 
there was the 1960 Master Plan in California. Something of the same optimism 
and faith in common and constructed solutions was evident in Europe and Brit-
ain—for example, in the 1963 Robbins Report, which called for a major expansion 
in British higher education.1 As Sheldon Rothblatt puts it, “the period was one in 
which the very idea of planning in itself was held in high esteem.”2
In his historical account of economic and social inequality, Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century (2014), Thomas Piketty shows that special circumstances 
after 1945 opened the way to greater social mobility and a larger role for social al-
location in higher education in the industrialized countries in the United States, 
1
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United Kingdom, Western Europe, and Japan. Before World War I, inherited 
wealth and capital incomes had retarded the potential for upward social mobility 
through work and education, especially in Europe and the United Kingdom but 
also in the United States. However, the world wars and the 1930s depression evacu-
ated many of the great fortunes, and this partial emptying out of the upper echelon 
of society provided more space for social mobility after 1945. Progressive income 
tax, capital taxes, and inheritance taxes, which had been used to mobilize resourc-
es for the war effort, continued into the postwar era, reducing intergenerational 
transfer and creating more room for the expansion of the middle class.3 The top tax 
rate was high and managers’ salaries were restrained. Until the 1970s, savings from 
labor were the main source of wealth, rather than capital incomes, which facili-
tated the spread of home ownership by what Piketty calls the “patrimonial middle 
class.” There was more room at the top and (partly because of that) more room in 
the middle of society, while the long thirty years of economic growth between 1945 
and 1975 further enlarged the scope for merit. This brought higher education into 
a more central place in American society. It was the pristine source of science and 
technology. It was the way of the future for families, the economy, and the nation. 
It was the great engine room of the growing middle class.
Nowhere in the world was higher education practiced on a larger scale and 
with more original thought and far-reaching innovation than in the fast growing 
state of California, which had moved to the front rank of American development. 
The central figure in the fashioning of higher education in California was Clark 
Kerr, chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley from 1952 to 1957 and 
president of the multicampus University of California from 1958 to 1967. Kerr was 
the principal architect of the 1960 Master Plan, the best known of all blueprints for 
system organization, one that helped to shape higher education across the country 
and across the world, and the author of perhaps the most influential book on mod-
ern research universities, The Uses of the University (2001/1963). Stories of individ-
uals can tell us much about history when those stories are at the heart of the time. 
Kerr’s life and work help to open up the motives and methods of the generation 
of postwar leaders that used public programs for the common good, establishing 
institutions of lasting value—institutions that were enabling and ennobling of a 
modern democratic community: the “city upon a hill,” as John F. Kennedy called it 
prior to his inauguration in 1961, when reflecting on the high potentials of public 
service.4
It is with the emblematic figure of Clark Kerr, whose work peaked in build-
ing the California Idea of higher education in the world, that The Dream Is Over 
begins.
5
Who was Clark Kerr (1911–2003), what did he accomplish, and what was in his 
mind that still survives? Kerr’s physical memorial is visible from Berkeley to San 
Diego, and his memory remains green. He was fortunate in his friends and col-
leagues. They consider themselves to be especially fortunate in him. Those who 
worked directly with Kerr repeatedly said, and continue to say, fine things about 
his personal and intellectual qualities. According to Sheldon Rothblatt, citing 
Matthew Arnold, Clark Kerr saw life clearly and saw it whole. He “read widely, 
was learned and had a wonderful capacity” to ask good questions and find the 
right answers.1 “His observations were compelling, and he spoke with clarity and 
direction in sentences often pithy.”2 For Christina Gonzalez, Kerr was “intensely 
interested in ideas.”3 Neil Smelser emphasizes his “ability always to grasp the big 
picture.” At the same time he was down-to-earth, his visions embedded “in the 
realities of social, political and economic life.”4 Kerr himself said that he was an 
“American pragmatist.”5
As a university president and then the head of the leading think tank on higher 
education, Clark Kerr never stopped being a social scientist. For Patricia Pelfrey, 
he had “a singular ability to look at mountains of information and discern patterns 
and trends where others saw only a jumble of unrelated facts and statistics”; and 
“he was a particularly acute observer of higher education.”6 He grasped the detail, 
but he was not a specialist. He saw the world whole and in its many parts at the 
same time. Kerr was a masterly synthesizer. Rothblatt remarks that although he 
“possessed the social scientist’s inclination to anticipate the future”7 and his so-
lutions tended towards the structural—he eschewed talk about the inspirational 
dimension of leadership—he was a humanist rather than a calculator, and he never 
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lost sight of human freedom. Thus like many social scientists that seek to under-
stand change in modern societies, Kerr was acutely aware of the structure/agency 
dilemma. While he could readily imagine the long trends and the forces of history, 
he found a place for agency within them.8 Prophetically, and rightly, Kerr forecast 
that within industrial societies, the scope for individualism and personal liberty 
would increase. As a leader he valued talented people and wanted them to be free 
to do whatever they could do.9 His own life showed that one person could achieve 
much when the conditions were right and the will was there.
In Clark Kerr’s time the dominant intellectual force in the practical social sci-
ences was John Maynard Keynes, whose General Theory of Employment Interest 
and Money (1936) argued that the state should induce economic growth by stim-
ulating aggregate demand, pointing the way out of the 1930s Depression. Kerr’s 
mode of thought recalls Keynes’s account of his method: “profound economic 
intuition and an unusual combination of keeping an open mind to the shifting 
picture of experience and of constantly applying to its interpretation the princi-
ples of formal thought.”10 In common with his teacher Alfred Marshall (who also 
influenced Kerr), Keynes used not just abstract reasoning but “trained common 
sense” to interrogate complex material, and he varied his interpretations to fit the 
context.11 Like Keynes, Kerr was big on common sense and contextual sensitiv-
ity, though in his case the intuition was that of a sociologically minded political 
scientist, not an economist. His method of achieving understanding was to apply 
his wide-ranging perception to the scene he was observing, to apply the principles 
of formal thought by posing contrasting poles of interpretation of those observa-
tions, and then find his way to a summary judgment that was mostly in the middle 
ground. The method was akin to the dialectical.
Rothblatt makes the telling comment that Kerr saw the world in terms of in-
betweens rather than absolutes.12 One example is his comment that the multiver-
sity was both public and private and something more.13 By moving beyond the 
dualism, without discarding it as an analytical tool, he could see things that the 
dualism alone would not have permitted him to see. He was an intellectual plural-
ist as well as a political pluralist. He wanted to encompass the complexity of the 
world rather than reduce it. Thus in his concept of the multiversity, multiplicity 
enables an inclusive, many-sided idea of the university. Likewise, while Kerr had 
beliefs and moral concerns, the simplifications of the ideologue were outside his 
frame of reference.
Kerr’s mode of leadership paralleled his in-between intellectual method. As Uni-
versity of California president and later as head of the Carnegie Commission, he led 
inclusively, by consensus. Drawing from his research in industrial relations and his 
own experience as a mediator in labor disputes,14 in the Godkin Lectures Kerr ar-
gued that mediation was the supreme function of leaders (note that the text reflects 
the male domination of both the lexicon and the university presidency in 1963).15
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The president in the multiversity is leader, educator, creator, initiator, wielder of pow-
er, pump; he is also office-holder, caretaker, inheritor, consensus-seeker, persuader, 
bottleneck. But he is mostly a mediator.16
Crucially, however, the role of the mediator was not to find the midpoint be-
tween the contending parties or reaffirm the status quo. Rather it was to find a 
higher level of synthetic agreement, a solution that contained everyone’s ideas or 
concerns and that all could endorse. This might be called transformative media-
tion. For Kerr, moving a plural group or institution to a higher level of agreement, 
and in doing so bringing the common enterprise forward, was a lifelong skill.17 
Arthur Levine, who worked with him at the Carnegie Commission, states that 
many times he saw Kerr perform “an almost magic trick”:
He would preside over a meeting in which there was a heated discussion with partici-
pants, saying black, white, red, blue and on through the rainbow. At some point, the 
conversation would wind down, and Clark would turn to the group and respond, “I 
think I heard you saying magenta.” The usual response was nodding of heads around 
the table.18
There was more to this than the capacity to see several moves ahead. Kerr knew 
that it was important that all parties not only own the solution but also share the 
common interest that it was designed to address. Everyone had a contribution 
to make, to something larger than themselves. He had been an active Quaker in 
his youth and took from that the belief that “there is that of good in every per-
son” (though he noted that this adage came under strain when he was a university 
leader).19
These ways of thinking and operating translated into an individual political 
style, based in keen and continuous observation, that was inclusive, responsive, 
and practical. One of Kerr’s methodological assets was a capacity to step back and 
analyze dispassionately events in which he himself was involved. Smelser calls this 
ability to secure distance, the attribute of the social scientist, Kerr’s “power of objec-
tification.”20 It rendered him a reliable witness when describing tumultuous events. 
Likewise, Kerr mistrusted slogans and symbolic political actions and instinctively 
rejected extremes. He supported the advance of liberty in the movements for racial 
and sexual equality and decolonization, and he saw higher education as “a great 
force in the liberation of the human spirit.”21 But he did not like the “aggressive 
politicization” of academic life. It disturbed both the tranquility of scholarship and 
“the public acceptance of academic institutions.”22 He believed, rather to his cost 
amid the student unrest of 1964, that any political problem, especially one in his 
immediate setting, could be addressed by negotiation and persuasion. However, as 
Neil Smelser points out, “these were years of ideological confrontation, not pursuit 
of practical interests.” Not everyone wanted to make peace.23
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CL ARK KERR AND POLITICS
At the levels of society and nation, Kerr’s political perspective was nuanced and 
moderate. Like almost everyone in his environment, he was a nationalist rather 
than a globalist, and he was a moderately spoken American exceptionalist. He 
shared the growing optimism of the 1950s and 1960s, the hopes that something 
special could be made in the United States and that its civilizing influence in the 
world was (or at least could be) benign. He was a patriot but not jingoistic. He was 
conscious of the dangers to freedom that lay in jingoism, as he famously showed 
in his liberal and conciliatory stance in the loyalty oath controversy. This helped 
bring him the Berkeley chancellorship24 and earned him the long-term suspicion 
and surveillance of the FBI. Kerr signed the loyalty oath and supported the Uni-
versity of California (UC) regents’ 1949 ban on the employment of Communist 
Party members. “I was totally opposed to communism—to its emphasis on to-
tal monopoly by one party over all political and economic life, and its reliance 
on force to assert its will.” At the same time he did not think that communism 
was a serious internal threat. As Berkeley chancellor and later as UC president, he 
“refused to act against alleged communists without full proof.”25
An in-between in politics and an in-between in his social vision, Kerr was an 
unabashed modernist. He saw industrialization as both transformative and inevi-
table, and technology as largely beneficial. He also placed markets at the center of 
the economy. Nevertheless, he had little faith in neoclassical theories about pure 
markets, as Rothblatt notes.26 He was a critical supporter of capitalism, which he 
saw in terms of in-between, as an amalgam of pluses and minuses. As a young 
man in the early 1930s Kerr railed against social injustice. He enrolled in a master’s 
degree program at Stanford to work for “a better social and economic and political 
order.”27 His 1939 doctoral dissertation focused on workers’ cooperatives for the 
unemployed in California during the Depression.28 In its subject matter, the work 
had something in common with John Steinbeck’s Pulitzer Prize–winning novel 
The Grapes of Wrath, about migrant workers in California, which was published in 
the same year. Kerr believed the world could be made a fairer and a kinder place, 
somewhere “in between free markets and a command economy.” For Kerr, gov-
ernment was a necessary part of the mix.29 He did not share the idea from public 
choice theory, published in 1962, the year before Kerr’s The Uses of the University, 
that politics necessarily turns on self-interest and that there is no such thing as the 
general welfare or social altruism distinct from private interests.30 Kerr was more 
high-minded. He saw the public good as more than the aggregation of private 
goods. “The university ought to remain a neutral agency devoted to the public wel-
fare, not private welfare,” he stated in 2001, meaning that the university was a com-
mon resource in which the private interest of one person or corporation should 
not be privileged over others.31 Likewise, he believed that much could be expected 
of government, though little could be assumed. The experience of the Depres-
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sion made him a Roosevelt New Dealer in politics and a Keynesian in economics. 
He respected Nordic social democracy. He advocated public planning though he 
knew that legislatures were not always reliable and governments could be over-
bearing, especially in relation to higher education. Universities had to hold to their 
missions, despite the tendency of government to know best and the seductions of-
fered by market interests.32 Kerr’s position will seem contrary for those for whom 
politics turns on an absolute polarity between market and state or for whom the 
state is absolutely subordinated to the freedom to trade in the market, but it was a 
classical liberal position, one shared by many in higher education today.
Transported into the present, it is likely that Kerr, the 1940s–1960s New Dealer, 
would be uneasy with today’s neoliberal eclipse of a broad-based notion of the 
public good, especially in economic policy and universal regulation on the basis of 
financial values. He would probably blanch at today’s level of economic inequality. 
One of his aphorisms was that while money was not the root of all evil, it was the 
root of some.33 He might also criticize military engagement in such theatres as Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Kerr had attended student peace conferences as a young man in 
the 1930s.34 Later he opposed the American intervention in Vietnam: “a bad war 
for Americans to be in.” He became national chair of the Committee for a Politi-
cal Settlement in Vietnam, which he described as “an antiwar but pro-American 
group.”35 Yet at one stage Lyndon Johnson had Kerr under consideration for the 
posts of American ambassador to South Vietnam and director of the CIA, so com-
pelling were his credentials.36 There were also firm offers of cabinet posts. When 
President Kennedy took office in 1960 he asked Clark Kerr to serve as secretary for 
labor. “I was then involved in working out the Master Plan for Higher Education 
in California and starting three new campuses, and so I declined,” stated Kerr.37 In 
early December 1964, during a meeting of the president’s Labor-Management 
Advisory Committee, Johnson asked Kerr to take the position of secretary for 
health, education and welfare. “You’ll have more money to work with than anyone 
else has had in American history,” said the president. To Johnson’s surprise and 
annoyance, Kerr, in the throes of the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, said he 
would have to think about it. Again, the time was not right to walk away. Mean-
while, reports Seth Rosenfeld in his 2012 book, Subversives, the president asked FBI 
head J. Edgar Hoover to conduct a routine background check of Kerr’s character, 
associates, and loyalty. Hoover, who had long been gunning for Kerr, produced a 
misleading report, recycling old charges against the University of California presi-
dent, allegations the FBI itself had dismissed. Kerr decided to stay in California. Si-
multaneously, Johnson withdrew the offer.38 Kerr was never again offered a cabinet 
post in a Democratic administration. There was no prospect of such an offer under 
the subsequent Republican administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.
Kerr was too in-between for Hoover. He was also too in-between for Ronald 
Reagan, who took office as governor of California at the beginning of 1967 and 
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unlike Kerr advocated the forcible repression of student activism.39 Reagan coop-
erated closely with Hoover. On 19 January 1967 the newly elected Governor Rea-
gan instigated Clark Kerr’s dismissal as university president by the UC regents. 
Within hours Kerr moved his constructive energies to the Carnegie Commission 
on Higher Education, followed by the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in High-
er Education, as chair and director (1967–1980). At Carnegie the influence of the 
author of The Uses of the University and the leader of the California Master Plan 
was amplified on the national stage. Kerr moved seamlessly from speaking on be-
half of a campus, a multicampus system, and higher education in a state to speak-
ing “to the enterprise as a whole.”40 Research at Carnegie underpinned the start of 
the Pell Grant scheme for needy students in 1972, the main federal contribution 
to equality of opportunity.41 In its annual roundup of American leaders in selected 
fields of endeavor, U.S. News and World Report chose Kerr as the most influential 
leader in education in 1974, 1975, and 1976. The American Council on Education 
named him as the first recipient of its Annual Award for Outstanding Lifetime 
Contributions to American Higher Education in 1980.42
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Arthur Levine states that Kerr’s achievement was fourfold. He modernized the 
public research university, managing the transition from the modest-sized uni-
versity typical of the pre–Second World War period to a much larger institution 
that sustained its commitment to high quality and maintained its social status. He 
cloned that public university successfully within the University of California. He 
grounded its social rationale and organizational form in the concept of the “multi-
versity.” And he located this within a larger system of higher education,1 based on 
the principles of social equality of opportunity and a managed division of labor, 
through the 1960 California Master Plan for Higher Education. This comes close 
to it. Kerr led the building of the high science-research university, the building 
of a networked system of such universities, and the building of a larger higher 
education system in a state that was one of the world’s ten largest economies. He 
did this both discursively and in bricks and mortar at a key phase in the evolution 
of higher education, and at the highest level, and the structures and activities that 
were established and clearly explained by Kerr became known everywhere that 
higher education is practiced.
This double achievement, in the world of ideas and the practical world, is what 
the social sciences have been designed to do. The tools of social science, its criti-
cal imagination, were fashioned in the later nineteenth century as an adjunct of 
government programs for the purposes of modernization and improvement. The 
subject matter of the social sciences is human society, but joined to power the so-
cial sciences also help to form human society. At the same time higher education 
and research are among the makers of society in more ways than this: through 
sciences, medicine, and culture, through engineering and technology, through 
3
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business studies, and through teaching of government. Few social scientists have 
enjoyed Kerr’s opportunity. He worked at a time when there was a broad consen-
sus about public planning, an unusual excitement about the expansion of educa-
tional opportunity, an optimism about institution building in higher education, 
and a willingness to fund it. It must also be said that Kerr and his contemporaries 
used to great effect the window of opportunity that they had.
The American research university first emerged in the forty years prior to 
World War I and came to dominate higher education and knowledge in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. The 1960s, when the 
institutional forms of the American research university were reset on a larger 
scale and at a higher level of social, economic, and cultural potency, were the 
“golden age” of the American institution. These were the Kerr years.2 According 
to Jonathan Cole in The Great American University (2009), Kerr “made the most 
significant advance in the idea of the American university”3 in his long lifetime. 
Like Wilhelm von Humboldt, who conceived the research university in terms of 
the freedoms to teach and to know, Kerr built institutions as well as ideas. Like 
J. H. Newman’s notion of teaching dedicated to knowledge rather than individual 
or social utility, Kerr’s idea of the institution has proven especially compelling.4 
Though Kerr’s multiversity is less high-minded than Newman’s “idea of a univer-
sity,” the multiversity is more realistically grounded and has become much more 
widely achieved.
Yet Kerr’s historical importance is more than just a catalogue of his individual 
effects on the environment. To render his achievements solely as an outgrowth 
of his biography, let alone his personality, would be to understate and decontex-
tualize his contribution. The Clark Kerr story is part of a larger story with a long 
history. The Kerr legacy is the emblematic figure in what can be called the “Cali-
fornian Idea of higher education.” This has older roots and embodies a particular 
approach to public system and public institution. The California Idea combines 
excellence with access and equality of opportunity in the service of state, society, 
and economy through the device of a managed division of labor between institu-
tions, with missions both comprehensive within their own frames and distinct 
from each other. Here the “public” character of the California Idea seemed natu-
ral to Kerr and his contemporaries, even to many working in private universities, 
though “public” is more problematic to some today. In the multiversity and the 
Master Plan, it was taken for granted that higher education served private inter-
ests. That in itself was not in conflict with the public idea of higher education 
and with the neutrality of the public multiversity. Private goods were contained 
inside the idea as it was manifest, on the basis that, to the extent possible, each 
person would pursue those goods without prejudice to the interests of others. 
Market forces operated, but “within carefully designed legal parameters.”5 It was 
also the task of the public higher education institutions, and the system managers, 
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to ensure that as many citizens as possible would benefit, directly and indirectly, 
within the common weal.
The California Idea of higher education took its mature form in Kerr’s time as a 
set of norms, structures, and practices within an enabling public order. It was also 
expressed in and supported by a clear-minded scholarship of higher education to 
which Kerr was a leading contributor. All of these elements—norms, policies, in-
stitutional forms and behaviors, and scholarship of higher education—supported 
each other and made manifest the wider effects of the California Idea of higher 
education within and beyond the United States. Since World War II the California 
Idea of higher education has been much more influential than any other. Mature 
national systems are still drawing closer to the practical forms and animating spirit 
of the California Idea, especially the California forms of research organization, its 
research freedoms, and the enterprising California university executive. Emerging 
higher education systems tend to bear the stamp of the California Idea, and the 
similarities are reinforced by university rankings. Though the multiversity is more 
than fifty years old, Kerr’s description still rings true in most respects, particularly 
for university presidents when they contemplate their tasks.
At the same time, the California Idea has now been articulated through a wide 
range of other policy cultures and educational traditions. While it has promoted 
a convergence in higher education and in science across the world, the outcome 
has not been universal homogeneity. Notions of “public,” “excellence,” and “equal-
ity of opportunity” are open to interpretation. System designs vary, even more 
than institutions. The flow of time has also lapped at the base of the California 
Idea. Its position in California has been eroded, as will be discussed. Its norms are 
now partly in question. It seems too difficult to provide access and excellence on 
a common public basis. The system falters. The public multiversity in California 
is travelling less well than it did. The Tier 1 private multiversities are doing better 
and threaten to overhang public excellence at the top. At the bottom of the system 
that manifests the California Idea, the promise of inclusion and social mobility has 
frayed. Yet the imagined alternative idea of higher education, that of the universal 
higher education market, ticks fewer boxes. Nothing as large and compelling has 
replaced the California Idea of higher education as a way of combining elite and 
mass higher education, while meeting multiple social and economic goals in a 
transparent manner.
THE 1960 MASTER PL AN
Clark Kerr’s in-betweenism and his instincts for inclusion and for transformative 
consensus were all at play in the preparation of the 1960 California Master Plan for 
Higher Education. While many people had their hands on the Master Plan, Kerr 
is generally seen as its principal architect. Patrick Callan observed, “He was the 
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instigator, framer, principal negotiator and advocate, and public face of the Master 
Plan.” The successful bill for the preparation of a Master Plan was proposed in 
1959 by Assemblywoman Dorothy Donahoe at Kerr’s suggestion.6 The conditions 
for a plan were clear enough: there was a growth crisis in California; there was 
unregulated sprawl and competition between sectors of education, with no clear 
division of labor; and the state had money. The question was, whose plan? As John 
Douglass puts it in The California Idea and American Higher Education, from the 
beginning Kerr “realized that the University needed to take the lead in building 
a consensus, particularly if the University wanted to maintain its unique role in 
the tripartite system.”7 The eight months of discussions over the California Master 
Plan were intense and difficult. The Plan was not so much a system blueprint as a 
hard-negotiated bargain between contending parties, on two fronts. But it was not 
a quick fix. It was designed to set a system in place for at least two decades, and it 
lasted longer.
First, the Master Plan was a bargain between the University of California and 
the well-organized state colleges, which wanted to become a second fully fledged 
university system (and later became the California State University). One of the 
origins of the plan lay in Kerr’s judgment that the political pork-barreling of new 
college campuses and the potential for academic drift, with the colleges demanding 
growing funding for research, posed clear long-term dangers to the UC position.
The strategy of the University was clear. Our three new campuses . . . along with the 
expansion of programs at Davis, Santa Barbara, and Riverside, were adequate to fill 
an anticipated void in facilities for training PhDs and conducting research and in the 
political map of fast-growing population areas without a UC campus. We did not 
want to share resources with sixteen additional “university” campuses (the twelve es-
tablished state colleges and four more then being developed) who would then claim 
lower teaching loads for their faculties and higher research subsidies at greater cost. 
And we did not want to watch the state colleges abandon their highly important skill 
training functions for teachers in the hot pursuit of the holy grail of elite research 
status. The state did not need a higher education system where every component was 
intent on being another Harvard or Berkeley or Stanford. An upward drift was desir-
able in quality but in the direction of several models. What we needed were three 
improved models—the open-access model, the polytechnic model, and the research 
university model. If the state colleges “went university,” some new colleges would 
have to be founded to serve the polytechnic role.8
In the outcome, though the colleges gained coherence and autonomy as a sec-
tor, they were unable to secure the research role and doctoral degrees that they 
wanted. California already had 9 percent of the nation’s population but 15 percent 
of its elite research universities, argued Kerr.9 It did not need more research uni-
versities. Kerr worked hard to ensure the University of California would protect its 
near monopoly of research, holding his nerve as the matter went down to the wire.
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Second, the Master Plan was a bargain between higher education on one side 
and the legislature and governor on the other that reduced the state’s role in deci-
sion making about postsecondary provision. It ended “the open market approach 
of lawmakers and local communities towards creating new campuses,” as John 
Douglass puts it.10 The state allowed its budget to be tied down for the long term, 
with its management left in the hands of the University regents and their state col-
lege counterparts. Why did the state of California agree to close off its fiscal and 
political options? The larger answer lies in the Californian and national political 
cultures.
The Master Plan was in continuity with the older tradition of what Douglass 
calls “the California Idea.” The California Idea derived from the California Pro-
gressives, a middle-class political reform movement that aimed to reshape Cali-
fornia at the end of the previous century. The Progressives believed that education 
would usher in “a modern and scientifically advanced society” and that all high 
school graduates should have the opportunity for postsecondary training. They 
argued that the state should progressively expand the number of public higher ed-
ucation institutions, especially in emerging population centers. Progressive think-
ing was in the van in the first two decades of the twentieth century, coinciding with 
the evolution of the University of California under President Benjamin Wheeler. 
Wheeler secured a major increase in public funding and positioned the University, 
in Douglass’s words, “as a great engine of equality and prosperity for the state.”11 
He was much assisted by the structure created in the state constitution of 1879, 
which gave legal status to the University and the board of regents, removing both 
from direct political interference. By 1920 the University of California consisted of 
two campuses—UC Los Angeles was managed by a provost who reported to the 
president at Berkeley—and two research stations. There was also a large system 
of public junior colleges and the teachers’ colleges. The Progressive educational 
spirit in California dipped in the Depression years but began to gather a new and 
stronger momentum in the decade after World War II.
THE MERITO CR ATIC 1960S
In the period from the 1950s to 1970s the United States came closer to becoming 
a meritocratic nation than at any other time before or since. Merit was generally 
understood to mean talent plus hard work. Thomas Piketty states that: “During the 
decades that followed World War II, inherited wealth lost much of its importance, 
and for the first time in history, perhaps, work and study became the surest routes 
to the top.”12 It was widely, though not universally, agreed that the fairest and best 
means of sorting the continuing competition for social position and success were 
higher education and the nexus between education and professional occupations. 
Though the idea of society organized as an educational meritocracy was utopian, 
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because there were widespread opportunities at this time, especially in California, 
the notion of meritocracy seemed credible and it stimulated new thinking. Merit 
became the springboard for the two narratives that still in one form or another 
shape expectations of higher education all over the world: education as human 
capital, as economic progress, and education as equality of opportunity, as social 
justice. Human capital theory and equal opportunity: these are the foundational 
myths of modern higher education systems. There are tensions between invest-
ment in human capital theory, which presupposes a selective system grounded in 
value to employers, and universal opportunity. Yet each myth is essential to the 
meritocratic ideal.
Piketty notes that Gary Becker’s (1964) influential mathematization of human 
capital theory is permeated by the belief that capital, other than human capital, has 
lost its determining importance.13 Human capital theory imagined that when stu-
dents acquired the right educated attributes, the embodied productivity required 
by graduate employers, salary and success would automatically follow. The implica-
tion was that providing graduates were “employable,” there was no end to the social 
wealth that education could generate by this mechanism, until saturation educa-
tional participation was reached. This notion of an open supply-driven potential 
for economic growth and enrichment, personal and social, rendered economically 
rational each additional student place. Thus each foundational myth, human capi-
tal and equality of opportunity, was needed by the other, and each also positioned 
higher education, especially the university, at the very center of human affairs. Each 
told the public that higher education had a great role in making a just and efficient 
society in which merit conquers all. Human capital theory made education respon-
sible not just for personal development but for universal career success and collec-
tive economic growth. Equal opportunity had solved the problem of democracy, 
it seemed. Yet in reality higher education, in California or anywhere, was far from 
being this powerful. It did not determine future society. It had little control over the 
economic and social settings that constituted its possibilities and limits.
The meritocratic vision of equity and economy advancing together was irresist-
ible to educational leaders. It promised them legitimacy, though at the price of 
future burdens. It was equally saleable in government and the public space. The 
two meritocratic paradigms quickly colonized the policy world. The social science 
research programs that were mobilized to support educational reform focused on 
widening equal opportunity and the barriers (particularly the financial barriers) to 
equality, on the private and social returns to higher education, and on smoothing 
the passage between the heterogeneous zones of education and work. Nor was the 
meritocratic vision threatening to the already rich and successful. For them hu-
man capital acquired on the basis of equal opportunity, floating free of other forms 
of capital, implied that those with social advantages succeeded not because of their 
birth and connections but because of their abilities and powers of application.14 
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In this curious backhand way, human capital theory modernized (“meritified”) 
privilege and made progressive educational leaders complicit in the maintenance 
of privilege and its barriers to equality, though their own normative commitment 
was to equality of opportunity.
GROW TH AND AC CESS
Meanwhile, however, the rising tide was lifting all boats. Tensions between privi-
lege and opportunity could be safely postponed. Nor was there much debate about 
the need for a public presence in higher education. Increasingly, state and federal 
intervention and investment were not just legitimate, but they were expected, and 
the national importance of education and research was magnified when they were 
drawn into the center of Cold War strategy. The 1957 Soviet Sputnik, the first satel-
lite launched into space, followed by the first cosmonaut, Yuri Gagarin, in 1962, 
stimulated American competitiveness and pushed science and universities up the 
policy agenda.
Hanna Holborn Gray argues that for Clark Kerr the sixties were a time of “great 
possibility” in which several factors came together—“generous federal funding, ex-
panded access to higher education, and general prosperity”—creating conditions 
that favored change, innovation, and experimentation.15 More urgently, growth in 
higher education was a problem to be solved.16 Participation was moving from 
mass access towards universal access for high school graduates. In California 
demographic growth was driving additional demand for higher education on 
an unprecedented scale, with 300,000 immigrants entering the state each year. 
In these circumstances a well-documented plan for higher education, promising 
shared opportunities in the national interest, had strong appeal. State politicians 
had much to gain by aligning themselves to the Master Plan and nothing to gain by 
opposing it. Kerr notes that California governor Pat Brown took little active part in 
the early evolution of the Plan but “later became an ardent supporter.” Perhaps his 
main contribution was to tell the negotiating parties, at a crucial moment, that if 
they could not agree on a plan, the state would make one for them. This interven-
tion achieved its objective, catalyzing movement to a solution. Eventually, Brown 
claimed responsibility for the Master Plan. He came to consider it as “one of the 
greatest accomplishments of his term as governor.”17
In 1960, 45 percent of California’s college-age population matriculated to a 
higher education institution. At that time the national average was about 25 per-
cent. The Master Plan promised to keep California ahead of the country. The Plan 
endorsed the continued growth of participation in response to economic need and 
popular demand, which were conflated. It proposed a tripling of the enrollment by 
1975. More grandly, it held out the heady prospect of the equalization of opportu-
nity and removal of access barriers. The Plan promised a place in college for every 
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high school graduate and all other persons qualified to attend. The promise of ac-
cess to all those qualified to enter is now a policy commonplace in many countries. 
Its significance in 1960 should not be lost. The Master Plan in California was the 
great exemplar that pioneered it for everywhere else. Kerr and his colleagues were 
trusted by the state and public because, as Patrick Callan states,
they advanced institutional aspirations in the context of a common policy goal: the 
commitment that every Californian high school graduate who was able to benefit 
from college could attend a college or university. California became the first state or, 
indeed, governmental entity to establish this principle of universal access as public 
policy.18
The Master Plan constituted a major innovation in social as well as educational 
policy. It also had long-term economic implications for California. However, while 
universal access was normatively compelling, in fiscal terms it was not as lavish as 
it might appear at first sight. For the first fifteen years the Master Plan promised to 
save money by shifting part of the expected growth from four-year to two-year in-
stitutions.19 Community colleges were to be established within commuting distance 
of almost every resident in the state, but this was less expensive than new research 
universities. In the outcome, the maintenance of a firm division of labor between re-
search universities, the state colleges, and two-year community colleges was to be as 
definitive of the California Master Plan as was the expansion of social access overall.
The elite, research-intensive University of California recruited from the top 12.5 
percent of the school graduate cohort. Thus the UC secured its role as “excellent” 
by guaranteeing the quality of its incoming students and concentrating the public 
investment in research. The UC was separated from the volume-building commu-
nity colleges by the Master Plan’s middle sector, the state colleges, that recruited 
from the top 33.3 percent of school graduates. The colleges were located more on 
the mass than the elite side of the system because their potential for research and 
doctoral training was truncated. This firm downward segmentation of opportu-
nity—with highly selective doctoral universities and the firm barriers to academic 
drift in both the two-year and the other four-year institutions—was to be leavened 
by guaranteed upward transfers between the sectors. Given that most enrollments 
were to be located in the bottom tier, if the Master Plan was to sustain and expand 
equality of opportunity, much depended on the transfer function and on the ca-
pacity of the school system to adequately prepare students from all districts and all 
social and ethnic backgrounds.
THE PUBLIC MISSION
The Master Plan for Higher Education in California was quintessentially public in 
its commitment to universal access and in its systemic character, in the organizing 
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of three subsectors on the basis of a division of labor. It embodied the idea of higher 
education as more than a collection of individual institutions; rather, these were 
interdependent institutions operating within the framework of common public 
structures and with a commitment to a single set of ideas. Institutions, and within 
them individual schools and research groups, competed with each other but within 
structured limits. The constrained missions and the formal cooperation between 
sectors were a major departure from the idea of university as stand-alone firm that 
was influential then in the private sector and is more dominant in all thinking about 
higher education today. The Plan also sustained the long-term autonomy of higher 
education in a highly politicized state. It meant that, provided all sectors kept to the 
rules, higher education could more or less regulate itself. The constituent campuses 
of the University of California were protected by the Office of the President from 
the direct interference that plagued public universities in other states. Legally, the 
UC campuses were not owned by the state government or the people of California, 
but by the regents. It was a formal independence highly unusual in the univer-
sity world, though the funding relationship with the state underpinned continuing 
ties.20 The state colleges, later the California State University, were likewise sus-
tained by a new board of trustees, which also ensured that they no longer engaged 
in unrestrained competition with each other. Instead of an overarching governing 
board, there was a low-key coordinating council to ensure cooperation between 
the sectors. Their autonomy did not necessarily contradict the public character of 
the Master Plan. Higher education in California was positioned as a kind of public 
civil society, universal but separate from government. The public connectivity of 
the institutions was sustained through both their relations with their boards and 
their direct dealings with the world, but they could choose the ways in which they 
would be socially responsive. This was a different kind of “public” to that of state 
government administration: democratic in purpose, access, and transparency and 
in the sheer range of its social engagements, while closed to electoral contest or 
political capture.
At the same time, institutions could not retreat too far from the public sphere. 
The trust inherent in the Master Plan rested on their capacity to effectively identify 
and meet emerging public needs on a voluntary basis, to listen to vocal groups, 
and to continually persuade them that higher education for all was a high priority 
of the state. In this gift economy, what the higher education institutions offered to 
the public, jointly and severally, was the gifts of mass education, meritocracy, and 
discovery. The two-year colleges provided an open door to all comers, undertak-
ing to provide for the common literacy of California as well as its social opportuni-
ties. The elite UC campuses were committed to providing scientific infrastructure, 
general disciplinary education, and professional training at the highest possible 
level—vast missions. In public production there is no natural limit to the volume 
and quality of outputs. There are merely opportunity costs when, within a bundle 
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of finite resources, one course of action is chosen over another. There are also 
limits to the imagination, but this is less of a constraint in research universities in 
which there is scope for bright people to take decentralized initiatives. In return 
the UC campuses gained the freedom to accumulate resources and local, national, 
and global power on a secure basis, providing the public subsidies continued to 
flow. In charge of their own destiny, they could become institutionally distinctive 
and creative. This structure freed the multiversity to do public good and to be itself 
while holding it at the pinnacle of the system.
Though the Master Plan now has its problems, as will shortly be discussed, its 
stability has been impressive. In a state in which both demographics and the politi-
cal economy have transformed fundamentally since 1960, perhaps it has been too 
stable. There have been few structural changes. In 1967 a state board of governors 
for community colleges was created, completing the set of sectoral boards. In 1973 
the modest common coordinating board became the California Postsecondary 
Education Commission. This was abandoned under fiscal pressure in 2011. The 
State University gained sole authority to offer doctoral degrees in education in 
2005. Meanwhile the fame of the Master Plan spread across the world. In 1963 the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) urged mem-
ber nations to adopt “development plans of the California type.” Two and a half 
decades later, in 1989, the OECD said the Master Plan was “recognized throughout 
the OECD world as a blueprint for preserving universal postsecondary education 
opportunity, while preserving the separate “missions” of the three types of pub-
lic institutions.”21 After more than half a century, it is still the formal frame for 
public higher education in California, though its resource base and its promise of 
universal access look very different than they did in 1960.
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Three years after the Master Plan, Clark Kerr put the seal on his understanding of 
the multiversity, in the Godkin Lectures at Harvard on 23–25 April 1963. The three 
lectures were published by Harvard University Press as The Uses of the University 
later the same year. Kerr added more chapters in successive editions of the book, 
until the fifth and final version in 2001,1 issued two years before his death. He re-
tained the original three lectures. Kerr spoke and wrote much during the course of 
his career, but it is to these three lectures above all that he owes his influence and 
reputation as a scholar of higher education. They are unparalleled in clarity of ex-
position and insight into modern higher education, especially the comprehensive 
American research university. Kerr was wholly familiar with the 1950s transition 
to large megauniversities, when quantitative growth transformed into a Hegelian 
change in quality, because it happened in front of his eyes during his own career, 
and he became responsible for its ordering. The multiversity described by Kerr 
still stands, the most visible and lasting component of the California Idea of higher 
education.
Kerr’s prose is not as transcendent as J. H. Newman’s in The Idea of a Univer-
sity.2 Newman’s writing is quite extraordinary. Among the major authors on the 
university, Newman brings the reader closest to the subtle, almost indefinable 
processes of teaching and learning, and his polemic is deeply persuasive, draw-
ing us to an archaic and unrealistic ideal. Newman refuses the role of research 
in universities, determinedly turns his back on Francis Bacon’s practical knowl-
edge, and dismisses the whole idea of learning for vocation. It is another world 
from this, but it is a world as beautiful as truth and the reader is carried with it. 
Kerr reaches into our minds in another way. He uses spare and simple prose, a 
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panoramic vision across the sector, and a pellucid clarity and realism in analy-
sis. Not a philosopher like Newman, he is a humanistic social scientist: at home 
with numbers but not ruled by them, lifting us to a medium height with language 
without losing his anchor in the material world. The observations are immediate, 
plausible, and witty. They make one’s own experience more clear to oneself. The 
lectures also create a larger reflexivity. They open higher education to a more ef-
fective public scrutiny and trigger discussion about institutional form, feeding the 
evolution of all institutions.
“A CIT Y OF INFINITE VARIET Y ”
Though it is often assumed that Kerr was describing the Berkeley campus, he had 
Harvard at least as much in mind.3 The lectures are nevertheless general to the 
large American research universities. The first Godkin Lecture provides a history 
of ideas of the university and reflects on the evolution of the American institution 
with its twin nineteenth-century foundations: the land grant movement and the 
research and graduate university that began at Johns Hopkins. It traces the passage 
of the university from the pristine world of J. H. Newman to the comprehensive 
research institution devoted to mass higher education:
The “Idea of a University” was a village with its priests. The “Idea of a Modern Uni-
versity” was a town—a one-industry town—with its intellectual oligarchy. “The Idea 
of a Multiversity” is a city of infinite variety. Some get lost in the city; some rise to 
the top within it; most fashion their lives within one of its many subcultures. There 
is less of a sense of community than in the village but also less of a sense of confine-
ment. There is less sense of purpose than within the town but there are more ways to 
excel. There are also more retreats of anonymity—both for the creative person and 
the drifter. As against the village and the town, the “city” is more like the totality of 
civilization as it has evolved and more an integral part of it; and movement to and 
from the surrounding society has been greatly accelerated. As in a city, there are 
many separate endeavors under a single rule of law.
The students in the “city” are older, more likely to be married, more vocationally 
oriented, more drawn from all classes and races than the students in the village; and 
they find themselves in a most intensely competitive atmosphere. They identify less 
with the total community and more with its subgroups.4
“A city of infinite variety.” In the easy rhythm of this beautiful passage, much of 
Clark Kerr’s sensibility is contained. We feel the power of a plain poetry, nestled 
within prose as simple as a Mozart sonata, that holds our loyalty to practical vi-
sions and ends. We see the deftness and directness and the common sense fluency 
of his thought. Here Kerr’s historical phases and sociological categories have given 
way to a more human story, in which his empathy of feeling is punctuated by 
moments of sharp-eyed realism. Actors from everywhere throng the multiversity, 
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moving through its glow, striving and retreating by turns. Kerr’s deep emotional 
engagement with the university is apparent. For the whole of his life, this institu-
tion sparked his curiosity and energy. It was the place where he found his full 
voice, and it was the object of his service, and of his love, for like others before and 
since, he found in the university a space of freedom. There is also a hint of that 
utopianism that Gray sees as an essential component of Kerr.5 Perhaps utopianism 
was always part of the 1960s, looking up at the shining city on a hill.6 It was cer-
tainly part of the Master Plan.
It may be that Kerr’s rich picture renders the multiversity more attractive than 
he intends, but the burdens of executive coordination, strategy, and identity are 
also apparent. As Smelser puts it, the multiversity is not only larger but has many 
more “moving parts.”7 The multiversity acquires ever more “accretions,” the prod-
uct of new opportunities and new problems, yet when conditions change it cannot 
rid itself of those accretions.8 In the multiversity there is an irreducible plurality 
of communities, functions, disciplines, internal interests, external constituencies, 
agendas, and beliefs. The plurality, always threatening to pull in every direction, 
is somehow contained within an unspoken consensus about the common good 
of the multiversity. This consensus, this residual harmony, never explicitly stated 
but sensed instinctively by all, is almost the defining feature of Kerr’s institution. 
Certainly it is essential. It was to be interrupted by the radical student movement, 
beginning with the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in 1964. Kerr never really 
understood this. But the multiversity outlasted the student movement.
The lecture also reflects on the changing character of faculty life, with the 
growth of administrative functions and external consultancy; on problems of 
governance (Kerr’s thoughts about faculty and governance develop further in the 
third lecture); and on the different styles of presidential leadership in universities, 
culminating in the president as mediator. The lecture is notable for the frank and 
self-deprecating humor with which the multiple roles of multiversity president are 
introduced:
It is sometimes said that the American multiversity president is a two-faced charac-
ter. That is not so. If he were, he could not survive. He is a many-faced character, in 
the sense that he must face in many directions at once while contriving to turn his 
back on no important group. . . .
The university president in the United States is expected to be a friend of the 
students, a colleague of the faculty, a good fellow with the alumni, a sound adminis-
trator with the trustees, a good speaker with the public, an astute bargainer with the 
foundations and the federal agencies, a politician with the state legislature, a friend 
of industry, labor, and agriculture, a persuasive diplomat with donors, a champion 
of education generally, a supporter of the professions (particularly of law and medi-
cine), a spokesman to the press, a scholar in his own right, a public servant at the 
state and national levels, a devotee of opera and football equally, a decent human 
being, a good husband and father, an active member of a church. Above all he must 
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enjoy travelling in airplanes, eating his meals in public, and attending public ceremo-
nies. No one can be all of these things. Some succeed at being none.
He should be firm, yet gentle; sensitive to others, insensitive to himself; look to 
the past and future, yet be firmly planted in the present; both visionary and sound; 
affable, yet reflective; know the value of a dollar and realize ideas cannot be bought; 
inspiring in his vision yet cautious in what he does; a man of principle yet able to 
make a deal; a man with a broad perspective who will follow the details conscien-
tiously; a good American but ready to criticize the status quo fearlessly; a seeker of 
truth where the truth may not hurt too much; a source of public policy pronounce-
ments when they do not reflect on his own institution. He should sound like a mouse 
at home and look like a lion abroad. . . . He is a marginal man but at the very center 
of the total process.9
Lecture 2 situates the multiversity in the American federal policy setting. The 
larger issue, with resonance in other national systems, is the impact of funded 
science on the plural institution. Research funding has created the “federal grant 
university,” though the research role is more concentrated than the land grant role. 
Direct relations between granting agencies and disciplines skew the balance be-
tween fields, resources are increasingly unequal, and disembedded faculty stars 
and research centers achieve an operational distance from the institution that is 
often frustrating for university presidents. Research functions and income have 
compromised the commitment to undergraduate teaching. These have become 
familiar issues.
Lecture 3 brings together the two sets of themes. The great shifts in higher edu-
cation have been the adoption of the principle of universal access and realization 
of the idea of progress through science. Expectations of the multiversity are rising. 
It is seen as the driver of economic growth and all-round solver of problems. It 
now includes all students, regardless of their social and economic background. 
The faculty are conservative and tend to resist, but the external factors driving 
change are irresistible: the growth of participation, the spread of credentialing to 
all professions and occupations, the university’s multiplying involvements in soci-
ety. Above all there is the increasing centrality of knowledge in human affairs. At 
the same time that “the knowledge industry” had become central to business and 
government, universities have become more like an industry themselves. Resourc-
es are becoming more concentrated in those units that produce useful knowl-
edge, stratifying the sector. Competition between universities has become intense. 
(Clark Kerr did not name it “academic capitalism,” as Sheila Slaughter and Larry 
Leslie were to do in 1997,10 but he described some of the signs.) There were three 
challenges ahead: to improve undergraduate instruction; to create a more unified 
intellectual world, with a relative strengthening of the humanities and social sci-
ences; and to “relate the administration more directly to faculty and students in 
the massive institution.”11 Those challenges still lie ahead.
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A THEORY OF THE UNIVERSIT Y
Clark Kerr’s grasp of what Smelser calls “the realities of social, political, and eco-
nomic life” is such that for the most part The Uses of the University still stands as a 
valid description of the research university, half a century after the lectures were 
delivered. A reflection on the present and never intended as a theory of the uni-
versity, it became one. Given the pace of change in higher education, this requires 
explanation.
In part Kerr’s argument has remained relevant because in California in 1963, 
most of the crucial features of today’s university were already in place, ahead of 
most of the rest of the world—such as mass higher education, large institutions, 
professional administration, the accretion of occupational degrees, corporate link-
ages, and the national government structuring of funded research. In part it has 
remained relevant because Kerr could see where things were going. In part it is 
because of Kerr’s method. He was strong at the level of generic concepts and syn-
theses, and he separated fact and value in the manner of Weber. He wrote as a 
social scientist, not as an actor within the politics of higher education with axes to 
grind, points to prove, and programs to protect. Again, he drew on that capacity 
to achieve critical distance from the things that mattered to him. Though the fact/
value separation is a fine methodological tool, it is never absolute. Explanation can 
be used to inform a range of normative projects, and Kerr’s observations, like those 
of all persons, were shaped by his values. One the strengths of critical distance, 
though, is the capacity to treat both facts and values as partly open systems. Kerr 
routinely took in new evidence and listened to new ideas, and he saw even some 
values as susceptible to evidence and change over time. One of the strengths of The 
Uses of the University is its air of curiosity and its openness to new explanations.
In the 1963 preface Kerr stated that his task was to uncover how the multiver-
sity worked and how it related to the environment in which it sat, not to preach 
one or another normative position on what the university should be. He saw the 
multiversity not as an ideal model but as a complex living institution with pluses 
and minuses. To his cost, amid a highly charged debate about the character of the 
university, given that he was a university president under attack from students on 
his own campus, others saw his notion of the multiversity as a defense of the status 
quo or an ideal institution to be achieved, as Newman’s Idea of a University had 
been. “Unfortunately many listeners or later readers thought that I had invented—
or was uncritically endorsing—the “multiversity” instead of merely describing the 
tremendous changes I had observed.”12 Kerr later said that with hindsight he would 
have been less frank, less the social scientist, more guarded in his commentary in 
the Godkin Lectures. “I paid a heavy price for being an honest and realistic com-
mentator.”13 We are fortunate that he did not have that hindsight, though we can 
sympathize with his predicament.
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None of us can control the way our words are used. Despite Kerr’s intention, 
the multiversity is read not only as an explanation or a commentary but as an 
ideal type, as the research university that emerging systems want to create. Ar-
guably, it is better that such normative propositions should be grounded in the 
empirical. Nevertheless, Kerr’s multiversity was also specific to his time and place, 
to the American research university in 1963, and it is impossible to translocate 
every sinew of that beast into other national systems. What is surprising is the 
extent to which Kerr’s conception of the multiversity does translocate. This is one 
sign of the Americanization of the sector that has occurred—not least because of 
Kerr’s masterly synthesis. It is, to say the least, ironic that Kerr’s realism, grounded 
in a conscious renunciation of the normative, fashioned a project that functions 
like that of Newman. Clark Kerr’s multiversity has become the principal imagined 
form of the research university across the world.
With hindsight, it is apparent that the Godkin Lectures were not perfect. They 
did not predict Silicon Valley, the Internet, and post-1990 communicative global-
ization, the spectacular advance of China in the economy and higher education, 
the offshoring of American manufacturing industry, or the collapse of Keynesian 
regulatory frameworks and the rise of neoliberal policy. However, Clark Kerr was 
not alone: no one else predicted these developments either. Perhaps the only ele-
ment that might have been better handled was Kerr’s account of the coherence of 
the multiversity.
Clark Kerr had an unquestionable grasp of what Smelser calls the “systemness” 
of the university—the manner in which it combined the disciplines and combined 
first degrees with extension and with graduate studies and research; the interre-
lationships between its many parts and its openness and connections to its envi-
ronment—just as he understood a multicampus network as a system and higher 
education as a system of different types of institutions. “By ‘system’ ,” says Smelser, 
“I mean an entity with identifiable but interrelated parts, such that changes in one 
part influence the other parts and the entity as a whole.”14 What then sustains the 
whole, beyond a myriad of bonds between one part and another? In the first God-
kin lecture Kerr remarks tellingly that “universities have a unique capacity for rid-
ing off in all directions and still staying in the same place.” He knew about the need 
for decentralized authority and successfully reformed the University of California 
so as to facilitate it,15 yet all within a “single rule of law.”16 In the 2001 edition of 
The Uses of the University, he notes that the integration of the multiversity into 
the outside world tends to trigger its disintegration within. Yet as noted, his argu-
ment also presupposes an unspoken consensus, the shared assumption that all 
within it want the multiversity to continue and flourish. All of this poses the ques-
tions, “what holds the multiversity together,” what is its institutional personality, 
given its several “animating principles”17 and many missions, interests, pressures, 
and inconsistencies? Kerr has various answers, mostly implicit. One answer, im-
plied by the absence of an explicit argument, is the postmodern answer: “nothing.” 
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Nothing holds the multiversity together. This would be consistent with Kerr’s 
trope of multiplicity, which again anticipates the postmodern sensibility. Another 
implied answer is “the university president,” the unspoken centripetal counter to 
the centrifugal tendency that almost defines the multiversity. An institution too 
varied to be held together by normative synergies at the least needs good manage-
ment.18 But Kerr makes no overriding claim for presidential coordination. There 
is even a hint the multiversity could function without it. A third answer is more 
explicit, the university’s “name”:
This means a great deal more than it sounds as though it might. The name of the 
institution stands for a certain standard of performance, a certain degree of respect, 
a certain historical legacy, a characteristic quality of spirit. This is of the utmost im-
portance to faculty, and to students, to the government agencies, and the industries 
with which the institution deals. Protection and enhancement of the prestige of the 
name are central to the multiversity. How good is its reputation . . . its “institutional 
character”?19
This is closer to the mark and begins to supplement the California Idea of high-
er education. Arguably, the multiversity is held together by its prestige and the 
desire to sustain it, which is more than the desire for revenues, for money is merely 
a means to a greater end. What matters is the social power of the multiversity and 
its visible manifestation as status. The mechanisms for reproducing institutional 
status are twofold and time-honored. They are selective student entry and research 
performance. These two mechanisms are heterogeneous but linked. Revenues 
from student tuition underpin stellar research performance. Research reputation 
helps to sustain the value of the university “name” that attracts high-scoring stu-
dents. (This symbiosis suggests another kind of “teaching-research nexus”, differ-
ing from that imagined by Wilhelm von Humboldt). All parties in the multiversity 
have an interest in the growth of institutional status through these two mecha-
nisms. Students want to gain access to selective institutions, and as graduates they 
stand to benefit from the multiversity’s name. Faculty want to work in high-status 
universities. Industry wants to follow the research strength as well as brand power. 
Donors want to back a winner. University presidents guard the institutional repu-
tation closely. Increasingly, since Kerr’s time, presidents focus on improving the 
university’s ranking, now the most visible sign of its prestige. In the third Godkin 
Lecture Kerr does note that “interuniversity rivalry” had become very intense, but 
this suggestive theme is not further explored.20 More than a lopsided competi-
tion for federal research grants, dominated by a few universities,21 was driving that 
rivalry. The motors of status competition were larger than Kerr saw, and they af-
fected not just the research universities but the whole higher education sector and 
all its students. The dynamics of status competition, interacting with and repro-
ducing social inequality, help to explain the failure of the Master Plan to achieve 
the promise of equality of opportunity, as will be discussed in part 3.
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The Uses of the University is one of three pathbreaking contributions to the com-
mon understanding of higher education by scholars working at the University of 
California in Clark Kerr’s time and the next generation. The second is an essay pre-
pared for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
by Martin Trow, Problems in the Transition from Elite to Mass Higher Education 
(1973). Trow was a sociologist who was founding director of the Center for Studies 
in Higher Education (CSHE) at Berkeley, a post he held from 1976 to 1988. In the 
expansion of participation, California was ahead of the curve, and like Kerr, Trow 
anticipates issues that arose later in many places. The argument is insightful and 
explanatory. It has influenced thinking in many countries. It is scarcely possible to 
overstate its impact.
Martin Trow focused on the growth of higher education. He argued that there 
was a “broad pattern of development of higher education” in “every advanced 
society,” manifest in three phases: elite higher education; mass higher education, 
where participation reached 15 percent or so of the age group; and universal sys-
tems, where participation exceeded 50 percent. In the transition between the three 
phases, higher education changed its character “in fundamental ways.”1 Access to 
higher education shifted from being a privilege in the elite phase to a right in the 
mass phase and then to an “obligation” in universal phase, when higher qualifica-
tions became mandatory for full and effective social engagement, and “failure to 
go on to higher education from secondary school is increasingly a mark of some 
defect of mind or character that has to be explained or justified or apologized for.”2 
Along the continuum, the main purpose of higher education shifted from “shap-
ing the mind and character of the ruling class” in the elite phase to preparing a 
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larger group in professional and technical skills in the mass phase, to preparing 
the whole population in “adaptability” to social and technological change in the 
universal phase.3 Trow’s three phases were Weberian ideal types.4 He used the cat-
egories elite, mass, and universal in two distinct ways. On one hand, he imagined 
them as separate historical stages in the evolution of higher education. On the 
other hand, he saw them as differing constellations of practice that existed along-
side each other in the present.
The three-part historical sequence recalls Clark Kerr’s passage from Newman’s 
university village to modern university town, to the multiversity as the city of 
infinite variety. However, whereas Kerr explained the research university alone, 
Trow considered the higher education system as a whole. Kerr’s multiversity was 
affected by growth and massification, but Trow’s system was defined by them. Us-
ing the three sequential phases, Trow develops prescient narratives about change 
in the sector. Student selection proceeds from the primary use of the criterion of 
academic merit in the elite phase to programs designed to create social equal-
ity of opportunity in the mass phase and then to open access in the universal 
phase, because “social inequalities show everywhere a stubbornly persistent effect 
on educational achievement.”5 In the elite phase, the student enters directly after 
school. In the mass phase, some students delay entry “until after a period of work 
or travel.” In the universal phase, “there is much postponement of entry” and pe-
riods of broken attendance, and vocational training and mixed work-study modes 
become a larger proportion of higher education. “The emphasis on ‘lifelong learn-
ing’ is compatible with a softening of the boundaries between formal education 
and other forms of life experience.”6 The curriculum moves from a “highly struc-
tured” program based on mandatory intellectual or professional requirements in 
the elite phase to a more flexible modular structure that facilitates choice in the 
mass phase, to the collapse of sequencing, structure, and assessment requirements 
in the universal phase, “where no single conception of higher education obtains.”7 
The pedagogical relationship between student and teacher moves from personal 
mentoring designed to shape individual development in the elite phase (for ex-
ample, in an Oxford college) to formal instruction in large classrooms in the mass 
phase, with emphasis on the transmission of skills and knowledge, to subordina-
tion of the student-teacher relationship in the universal phase as the student is 
exposed to “new or more sophisticated perspectives” such as correspondence pro-
grams, “video cassettes and TV’s,” the “computer and other technological aids.”8 
No doubt if Trow had been writing today he would have added Massive Open 
Online Coursework (MOOCs) to that list, but the forecast made more than forty 
years ago has not dated.
In the transition from elite to mass to universal higher education, institutions 
change. Elite systems “tend to be highly homogeneous.” The institutions are small 
and resemble each other, and they share strong notions of membership, clear 
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boundaries between institution and society, and (“at least in their meritocratic 
phase”) high standards. Mass systems are comprehensive and diverse in functions 
and standards, with institutions of up to 40,000 students in size and more fuzzy 
and permeable external boundaries. In the still more diverse systems of universal 
access, when the boundary between higher education and society is vanishing, 
“the very notion of standards is itself challenged and problematical.” Fragmented 
student populations of unlimited size have merely nominal connections. Students 
“do not in any sense comprise a community” united by frequent association, val-
ues or identity.9 Governance also changes. Elite institutions are run by small ho-
mogenous groups inside and outside the university. Part-time amateur academic 
leaders are served by a handful of administrative staff. In the mass phase, institu-
tions maintain an elite leadership but are increasingly affected by interest groups 
and democratic process inside and outside the sector. Academic administrators 
are full-time, and beneath them the university bureaucracy mushrooms. In the 
universal phase, financial managers and specialist services flourish, the diversity 
of functions and units drives standardization, and higher education becomes the 
property of the public media. Academic values and processes appear archaic and 
are habitually questioned.10
Having framed higher education in this linear narrative, Trow then desimplifies 
it. Movement from elite to mass to universal higher education “does not neces-
sarily mean that the forms and patterns of the prior phase or phases disappear 
or are transformed.” Each phase survives in some institutions and parts of oth-
ers, even as the system broadens its enrollment and functions. “In a mass system 
elite institutions may not only survive, but flourish; and elite functions continue 
to be performed within mass institutions.”11 A Master Plan–style division of la-
bor, in which expansion was centered on nonelite institutions, allowed the pristine 
environment of the elite public universities to be protected. They “defend their 
unique characteristics in the face of the growth and transformation of the system 
around them.” Nevertheless, Trow was concerned that elite universities were “not 
always successful” in doing so.12 Public agencies find it difficult to nuance regula-
tion for diverse structures and values and impose standard treatments in the name 
of equity. Anxiety about elite research-intensive universities in a mass-to-universal 
era is a repeated theme in Trow.13 He may have worried too much. Arguably, elite 
public universities like UC Berkeley came to face greater challenges from private 
competition and public defunding than they did from public intervention and 
from contamination by mass educational styles within. In the end, it was the mass 
and universal public institutions, especially the community colleges, whose social 
role came into greater question.
Martin Trow’s account of elite, mass, and universal, supported by its undertone 
of historical inevitability, offers a plausible framework for sorting higher educa-
tion systems and their trajectories. Though the real world does not always fit with 
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Trow’s three-phase schema—for example, elite universities often lead in modern-
ization reforms—the examples that he uses to illustrate elite, mass, and universal 
are pungent, locking into the common perception. Over the course of his career, 
Trow was ambivalent about the question of the universality of his account. In 
the 1973 essay, he firmly predicts that the American patterns will play out across 
Europe, the United Kingdom, and the “advanced industrialized” world,14 while 
providing little support for the claim. In a later essay, in 2000,15 he emphasizes the 
differences between American and European higher education and provides an 
exceptionalist reading of the American sector. But his argument has resonated as 
much outside the United States as within.
THE DRIVERS OF GROW TH
Nonetheless, the larger intellectual achievement of Trow’s 1973 essay lies not in 
his narrative of transition from elite to mass to universal, but in his explana-
tion of the social dynamics of the growth of participation in higher education. 
This explanation says much about the nature of modern society. Arguably, Trow’s 
sociological imagination better explains long-term patterns of educational par-
ticipation and the social character of higher education than the alternate explana-
tions of growth.
In Trow’s time, the main explanation of the relationship between higher edu-
cation and the economy was that provided by human capital theory, which was 
formulated by Jacob Mincer, Theodore Schultz, Gary Becker, and others in the 
decade prior to the 1973 essay. Human capital theory remains the dominant intel-
lectual framework in this domain. It is entrenched as the policy orthodoxy. It has 
sustained many thousands of empirical studies since the early 1960s.16 According 
to the orthodox narrative, the expansion of higher education is shaped by govern-
ment and/or market forces in response to the economic need for educated human 
capital. Higher education expands more or less in step with growing demands 
for graduate knowledge, skills, and certified professional competences. Economic 
demand for human capital is signaled in the labor markets by the wage returns to 
skill. Prospective students focus on graduate wages and employability, calculating 
the likely financial benefits. People, or governments on their behalf, invest in edu-
cation in terms of time, income forgone, and the cost of tuition to the point where 
the lifetime returns to degree holders equal the costs of investment. Economists 
note that higher education can lag behind economic need, overprovide graduates, 
oversupply places, and hype up qualification levels (“credentialism”). However, in 
the long run, believes the orthodox economist, higher education tends to equilib-
rium with economic demand. If there are too many graduates, the price of their 
labor falls and the expansion of higher education slows or reverses. If this does not 
happen, then the market is not clearing. There must be a blockage of some kind in 
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higher education or in government policy that prevents market signals from being 
followed.
Trow could have adopted the human capital orthodoxy, and at the time he 
might have been expected to do so. He did not. His picture of higher education is 
closer to the action, more documentary and less abstract. He notes that the service 
sector of the economy is expanding, triggering greater demand for graduates.17 
But this “economy pull” factor is not the main driver of educational growth. Social 
demand for education does not fluctuate in proportion to changes in employment 
or earnings. It is unquestionable that most families see higher education first in 
terms of future careers and that students want their degrees to facilitate pathways 
to work. The question at issue is whether education and the economy are con-
nected by a human capital logic. For Trow the motor that drives the rising demand 
for participation is not economic rates of return but family aspirations to main-
tain and improve social position. Families and students invest time and money in 
higher education to augment their position, as human capital theory suggests, but 
for the most part they do not know what the outcome will be. They know only that 
whatever the state of the labor market at the point of graduation, it is better to be 
a graduate than not.
This leads Trow to three insights. First, because there is no intrinsic limit to po-
sitional aspirations,18 there can be no limit to desires for social betterment through 
higher education and hence no ultimate limit to participation growth. It is not sub-
ject to economic scarcity. There will be “continued popular demand for an increase 
in the number of places in colleges and universities,” he states. “It seems to me 
very unlikely that any advanced industrial society can or will be able to stabilize 
the numbers.”19
Despite much loose talk about graduate unemployment or an oversupply of educated 
men, it is still clear that people who have gone on to higher education thereby in-
crease their chances for having more secure, more interesting, and better paid work 
throughout their lives. . . .
Growth and the movement from elite to mass higher education itself creates a set 
of social and psychological forces that tend to sustain it. As more and more people 
go to college or university, and as an even larger number become aware of it as a pos-
sible and reasonable aspiration for themselves and their children, higher education 
enters into the standard of living of growing sectors of the population. Sending one’s 
sons or daughters to college or university increasingly becomes one of the decencies 
of life rather than an extraordinary privilege reserved for people of high status or 
extraordinary ability. . . . But in addition, sending one’s sons and daughters to college 
or university is already, and will increasingly be, a symbol of rising social status. Not 
only does it give evidence of status mobility in the adult generation—in this respect 
resembling the purchase of a home in the country or an automobile—but it also lays 
the necessary foundation for the social mobility of a family across the generations.20
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Trow says that in the longer term graduate unemployment is not a problem 
because, as well as the expansion of services jobs, there is the “educational inflation 
of occupations.”21 Labor markets respond to changes in higher education, as well as 
vice versa. A growing number of occupations require degrees at the point of entry, 
and graduate jobs move down the occupational scale as the number of gradu-
ates expands, for employers take the best-qualified applicants on offer. Graduates 
tend to displace those without college, often using their educated capabilities to 
enrich the jobs. “What mass higher education does is to break the old rigid con-
nection between education and the occupational structure” that otherwise would 
prevent graduates from taking what were nongraduate jobs, states Trow. People 
with higher education can now “seek employment without loss of dignity wher-
ever the jobs may exist.”22 This explains why since Martin Trow’s time, in nearly all 
countries, participation has kept expanding despite the fact that graduates are no 
longer guaranteed professional employment and some face unemployment in the 
medium term. Participation growth falters only when the equation of costs and 
rewards—which include not just additional earnings but social status and per-
sonal pride—becomes so unfavorable as to erode the graduate premium, which is 
the advantage that graduates hold over nongraduates. This happens only for lower 
tier graduates in highly stratified higher education systems (though as will be dis-
cussed, it has now happened in California).
Though Trow and the economists are on separate tracks, his fellow sociologists 
and sociologically minded political scientists—who take into account elements 
such as the drive for status (as distinct from earnings), the impact of stratification 
in the labor market and higher education, and the fragmented structure of the 
labor market—are more likely to agree with him. For example, Trow’s understand-
ing of the loose fit between jobs and higher education is shared by other scholars 
familiar with both sides of the divide. Clark Kerr remarks that “there is . . . no pre-
cise way to relate rising job content to higher educational requirements,” and “the 
correlation between a higher education degree and a good job” has weakened.23 In 
an overview of four decades of research, Higher Education and the World of Work, 
published in 2009, leading European scholar of higher education Ulrich Teichler 
emphasizes that “a match between the number of graduates and the corresponding 
positions, or between the competences acquired during study and job require-
ments, cannot be expected.”24 There is perennial concern about “overeducation.” 
However, research shows that “most persons seemingly overqualified do not face 
major hardships on the labor market but acquire mostly a position only slight-
ly less than that they strive for.”25 Educational sociologist David Baker confirms 
Trow’s point that education shapes work, as well as vice versa: “The usual version 
of the human capital model considers the effects of education too literally and 
narrowly, thus missing the reciprocal transforming relationship between highly 
educated populations and the nature of work.”26
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Trow’s second insight, implied rather than stated, is that in the long run govern-
ment policy must follow the growth of social demand for higher education. Gov-
ernments will be under pressure, especially from middle-class families, to facilitate 
growth until saturation is reached, using expanded supply and if necessary finan-
cial aid to support participation. This was plausible in 1970s California with its ac-
tive electorate and sensitive polity. The prediction that participation would expand 
without limit around the world was bolder, given that participation was mostly 
much lower than in California; early 1970s governments were still enamored of 
manpower planning, as it was then called, using rates of return and employment 
data to plot a rational fit between education and the labor markets, or so they 
hoped; and few polities were as open to popular pressure as that of California. Yet 
in the long run Trow has been proven right. Whether in multiparty or single-party 
polities, it seems that almost all governments now support continually expand-
ing aspirations for higher education, though these are often financed by shifting 
part of the cost to families. In many countries the resort to mass private educa-
tion as one medium of mass expansion has facilitated the deregulation of supply 
in demand-driven systems. Old ideas about restricted ability distributions or re-
stricted labor market take-up of graduates have gone.
The third insight is especially pertinent in relation to California. Trow notes 
that high and growing participation in higher education does not necessarily trig-
ger upward social mobility on a broad scale when social stratification is aligned to 
the vertical institutional segmentation of higher education:
It is hard to imagine a successful move to end the expansion of higher education, al-
though that is certainly talked about in conservative circles in all Western countries. 
But the establishment of different sectors of higher education, reflecting the status 
hierarchies in the larger society, is a more effective way of using higher education to 
buttress rather than undermine the class structure.27
A three-tier system of the California type limits the extent to which the frame-
work of equality of opportunity can be realized as upward social mobility. Trow’s 
1973 realpolitik showed California’s conservatives they had little to fear from the 
Master Plan. However, he highlights a tension within it, for the promise of educa-
tional and social opportunity was always basic to popular consent to the Plan. As 
Trow put the matter in his later essay comparing Europe and America,
in most countries, higher education trained and educated the ruling strata, selected 
and recruited to government service and the learned professions. It conferred status 
on those who earned degrees and qualified them in various ways for the society’s 
most challenging (and prestigious) jobs and occupations. In recent decades it has 
expanded those functions to provide education and training in a wide range of new 
and semi-professions. In the United States, colleges and universities perform those 
functions, but also, and most importantly, they give substance to the idea that any-
thing is possible to those with talent, energy and motivation. This sense of society 
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with limitless possibilities for all, largely (though not exclusively) through higher 
education, is what is usually meant by “the American dream.” The end of the Ameri-
can dream is continually proclaimed, usually by intellectuals who never believed in 
it to begin with, and wished no one else would. But this faith, fundamental to the 
American political system, survives hostility and cynicism, and underpins America’s 
peculiar mixture of conservatism and radical populism. Through its role in fostering 
social mobility and the belief in a society open to talents, American higher education 
legitimates the social and political system, and thus is a central element in the society 
as it is nowhere else.28
In the longer term, the California Idea of higher education could retain its le-
gitimizing functions—and sustain its own legitimacy—only if enough of the faith 
in it was fulfilled. If participation in the community colleges failed to generate 
sufficient value; if the routes to upward mobility were too attenuated, or were 
blocked; if economy, society, and education became more unequal, then the shiny 
exceptionalist ideals would become tarnished.
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The third University of California scholar who has made a front-rank contribution 
to the global understanding of higher education is Burton R. (Bob) Clark. Clark 
worked at Stanford, Harvard, Berkeley, and Yale, where he served as chair of soci-
ology, and then became the Allan M. Cartter Professor of Higher Education at the 
University of California, Los Angeles, in 1980. Of Clark’s major books and papers,1 
The Higher Education System (1983) is the most important. As with the works of 
Clark Kerr and Martin Trow, the mark of the book is its close grasp of the realities 
of higher education and its relational dynamics. Each social scientist has a some-
what different vantage point on the problem, however. Rather than examining 
higher education at the level of society (Trow) or from the university president’s 
office (Kerr), Bob Clark sets out to “detail systematically how higher education is 
organized and governed”2 from the bottom up. Higher education is organized in 
“two basic crisscrossing modes: by discipline and by institution.”3 In discussing 
systems and institutions, Clark develops the perspective of the academic depart-
ment. He identifies knowledge as the principal organizing and differentiating ele-
ment in higher education. The generative effects of knowledge are largely missing 
in Trow’s study of growth, and they are discussed in general rather than specific 
terms by Kerr. Yet research repeatedly shows that faculty identify with their field. 
As Clark states, “the discipline rather than the institution tends to become the 
dominant force in the working lives of academics.”4 Higher education is continu-
ally diversified by the evolution of new fields and subfields of knowledge, which 
creates a problem of systemic and institutional coordination.
This allows Clark to define what is distinctive about the higher education sec-
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independent sector with its own “action patterns.”5 To understand its complexity 
requires us to “retreat somewhat from general theorizing across the major sectors 
of society and concentrate on analysis of particular realms.”6
It does not make much sense to evaluate business firms according to how much they 
act like universities, nor economic systems according to their resemblances to higher 
education systems. Nor does it make any sense to do the reverse; yet it is built into 
current commonsense and management theory that we do so.7
The knowledge-centered nature of the tasks of higher education fosters diver-
sity of outlook, the endemic autonomy of persons and groups, the peculiarly flat 
structures often found in academic communities, and also the uncertainty and 
ambiguity that is endemic to the sector. Reciprocally, the way higher education is 
organized shapes the way knowledge is bundled.8 “Knowledge materials . . . are at 
the core of any higher education system’s purposes and essences.”9 The centrality of 
knowledge, Clark concludes, is “the root cause of the many odd ways of the higher 
education system.”10
The Higher Education System investigates academic work, beliefs, power and 
authority, system integration, and the handling of change. Like Martin Trow, Clark 
was a comparativist and the book is grounded in a succession of empirical studies 
that he conducted in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Ger-
many, Japan, and the Soviet bloc. “To define what is basic requires that we move 
among nations and confront their common and varied structures and procedures,” 
he said. This is a corrective to “the unconscious assumptions that possess our vi-
sion when we study only a single country, generally our own,” which Clark calls 
“the hometown view.”11 Clark explains the role of symbolic factors, the integrating 
role of shared beliefs, the different permutations of system structure, kinds of hi-
erarchy and status, forms of academic career, and modes of institutional and sys-
tem coordination. If the book were to be prepared today, it would say more about 
competition, rankings, university brands as symbolic and integrating factors, and 
managed faculty behaviors, issues that Clark explored more fully in Creating En-
trepreneurial Universities (1998), fifteen years later.
The Higher Education System is best known for its triangle of coordination. 
Clark locates three Weberian ideal types at the points of the triangle: systems 
driven by states, systems driven by market forces, and systems driven by academic 
oligarchies. He positions each national higher education system within the tri-
angle, with the United States closest to market coordination, Soviet Russia closest 
to state control, Italy closest to academic oligarchy, and so on. Japan is the most 
difficult to place as it has strong elements of all three.12 Modes of coordination 
make a difference. For example, Clark observes that while state control tends to 
aggregate, markets tend to fragment. “The state system thereby encourages a stu-
dent class consciousness: the market system restrains it.”13 Clark’s triangle is still 
widely used by doctoral students for analytical purposes. It is not without ambigu-
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ity. Clark wrote the book before the full evolution of neoliberal systems in which 
government deploys quasi markets as means of allocation, control, legitimation, 
and performance management. Two points of the triangle, state and market, can 
overlap, as Clark himself suggests.14 Another problem is where to place the univer-
sity executive: with the academic oligarchy, with the state, or at a point of its own? 
Should the triangle be a square? Despite these problems, Bob Clark’s triangle has 
yet to be superseded.
THE MULTIVERSIT Y AS C ORPOR ATION
Creating Entrepreneurial Universities: Organizational Pathways of Transformation 
(1998) has been cited more often than the Higher Education System. It appeared at 
a moment when universities in many countries were moving towards enterpris-
ing missions, corporate forms of autonomy facilitated by government, more active 
relations with stakeholders and local communities, and an emphasis on raising 
funds; these had long been features of the American university but were novel in 
institutions that had long been administered and funded by the state, as in Europe. 
Clark’s research was conducted in 1994–1997 in five universities that were early 
adapters of the entrepreneurial turn: Warwick and Strathclyde in the United King-
dom, Twente in the Netherlands, Chalmers in Sweden, and Joensuu in Finland. All 
had been successful, particularly Warwick. Clark focuses on the individual institu-
tion without regard to system dynamics—in the book he argues that a university-
specific strategy has become crucial, so that the multiversity in effect becomes 
a firm competing with other firms. However, what lifts Creating Entrepreneurial 
Universities above the how-to-succeed-in-business textbook is Clark’s focus on the 
knowledge-related dimension. He argues not for the holus-bolus importation of 
business and public sector management into higher education but for the hybrid-
ization of executive-led organization with academic culture and faculty agency.
Clark identifies five elements crucial to institutional transformation: “a 
strengthened managerial core; an enhanced developmental periphery; a diversified 
funding base; a stimulated academic heartland; and an entrepreneurial culture.”15 
All five universities had developed “a greater systematic capacity to steer them-
selves,” using varied local combinations of “centralized decentralization.”16 They 
had strengthened lines of authority from president/rector to dean to department 
head. Individuals and units were newly accountable, while at the same time the 
executive took an enhanced responsibility for the financial health of the institution 
as a whole. “Most important, the administrative backbone fused new managerial 
values with traditional academic ones.”17 In part this was ensured by drawing on 
the faculty when composing the leadership. For the new generation of professional 
managers and strategically focused executive leaders, the model was Clark Kerr’s 
multiversity president.18 In the “enhanced developmental periphery,” alongside 
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the traditional departments were new, temporary, and flexible units that handled 
commercial consultancy, outreach teaching, or cross-disciplinary research proj-
ects. This provided an enhanced responsive capacity in the face of the growing 
demands on universities. At the same time and most importantly, “impressive in 
the universities studied was the extent to which the heartland departments had 
been brought into entrepreneurial change.”19 Even the humanities and humanistic 
social sciences found ways to explore policy analysis and multimedia production, 
providing that they were selective and retained core academic identities—always 
provided that they could be subsidized by the units with higher income-earning 
potentials, such as the business school.
When Creating Entrepreneurial Universities was published, the case for the di-
versified funding base was becoming obvious in many countries. For Clark, fund-
ing from a range of sources created opportunities and protected autonomy, while 
allowing university presidents to protect less enterprise-focused disciplines—but 
in any case it was inevitable. The problems of public funding were a function of 
mass education:
The state mantra becomes: do more with less. It has become a virtual iron law in-
ternationally that national and regional government will not support mass higher 
education at the same unit-cost level as they did for prior elite arrangements.20
At the end of the 1990s, it was becoming an iron law in California also.
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So this is the California legacy. The California Idea of public higher education 
is an ideal to be realized (“the city upon a hill”), as well as a vast workshop of 
practical activity in which people are prepared for work and society, opportunity 
is allocated, and new ideas are formed and disseminated. It embodies a society-
wide commitment to universal access to higher education, with tuition free of 
charge or low enough to constitute only a minor barrier to entry and financial aid 
for the needy as required. It is a self-regulating system of higher education that 
expands continually to meet social demand, affordable in both private and public 
terms, while providing for the vocational needs of the state on behalf of the state. 
It includes a front-rank research establishment in the University of California, 
which together with the private sector does much to drive the economy. It is an 
interdependent higher education system, comprising an ordered and hierarchi-
cal division of labor between three kinds of institutions with defined missions, 
sustaining access while augmenting the quality of the elite sector of autonomous 
research universities. The barriers in this institutional hierarchy are moderated 
by rates of transfer from community colleges to the California State University 
campuses and the University of California, and between the CSU and the UC, 
which enable educational and social mobility on a scale that is consistent with the 
promise of equality of opportunity. Or at least that is how it is meant to happen. 
That is the ideal.
In this manner the California Idea, realized in a practical way in the world, 
is meant to ensure the simultaneous advance of the public good and the many 
private goods via higher education. The Idea is informed by nation-leading and 
world-leading wisdom in system design and guidance, institutional organization 
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and management, academic leadership, and in ideas about higher education. It is 
also normatively powerful. It plants higher education at the center of society. If the 
vision takes the form of American exceptionalism, that sense of a special people 
chosen for a promised land, the California Idea of higher education emphasizes 
those ideas that render modern America (especially California) attractive to the 
rest of the world: openness, optimism, the buzz of continuous change, forward 
vision, and larger opportunity amid the common enterprise on a new and fertile 
frontier. Above all, there is that open, California sense of freedom. The California 
Idea is compelling.
The separate components of the California Idea were not especially original, 
especially in the American context. The central positioning of public educa-
tion in the future of the state was not California’s invention. Other states devel-
oped a tripartite division of labor, student transfer between sectors, and even 
the notion of universal access. The multiversity concept was general to the 
American research university, not the California research university, and was 
always at least as much Harvard as Berkeley. What makes the California Idea 
unique is that all of these features were systematized together in a single Mas-
ter Plan with long-term life and that, along with the Master Plan, California 
led intellectual thinking about higher education, as embodied in the scholar-
ship of Clark Kerr, Martin Trow, and Bob Clark. The Master Plan was more a 
developed and coherent system design than those that evolved in most other 
American states. It guaranteed not just a division of labor between institu-
tional mission types; it protected the multiversity within that division of labor 
from competition in the form of upward drift, which most other states did not 
do, or did not do as well. The California combination of research university 
excellence and social access is the aspect that is most often cited, even though 
outside the United States, there are often qualms about the firm hierarchy be-
tween the three segments of the system and the narrow entry into the doc-
toral universities. More generally, the Master Plan legitimated the idea of a 
planned system itself,1 stimulating system blueprints in many jurisdictions in 
the United States and abroad, even though no other nation or region exactly 
copied California’s forms (see part 2).2
Peter Scott argues that the Master Plan and the works of California scholars 
including Kerr, Trow, and Clark constitute the first “general theory” of higher 
education. Though the theory is “highly coloured by the particular experienc-
es of America” it “still dominates” worldwide imaginings of what is possible in 
higher education. The California Idea of higher education is underpinned by 
“a powerful secular faith, a belief, at its most intense in America but general 
across the developed world, in the inevitability of social progress underpinned 
by economic growth.” Despite economic shocks, this belief remains largely 
unshaken.3
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THE EXCELLENCE OBJECTIVE
“Between the idea / and the reality / . . . falls the Shadow,” as T. S. Eliot famously 
said.4 Imagined social forms never shine as brightly in practice as their ideal ver-
sion would suggest. Large-scale and far-reaching constructions are more likely to 
fail than most. All the same, there are no iron laws here. The distance between idea 
and reality, the extent of the failure of the plan, varies from case to case. Policy con-
structions falter when the imagining was patchy in its coverage or was internally 
contradictory, when conditions and resources change, when the will to implement 
them falters, or when intentions shift from the original design. In the case of the 
California Idea of higher education, the political, fiscal, and social conditions are 
now very different to those of 1960/1963, and there is continuing commitment to 
some aspects of the vision but not others. The multiversity has travelled better 
than has the overall system design. The goal of excellence has been realized more 
completely than that of access. Equality of opportunity through public education 
seems a long way from realization. If Trow’s 1973 analysis was right, the goal of 
equal opportunity was never going to be fulfilled.
Some parts of the California legacy have been effectively realized. First, the 
division of labor between the three subsectors has proven stable. In some other 
segmented systems, upward academic drift, with nonresearch campuses moving 
into research and graduate degrees, has exploded the vertical division of labor. 
Australia (1988) and the United Kingdom (1992) dissolved their binary systems 
into unitary systems, though the premerger universities have remained dominant 
in research.
Second, the University of California has sustained unquestionable research ex-
cellence across all campuses, except UC Merced, founded in 2005, which is still in 
formation. In the Shanghai Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), 
focused solely on research, seven UC campuses are in the top sixty in 2014. UC 
Berkeley is fourth, behind Harvard, local rival Stanford, and MIT, and ahead of the 
University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom, Princeton, and Caltech. UCLA is 
twelfth and UC San Diego is in fourteenth place; UC San Francisco is eighteenth; 
UC Santa Barbara, forty-first; UC Irvine, forty-seventh; UC Davis, fifty-fifth; UC 
Santa Cruz, ninety-third; and UC Riverside, in the top 1505 (table 7.1). If science 
is one of the hopes of the world, then much of that hope is invested in California. 
The UC research capacity, the outcome of the 1960s policy implemented with state 
and federal support, recalls the vision of the “city upon a hill” that John F. Kennedy 
proclaimed in 1961 soon after the Master Plan had been signed into law.
The University of Leiden Centre for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS) 
provides detailed comparisons of university research output. Table 7.1 shows that 
Berkeley is fourth among the major research universities in the proportion of its 
published research papers in the top 10 percent in their field by citation rate in 
2010–2013 behind only MIT, Harvard, and Stanford. Santa Barbara, San Francisco, 
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Table 7.1. University of California campuses in the Shanghai Academic Ranking of World Univer-




Index in 2014 
ARWU ranking 
(max. = 100.0)
Proportion of all 
research papers in 







1 Harvard 100.0 22.1% 6,892
2 Stanford  72.1 21.9% 3,083
3 MIT  70.5 24.8% 2,486
4 UC Berkeley  70.1 21.8% 2,573
5 Cambridge (UK)  69.2 17.3% 2,100
6 Princeton  60.7 21.5% 1,110
7 Caltech  60.5 21.4% 1,092
8 Columbia  59.6 17.5% 2,064
eq. 9 Chicago  57.4 17.6% 1,238
eq. 9 Oxford (UK)  57.4 17.8% 2,301
11 Yale  55.2 18.5% 1,913
12 UC Los Angeles  51.9 17.4% 2,438
13 Cornell  50.6 16.6% 1,910
14 UC San Diego  49.3 18.1% 2,124
15 Washington, 
Seattle
 48.1 16.6% 2,276
16 Pennsylvania  47.1 17.2% 2,178
17 Johns Hopkins  47.0 15.8% 2,348
18 UC San 
Francisco
 45.2 19.8% 2,017
19 Federal IT 
Zurich  
(Switzerland)
 43.9 17.1% 1,403
20 University  
College London 
(UK)
 43.3 15.8% 1,959
41 UC Santa 
Barbara
 34.3 20.3%  864
47 UC Irvine  31.9 15.2%  949
55 UC Davis  30.4 13.9% 1,477




UC Riverside  n.a. 15.3%  459
Source: Author, adapted from data in ARWU 2015; Leiden University 2015
Note: ARWU = Academic Ranking of World Universities. n.a. = data not available
* Papers in the top 10 percent of their research field in terms of total citations.
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Santa Cruz, and San Diego all outperform Cambridge, Columbia, Chicago, and 
Oxford. The final column in Table 7.1 shows the number of high-citation papers 
produced in each university. This is a useful measure of a university’s scientific 
“firepower,” as indicated by the quantity of high-quality research published in the 
years 2010–2013. Here Harvard performs remarkably, with more than twice as 
many papers in the four years as the world number two, Stanford. The University 
of Toronto, not shown in the table, is third (with 2,738), and the University of 
Michigan (2,616) is fourth. UC Berkeley is fifth and UCLA is seventh. UC San Di-
ego and UC San Francisco are also in the first fifteen universities. If UC Berkeley 
and UC San Francisco are combined, their total 4,590 high-citation papers is 50 
percent larger than the output of Stanford, and two-thirds that of Harvard. This 
is a plausible combination—Berkeley and UCSF share the same urban space; San 
Francisco is solely a medical school, and Berkeley does not have a medical school.
In the Leiden field-specific measures of research performance, UC Davis is first 
in the world in high-citation papers in Life and Earth Sciences and UC Berkeley is 
third. Berkeley is second in Physical Sciences and Engineering, after MIT, and fifth 
in Mathematics and Computer Sciences. UC San Francisco had the third largest 
number of high-citation papers, after Harvard, in Biomedical and Health Sciences.6
The University of California’s research preeminence has been achieved with 
endowment funding much less than that of leading Tier 1 private universities. One 
reason is that, more than most universities, the UC is unambiguously commit-
ted to the merit principle. Fostering and supporting the best people enabled the 
spectacular rise of the San Diego campus to a leading world position in only three 
decades. Like Clark Kerr, the successive USD chancellors believed in freeing re-
searchers to act. For example, in her biography of Richard Atkinson, San Diego 
chancellor (1980–1995) and UC president (1995–2003), Patricia Pelfrey notes that 
“Atkinson operated on the conviction that nothing is more important to organiza-
tions than encouraging talent and that talent is best encouraged by giving it the 
widest possible scope, without overly specific prescriptions about outcomes.” It has 
been a winning formula.7
THE AC CESS OBJECTIVE
When the focus moves from the excellence objective to the access objective, the 
picture is more mixed. The public character of higher education, and especially 
its contribution to equality of opportunity, is shaped not by whether tuition is 
charged or by the sticker price but by the combination of price, subsidies, exemp-
tions, student loans, student selection, graduation rates, and the value of qualifica-
tions in terms of social status and labor market power. The public value of higher 
education has different meanings depending on the character of institutional mis-
sion and who uses the institutions.
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Perhaps the ultimate determinant of the public character of the University of 
California is who gets in and benefits from the social mobility its valuable de-
grees enable. Here the UC campuses—including Berkeley, Los Angeles, and San 
Diego—take in more students from socioeconomically disadvantaged back-
grounds than do most leading research universities. In total, 42 percent of all UC 
students receive federal Pell Grants, allocated to students from families with in-
comes of $44,000 a year or less, suggesting significant social mobility. A third of 
all UC tuition dollars are directed to financial aid. This is exclusively needs-based 
aid. Berkeley has developed a progressive tuition regime whereby 40 percent of 
students pay no tuition, financed by tuition from higher-income families. Those 
with family incomes below $140,000 per annum have discounted tuition. Pro-
gressive tuition has spread to the other UC campuses.8 UC campuses also take 
in a high proportion of students with at least one parent born outside the United 
States. Rothblatt cites a figure of 60 percent of entrants at Berkeley in 2004 and 
notes also that 27 percent of students were in the first generation of their family 
to go to college.9
In the outcome, students from poor families and first-generation higher ed-
ucation students are much better represented at UC Berkeley than in the Ivy 
League private universities. In his study of Yale, The Power of Privilege (2007), 
Joseph Soares reports that in the 1988–2000 period, 64 percent of the students 
of Tier 1 institutions in the United States and 44 percent of the students from 
Tier 2 schools were from the richest 10 percent of households in terms of family 
income. In Soares’s study, Tier 1 institutions are the leading private universities, 
and the major public research universities are in Tier 2. He compares these in-
takes with the UC system in the period 1991–1996. The most socially exclusive 
UC campus was Santa Barbara, with 31 percent of its students from the top 10 
percent of families. The other campuses had ratios of 28 percent at Berkeley and 
San Diego, 24 percent at Santa Cruz, 23 percent at Davis and Los Angeles, 18 
percent at Irvine, and 15 percent at Riverside.10 Berkeley’s school-leaver intake is 
as academically accomplished as the Tier 1 intake. At the same time, according 
to John Douglass, both UC Berkeley and UCLA now each have as many low-
income students as the whole Ivy League; 40 percent of Berkeley undergraduates 
pay no tuition; 65 percent receive at least some financial aid; and half graduate 
with no debt. The average debt of $19,000 was just over two-thirds of the na-
tional average of $27,000. In addition, UC’s undergraduate completion rates are 
unmatched by any other research-intensive public university.11 Like the data on 
research outputs, these are impressive numbers and consistent with the spirit of 
the Master Plan.
However, the UC takes in a relatively small minority of the age cohort. It cannot 
on its own sustain a successful equality-of-opportunity regime across California’s 
society. The outcomes from higher education as a whole have been less good.
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The Master Plan sought to control costs yet at the same time provide universal 
access and high social mobility and a UC system that could compete with the best 
private and public universities in the country.12 Both access and excellence carried 
a price tag, but more so, universal access in combination with high social mobility. 
After the Plan was announced, California’s population and the social demand for 
higher education grew more rapidly than predicted. Inevitably, as Martin Trow 
suggested in 1973, once the principle of universal access was established, social as-
pirations for higher education grew at pace. Under these conditions, the scope for 
upward social mobility depended on the capacity of the schools to bring students 
from all California’s communities and social groups to the starting gate for higher 
education, on the capacity of the community colleges to bring students through to 
successful completion, on the capacity for upward transfer from the community 
colleges through to the CSU and the UC, and on a proportional expansion of the 
UC and CSU in line with the growth in the bottom-tier sector, the community 
colleges. In turn, each of these positive developments depended on the mainte-
nance of the necessary public resources in schooling and in all three tiers of higher 
education, as well as continued no or low tuition. A primary difficulty, especially 
in the longer term, was that the resource needs of the expanding system have been 
much greater than were envisioned in 1960.
In the outcome, California and its public education have failed to deliver. First, 
as was planned in the 1960s, growth was concentrated in the community colleges, 
and the CSU and UC systems were not expanded in proportion, so that oppor-
tunities for upward mobility were attenuated. In most other nations that provide 
research universities, the proportion of young people entering those institutions 
has expanded markedly in the last forty years—through growth of the institutions 
or, more often, the opening of new research universities—in line with social de-
mand and economic need. This expansion has helped to broaden the highways for 
mobility into the professional and managerial occupations. This is not the case in 
California, where the research-university sector remains confined to the top 12.5 
percent of school graduates. From the point of view of equality of opportunity, 
this was a flaw in the original system design, as it placed too much pressure on the 
transfer function. Transfer between institutions in a vertical hierarchy is always a 
second-best form of social access because it requires greater stamina of aspiration.
Second, for reasons that will be further discussed in part 3, over time the state’s 
tax-spend compact has severely deteriorated. For the last twenty-five years, Cali-
fornia has been unable to properly support the Master Plan. Funding declined 
especially sharply in the cutbacks triggered by the recession of 2008 and after. This 
has affected all three sectors, including the University of California, which has 
become less competitive vis-à-vis Stanford in competition for top global research 
talent. UC tuition has been pushed up for the growing number of out-of-state stu-
dents, helping to keep the in-state price down, but the cost of attending UC gradu-
Whither the California Idea of Higher Education?    47
ate professional schools now comes close to equaling that of the major private 
universities. This has required ever more nimble footwork with tuition discounts 
and student aid.
Third, there has been a decline in the resourcing, quality, standing, and accessi-
bility of mass public education across the nation, and in California both the public 
schools and the community colleges are undersupported. Public schools’ gradua-
tion rates have stagnated, and there is pronounced locational and ethnic inequal-
ity.13 In the community colleges there are again regional and ethnic inequalities in 
graduation and transfer rates, and the combined graduation and transfer rates in 
both the community colleges and the state universities are disappointing. In a sys-
tem in which social opportunity is reduced, fragmented, and punctured at many 
points, the outcomes of public education in California—as in the country—are 
increasingly differentiated on the basis of location, socioeconomic background, 
and its partial correlate, ethnicity. Access, retention, graduation, and transfer rates 
all sharply favor the white middle class and Asian Americans, with students from 
African American and Hispanic families, which are disproportionately located in 
the bottom half of the income distribution, doing noticeably worse. It is far from 
the 1960 promise of equal opportunity through higher education.
Fourth, and most seriously, public higher education no longer provides for uni-
versal access. California’s community colleges first began to turn away students 
in bad state budget years in the 1980s. They currently turn away at least 200,000 
potential students each year. Enrollment in the CSU campuses was first reduced 
by 50,000 in the early 1990s. Following the cutbacks triggered by the 2008–2010 
recession, they are once again not accepting all eligible students.14 This is a major 
retreat. Across the world, a growing number of national systems provide near uni-
versal access to higher education (see part 2). In California universal access has 
never been a utopian goal. It was and is achievable. California was the first political 
jurisdiction in the world to achieve it. Apparently it is now the first to lose it. This 
is the most serious failure of the expectations called up by the Master Plan. It signi-
fies a historic decline in California’s public higher education on both the national 
and global scales—in its provision to its people and as an idea, an exemplar.
In 1960 state participation was double the national average. Fifty years later, 
in 2010, California was the forty-third state in the proportion of 18- to 24-year-
olds with baccalaureate status. In the United States as a whole, the proportion of 
the population graduating with a degree has fallen in relative terms to be only 
slightly above the OECD average.15 California has massively deteriorated relative 
to the rest of the country, yet in a curious way this is part of the historical pattern 
in which national trends are led from California. The United States is following 
California as it goes up and down.
There will be a dramatic demographic surge in the next generation. The state 
will have 50 million people in 2050, compared to 38 million in 2013.16 What will 
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happen? Will a new Master Plan appear to lift the sights of the state and secure a 
renewed social consensus on the need to fund and provide public education that 
combines excellence with universal access and prospects of mobility? Is the will 
there for that?
THE FUTURE
Clark Kerr would have been half, but only half, pleased at the outcome of his 
work. In the long outcome, the Master Plan has functioned very well overall in 
the research multiversities. There it has provided for excellence limited only by 
the imagination and for a high level of social access, given the elite academic char-
acter of entry. It has partly failed at the system level, especially in relation to the 
promise of universal access, and the vehicle of planning itself seems to have run 
into sand. In the end the execution of the Plan has faltered in the way that the 
original Plan was especially strong: in the big picture, in the economics and the 
politics. California has fallen short of the public values of the “city upon a hill” that 
sustained the 1960s’ commitment to common social advance through higher edu-
cation. To anticipate part 3, it must be said the failure of the Plan was not its own 
work. The dominant political philosophy has undermined its enabling conditions. 
High individualism in California’s culture has valorized private good without re-
gard for the common good.
Are the principles that animated Kerr and his colleagues now obsolete? Is the 
public research university to be the only strong survivor of the California Idea of 
higher education? What is its future in the present ideological and economic set-
ting, which favors the Ivy League alternative and in which the public university is 
now becoming more beleaguered? What are the implications of declining mass 
education and closing mass access for the opportunity structure and for growing 
social and economic inequality? Has the prospect of widespread social mobility 
through higher education been broken? What is the future of public higher educa-
tion in California—and everywhere? These questions will be explored further in 
the chapters that follow.
One thing is clear. There will be no return to 1960 or 1963, any more than there 
is a way back for JFK from Dallas. As Clark Kerr remarked in the 1963 preface to 
the Godkin Lectures: “Instead of platitudes and nostalgic glances backward to what 
it once was, the university needs to take a rigorous look at the reality of the world 
it occupies today.”17 Part 3 will return to the future of the California Idea of high-
er education. Before that, part 2 examines how the California Idea, with its high 
participation and institutional diversity and its compelling notion of the research 
multiversity, crossed the waters, radiating outwards from California to the whole 
higher education world, the ultimate success of that vision of a city upon a hill.
PART T WO
Crossing the Waters
The California Idea in the World
There is no reason for the West to be pessimistic. The West will not lose power. 
It will have to share power. . . . The massive new middle classes emerging all 
around the world have begun to accept many of the aspirations and values of 
the Western middle classes.
—Kishore Mahbubani, The Great Convergence (2013), pp. 11–12
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Four decades after the publication of The Uses of the University in 1963, its full 
worldwide effects became clearly apparent. In 2003 the first reputable ranking of 
the world’s top five hundred universities appeared. Fifteen of the top twenty uni-
versities were American. The ranking looked credible. It used transparent metrics 
of research prizes, publications, and citations, from known sources. Outside the 
United States, media, government, university presidents, and many faculty were 
fascinated by the new ranking table. For each university it seemed to provide a 
neat measure of the distance between its research quality and the global standard, 
which was mostly an American standard.
Unlike most of their counterparts abroad, American universities were used to 
ranking. The National Research Council had ranked research university depart-
ments for most of the postwar period. U.S. News and World Report had begun 
ranking colleges in 1983 and published an annual survey from 1985 onwards. U.S. 
News modeled competition in higher education as a student market in degrees. 
When the global ranking appeared in 2003, the United States was largely indif-
ferent. Few people grasped that with the new ranking an open global competition 
in higher education had begun, that it was a competition about research science, 
not the student market, and that its effects would be transformative.1 After all, why 
should a global ranking matter? Only national standing was important. As in base-
ball, so in universities, the “world series” was a contest inside the United States. 
Few noticed where the new ranking had been prepared, and fewer realized that 
this too was a sign of the times. The new ranking had been created in a university 
on the east coast of China.
8
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Many later observers assumed that the Shanghai Academic Ranking of World 
Universities (ARWU), as it became known, came from the Chinese government. 
This was incorrect. The ranking was conceived and prepared by a Shanghai Jiao 
Tong University engineering professor who also worked in higher education plan-
ning: Liu Niancai. Shanghai Jiao Tong was a comprehensive research university, 
strong in engineering, and beginning to contend with Fudan University for 
the leading role in the nation’s second city. An extended partnership with the 
University of Michigan was bearing fruit in research. Liu developed the ARWU 
to lift Shanghai Jiao Tong’s position, principally by advancing the university’s 
contribution to China’s science and technology. The aim was to measure how far 
universities like Shanghai Jiao Tong must travel to catch up to the West, meaning 
the United States.2 Thus a Chinese university began to rank American universities 
and to frame the world market, including common aspirations for “world-class 
university” status, on the terms that it set.
Some responded to the new ranking by hunting for methodological flaws and 
dubious interpretations. A Chinese ranking could not get it right. But revised and 
streamlined in the second year in 2004, the ARWU proved robust and soon be-
gan to shape strategies of universities and governments. Universities focused on 
how to lift themselves into the top 500, 100, or 30, depending on where they were 
placed. Submissions to Nature and Science rose. High-citation researchers received 
job offers at more lucrative rates of pay. Governments began to invest in programs 
to increase their numbers of world-class universities as defined by the ranking. 
The term world-class universities (WCU) was popularized by the Shanghai group, 
which began to hold biennial WCU conferences, cementing its global leadership 
role, just as the volume of science papers published by researchers in China’s uni-
versities was taking off.
The Shanghai ranking did not set American university agendas. Rather, it 
propagated American agendas. In framing his ranking, Liu adopted the norms of 
the large, comprehensive American science university (see table 8.1). The better a 
university’s English-language science and the more it published, the more articles 
it had in Nature and Science, and the more Nobel Prizes that it won, the higher it 
would be ranked. This was a ranking of global multiversities. Universities with 
a disciplinary coverage that was substantially different from Harvard’s or Berke-
ley’s did not do well in the ARWU. Those with strong research in all sciences and 
quantitative social science, especially in medicine and engineering, did very well. 
The ranking, and the performance incentives it created, not only symbolized but 
sustained the world domination of the institution that Clark Kerr had described 
and had patterned in the University of California campuses.
In the decade since the ARWU began, ranking-induced reforms in many 
countries have pushed world higher education closer to the multiversity idea 
and quickened investment in R & D. Huang Futao notes in relation to China: 
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“The significance of the emergence of global rankings systems on the formation 
of China’s world-class university, especially the publication of ARWU, . . . cannot 
be overestimated.”3
This is not the only way in which the higher education world has followed 
American practices, practices (not limited to California) that were popularized 
by the California Idea of higher education. The 1960 Master Plan’s approach to 
access and the growth of higher education—essentially one of open access and 
demand-led participation—has become the norm in most higher education sys-
tems, except in the poorest nations. In this manner the California formula of a 
higher education system that combines the excellence mission and the access mis-
sion through research multiversities (now often called world-class universities) 
and mass higher education institutions has become very widely used. The pattern-
ing of higher education on this basis is not universal. For example, some Western 
European system structures consisting of single-mission types or binary systems 
based on the principle of parity between institutions with different missions have 
continued and are influencing the evolution of dual academic-technical systems 
in East Asia. In many countries the division of labor is not as firm as that enforced 
Table 8.1. A means of Californization: Indicators used in the Shanghai Academic Ranking of World 
Universities
Indicator Weighting
Nobel Prizes* and Fields Medals for Mathematics won by alumni (sliding 
scale, more recent prizes score highest)
 10%
Nobel Prizes* and Fields Medals for Mathematics won by currently 
employed faculty
 20%
Faculty who are high citation researchers according to lists kept by 
Thomson-Reuters (roughly the top 300 in each research field)
 20%
Papers published in the journals Nature and Science in the previous five 
years
 20%
Papers indexed in the Thomson-Reuters Science citation index and Social 
Science citation index in previous year
 20%
Per capita indicator: Standardized sum of the above indicators divided by 
the number of full-time equivalent faculty
 10%
Total 100%
Source: Author’s summary of listings in ARWU 2015
Note: This is the 2014 set of ARWU indicators, not the initial set used for the first ranking in 2003. The Shanghai 
ARWU ranking underwent modest changes in the early years, but most of its elements have been continuous; 
it has been more stable than the global rankings by the Times Higher Education (2015) and QS World Rankings 
(2015). The main change was the introduction of the 10 percent per capita indicator, designed to compensate 
for the bias in favor of institutional size in the other indicators. That change assisted smaller high-performing 
research universities such as Princeton and Caltech.
* Does not include the winners of the Literature Prize and the Peace Prize
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by the Master Plan. Nevertheless, the power of the American and particularly the 
California Idea is especially apparent in two ways. First, in emerging higher educa-
tion countries, system forms are mostly closer to California than Western Europe. 
Second, as noted, in nearly every country the classical Clark Kerr multiversity, 
the comprehensive research-intensive university with a broad set of functions and 
many parts and constituencies, has been adopted or has set the template for insti-
tutional reform.
At global level, it is more accurate to refer to the part “Americanization” of 
higher education than its “Californization.” Harvard and the rest of the Ivy League 
exercise a great influence, admired everywhere, and the Midwestern public uni-
versities are also widely known. Nevertheless, at system level it is the ideas embod-
ied in the Master Plan and the work of Kerr, Trow and Clark, together with the 
stellar success of the University of California, that above all have come to stand 
for the modern virtues of American higher education, just as the ideas of Wilhelm 
von Humboldt came to signify the essence of the nineteenth-century German uni-
versity. California public education, centered on the state and a public policy com-
pact, is closer to the political forms of higher education in other countries than is 
the Ivy League. Replicating Harvard and Yale around the world is no more pos-
sible than replicating Oxford and Cambridge. While the achievements of Berkeley 
and San Diego place them in the same league as those historic foundations—it is 
no easier to reach the research output of Berkeley than that of Oxford or MIT—
the fact that the UC campuses are the product of a visible process of state-driven 
construction, implemented by modern planners such as Clark Kerr, makes them 
an example to strive for rather than an impossible fantasy. The California dream is 
a dream of modernity. As such, it appears to be in reach.
It is therefore ironic that although the California Idea is no longer fully honored 
in California, and U.S. higher education is widely criticized at home, especially for 
galloping tuition costs, U.S. and especially California higher education continue to 
be idealized, admired, praised, envied, and part-emulated abroad.4 The California 
Idea is still radiating outwards, still transforming higher education.
Not every feature of the California Idea has become normative. No system be-
yond the United States and few systems within the country combine California’s 
highly developed public mission with its equally well-defined institutional and 
sectoral autonomy, in which the institutions are understood as public organiza-
tions in civil society, obliged to states and stakeholders but located at arm’s length 
and free to manage their own affairs—though the American idea of academic free-
dom is widely understood as essential to California/U.S. research creativity. More 
generally, the California/U.S. multiversity and system forms have not been ad-
opted as such anywhere. Rather, they have been adapted, often with widely varying 
results. American forms and behaviors in higher education have been a major but 
not the only influence in countries with their own histories and cultural practices, 
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state forms, and political economies. Other foreign influences are often also at 
play, such as the British, German, and French institutions and in emerging systems 
the more recent examples of the Dutch, Nordic, Singaporean, and Chinese ap-
proaches. The California Idea has been mixed and matched. Yet all of these other 
norms and exemplars are also affected by American higher education, especially 
the multiversity.
Part 2 explores the global radiation of American approaches to higher educa-
tion, popularized above all by the California Idea, and the kind of higher educa-
tion world that has resulted when American practices have been combined with 
other traditions and other modern forms in circumstances often very different 
from California’s. It also considers what this partly Americanized and increasingly 
multicentered higher education world, one that Clark Kerr might have glimpsed 
but never experienced, means for American universities. The account begins with 
the worldwide growth of participation in higher education.
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In 1973 Martin Trow forecast that there would be “continued popular demand” 
for higher education on an open-ended basis in all societies. “It seems to me very 
unlikely that any advanced industrial society can or will be able to stabilize the 
numbers,” he said.1 In a later essay in 2000, Trow seemed disappointed in the 
pace at which his prediction was bearing fruit. Europe, where participation was 
at 30–40 percent, was two or three decades behind the United States on the “con-
tinuum” to “universal access.”2 However, fifteen years further on, it is apparent that 
Trow’s 1973 prediction is being realized, and not only in Europe.
The best source of information on rates of participation in higher education is 
the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) 
Institute for Educational Statistics (UIS). The institute compiles a data series for 
the gross tertiary enrolment ratio (GTER), which measures the total number of 
students in university and college programs3 as a proportion of the school-leaver 
age cohort. The GTER must grapple with the problem of standardizing worldwide 
offerings, codifying courses and hours, and coping with varied rates of mature-age 
and foreign student entry.4 However, despite its limitation, it is the best available 
statistic for comparing participation between nations and over time because data 
for most countries are available.
The UNESCO data series begins in 1970, a decade after the Master Plan. In 
1972 the United States had the highest rate of participation in the world, with a 
GTER of 48.0 percent. The only other nation where more than one-third of the 
population was in higher education was Soviet Russia, which routinely strove to 
match America in all departments. Russia’s GTER was 43.9 percent. Just nineteen 
national systems had GTERs above Martin Trow’s 15 percent threshold for mass 
9
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participation. The United Kingdom was at 15.3 percent, Japan at 19.4 percent. This 
was far from the high participation and limitless growth in higher education that 
Trow was imagining. Nevertheless, ten years later, in 1982, the United States had 
broken through the “universal” barrier to reach 56.9 percent, the only nation to do 
so—Russia was at 47.1 percent—and there were forty-seven “mass” higher educa-
tion nations with GTERs of over 15 percent. The overall world GTER moved only 
from 10.1 to 12.7 percent, however5 (see table 9.1).
Over the next decade, the 1980s, the worldwide GTER continued inching up 
slowly, reaching 14.0 percent in 1992, though by then four nations had exceeded 
50 percent—Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Finland—and no less 
than fifty-nine higher education systems had crossed the 15-percent mass educa-
tion threshold. In 1992 the worldwide participation ratio was still held down by 
low GTERs in three of the four largest countries in population: only 2.8 percent in 
China, 6.0 percent in India, and 9.6 percent in Indonesia. The United States had 
achieved a high GTER of 76.9 percent. Russia, where the Soviet Union was frag-
menting, was stuck at 49.3 percent.6
GROW TH TAKES OFF
In the second half of the 1990s, as the full impact of the communications rev-
olution unfolded and air travel cheapened and expanded in volume, the rate 
of growth of participation in higher education quickened. The enrollment in 
middle-income and lower-middle-income countries began to increase at the 











United States Gross Tertiary Enrolment 
Ratio (GTER)
48.0 56.9 76.9 78.8 94.3
Worldwide Gross Tertiary Enrolment Ratio 
(GTER)
10.1 12.7 14.0 21.5 32.0
Number of systems with GTER over 15% 
(Trow “mass”)
19 47 59 96 107
Number of systems with GTER over 50% 
(Trow “universal”)
0 1 4 34 49












Source: Author, based on data in UNESCO Institute of Statistics 2015.
*Data for Canada available only for 1992. For 2012 Greece recorded a GTER of 116.6%, compared to 66.7% in 2002, 
an implausible rate of increase in school-leaver and/or mature-age participation. The UIS series can be only as 
consistent as the national agencies collecting participation data.
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same rate as in wealthier countries. There was a surge of student growth in the 
post-Soviet countries after the state regulation of enrollments was removed, with 
an enrollment boom in the market-oriented fields of business studies and law. 
In Latin America, the post-Soviet bloc, and parts of Asia, much of the growth 
took place in mass private sector institutions, some of them for-profit institu-
tions, and fee-paying places in the state sector. The worldwide GTER jumped 
from 14.0 percent in 1992 to 21.0 percent in 2002. The number of systems with a 
GTER of 15 percent or more reached ninety-six, and those above 50 percent rose 
from four in 1992 to thirty-four in 2002. New “universal” systems included not 
only the English-speaking nations and most of Western Europe but the Baltic 
states, Poland, and Russia, as well as Greece, Argentina, and Libya. South Korea 
and Finland moved ahead of the United States, with Korea the new world leader 
at 85.8 percent in 2002.7
The pace of change further accelerated in the 2000s. The world GTER increased 
by a remarkable 1 percent a year to reach almost one third (32.0 percent) in 2012. 
Forty years before, just prior to Trow’s 1973 essay, only two national systems in the 
UNESCO data had GTERs above 32.0 percent: the United States and Soviet Russia. 
The world as a whole was catching up to the American level of four decades before. 
There were forty-nine systems with a GTER of more than 50 percent, and one 
hundred and seven above the 15-percent mark. New nations with GTERs above 
50 percent in 2012 included Albania, Armenia, Barbados, Bulgaria, Iran, Jamaica, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, and Thailand. 
It was apparent that when the GTER exceeded the “universal” level of 50 percent, 
the rate of participation kept on rising. By 2012 it had reached 90 percent in South 
Korea, Canada, the United States, Finland, and Belarus. In Argentina, Australia, 
Cuba, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Puerto 
Rico, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, and Ukraine, it had passed 75 percent. South Korea’s 
GTER, sustained by the nearly complete retention of the age group plus mature-
age participation, with students enrolled in two parallel systems of academic uni-
versities and technical-vocational universities, was 98.4 percent. New “universal” 
systems included Albania, Croatia, Turkey, Iran (where the GTER had risen from 
19.1 to 55.2 percent in the previous ten years), Mongolia, and Thailand. Aggregate 
progress had been made on gender also. From 1990 to 2010 the female-to-male 
ratio of total years of education lifted from 82 to 91 percent.8
Most significantly, in the large-population countries, China had lifted its GTER 
to 26.7 percent; participation in India was also growing rapidly, especially in the 
private colleges, and had climbed from 10.4 to 24.8 percent between 2002 and 
2012; and the GTER in Indonesia, with expansion again mostly in the private sec-
tor, was at 31.5 percent.9 It looked likely that China would achieve its official tar-
get of 40 percent by 2020. In the Beijing and Shanghai regions, the GTER was at 
60 percent by 2010.10
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In 2012 the overall GTER in North America and Western Europe was 79.0 per-
cent, while participation in Central and Eastern Europe at 70.9 percent was mov-
ing closer to the Western European level. The regional GTER was 42.8 percent 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, exceeding 50 percent in four countries. In 
all systems in East Asia except China, the GTER exceeded 50 percent. It was still 
low in South Asia, at 22.8 percent in 2012, but was growing more rapidly in that 
region than in the world as a whole. Only in Central Asia, where the GTER was 
24.5 percent in 2012 had overall participation not grown since 2002. The gap in 
the worldwide pattern of participation was sub-Saharan Africa where per capita 
incomes were low, most states lacked the economic resources to begin building 
mass higher education, and the middle class was relatively small. From 2002 to 
2012 the regional GTER rose from 4.9 to 7.8 percent in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012 
the GTER was below the mass level of 15 percent in all systems for which data were 
available except Mauritius.11
The gap in educational participation in Africa has global consequences. Fam-
ily size and birth rate are correlated to education levels, especially women’s edu-
cation. Educated women tend to control family size and thereby limit national 
birthrates. When enough women reach higher education, growth of population 
slows sharply.12 The world population projections were revised in 2014. During the 
previous twenty years, it had been expected that global population would peak 
at 9 billion in 2050. The revised projections stated that population will keep on 
increasing, reaching 11 billion in 2100, with no peak in sight. The change of ex-
pectations centers on sub-Saharan Africa. Fertility rates have come down in most 
countries but not in sub-Saharan Africa with its low GTERs. Regional population 
is expected to grow from 1 billion in 2014 to more than 4 billion in 2100. In Nigeria 
alone, the expected population growth is from 200 to 900 million. Currently, the 
average Nigerian woman has six children.13 These population projections assume 
no change in the GTER. That is, population in Nigeria will grow to 900 million 
unless high-participation higher education is established. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
it is a race between higher education and fertility. In the worldwide rollout of the 
California ideal of universal access, there is much at stake.
At the same time that participation in higher education surged all over the 
world, it continued to rise also in the United States, reaching 94.3 percent in 2012, 
second in the world among the countries from which data were available. The na-
tion was not as well placed in its comparative gross graduation rate at first-degree 
level (three-year programs or more), being the world’s twenty-fourth higher edu-
cation system at 40.1 percent on that measure.14 This reflected the facts that a rela-
tively high proportion of American students were in two-year colleges, transfer 
to four-year programs was limited, and degree completion rates were lower than 
in some countries. In 2012 the leading nation in the proportion of the age cohort 
with degrees was the Russian Federation, at 61.6 percent, followed by Iceland and 
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Poland. South Korea was at 50.0 percent and the United Kingdom, with most of 
its cohort in three-year rather than two-year programs, was at 47.8 percent. Cuba’s 
degree graduation rate of 50.8 percent in 2012 also exceeded that of the United 
States.15 These comparisons do not reveal the quality of higher education in differ-
ent countries—for example, the student children of many of the families in India 
and Indonesia enter small local private colleges with undertrained teachers and 
no scientific equipment. Though populations have been successful in demanding 
educational opportunities from government and market, popular demand alone 
is not enough to lift the threshold of quality on a universal basis—especially in 
market-based systems that stratify higher education into high- and low-quality 
streams. Nevertheless, the rapid spread of higher education and labor market 
qualifications throughout the world is unmistakable.
EC ONOMY AND SO CIET Y
What are the dynamics of this now almost universal California-style open-ended 
growth of participation? Martin Trow’s explanation is that growth in participation 
is driven fundamentally by rising popular demand, which in turn is sustained by 
rising social aspirations—by the spread of the desire for the positional advance-
ment of the family through higher education (see part 1). A further factor sus-
taining growth is that while students from affluent backgrounds, well represented 
in higher education, have means other than higher education of advancing their 
social position—for example, social and cultural capital at the point of entry into 
work—this is less true of students from social groups with a lower propensity to 
participate. At any given time the disadvantaged student is particularly likely to 
benefit from higher education.16 This drives successive extensions of aspirations to 
the whole society (see part 3).
The growth of educational enrollment is mostly accompanied by an expansion 
of occupations requiring skilled labor. As participation increases, not all gradu-
ates enter professional occupations. The point, however, is that those who do not 
enter higher education experience an increasing disadvantage in the labor market. 
This maintains the graduate premium, grounded not just in higher earnings but 
also the social status attached to degrees, that is essential to the continued growth 
of participation. These factors shape the movement from elite to universal higher 
education. In developing countries, the dynamic of participation growth begins to 
take off once the urban middle class reaches sufficient size, as long as state policy 
facilitates expansion. The infrastructure of higher education is located in urban 
areas, so that urbanization expands and concentrates popular demand; states re-
spond sooner or later to pressure from urban middle-class families for educational 
opportunities, and the middle class helps to finance education through taxation 
and tuition payments.
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Since the mid 1990s, when the worldwide growth of participation quickened, 
four factors have been at work. First, the pace of urbanization has also increased, 
with more families moving from the rural economy to the cities. Between 1970 
and 2010, the proportion of the world’s population that was located in urban areas 
rose from 36.6 to 51.6 percent. The pace of urbanization was uneven by region. 
It was most rapid in nations in which precapitalist rural economies were being 
absorbed by modern capitalism. In South America the urban share climbed from 
59.8 to 82.8 percent, in China, from 17.4 to 49.2 percent, and in Indonesia, from 17.1 
to 49.9 percent, though it grew more slowly in India, from 19.8 to 30.9 percent.17
Second, and associated with urbanization, there has been a marked growth in 
the size of the world’s middle classes, persons capable of discretionary and aspi-
rational spending. In a study for Brookings and the OECD, Homi Kharas and 
Geoffrey Gertz define the middle class as persons living on US$10–$100 per day 
in purchasing power parity terms. In these terms 1.8 billion persons were middle 
class in 2009, 28 percent of world population. A further 2 percent were “rich.”18 
Thus 30 percent of all persons were middle class or above, similar in proportion 
to the world GTER of 28 percent in 2009.19 Third, globalization has increased the 
opportunities for city-based graduate labor in developing countries, in such fields 
as international trade, finance, and public administration. Fourth, policy support 
for the open-ended growth of higher education has become nearly universal. All 
international agencies now advocate the continuing growth of participation. In the 
year 2000, with the release of a landmark report on higher education in the devel-
oping world,20 the World Bank moved away from its earlier advocacy of growth in 
primary rather than higher education. The Bank now advocates simultaneous ex-
pansion of educational provision at all levels. With its member countries mostly in 
the advanced industrial bracket, the OECD has long advocated high participation 
in higher education, for both economic development and social inclusion. Nearly 
all individual governments embrace this orthodoxy. Some struggle with the cost 
of expanding systems, while others transfer an increasing proportion of costs to 
students and families, especially in the lower-status institutions. Fiscal pressures 
have driven the pronounced growth in the role of private sectors and of low-cost 
online and distance delivery in many countries.
In a 2005 data-based review of worldwide growth in participation, national 
system by national system, Evan Schofer and John Meyer found that the older no-
tion of higher education as constituting a closed society and occupational system 
has been replaced by an open-system picture of education as constituting use-
ful human resources for unlimited progress and individual growth. This is the 
California Idea of higher education writ large. Schofer and Meyer also link the 
worldwide expansion of participation to the global spread of democratization, hu-
man rights, and global linkages. That argument is more tendentious. While, all 
else being equal, higher education fosters personal agency and a critical approach 
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to knowledge, this does not mean that it is necessarily located in a Western lib-
eral political agenda, nor that global imitation and policy borrowing in one arena 
are necessarily joined to others. The great growth of higher education extends to 
multiparty states like Norway and South Korea, single-party states like Russia and 
Singapore, and dynastic regimes like China. Everywhere, states that once restrict-
ed participation and worried about “over-education” now accommodate demand. 
It is easier for states to offer access to higher education than to guarantee em-
ployment. Responsibility for outcomes is transferred from state to families. At the 
same time, as was concluded in a major survey of educational growth in the BRICS 
countries, “states use the expansion of education, including university education” 
to promote “political legitimation with the mass of families who want to enhance 
their children’s employability and social mobility.”21
Governments continue to use human capital rationales to explain the expan-
sion of higher education, recycling expectations about careers, status, and wide-
spread mobility that universal higher education systems cannot fulfill. If the statis-
tical fit between investment in education and economic outcomes were sufficiently 
close, high-skill work would be growing in proportion to graduate numbers. But 
the higher education/economy relation is not one of fit. The fact they are still seen 
in a linear continuum points to the power of the human capital myth. Though the 
empirical relevance of human capital theory is questionable, it survives.22 In some 
fields, such as medicine, there is a close match between training and labor market 
outcome. From time to time, labor markets “pull” additional educational supply in 
specific areas—for example, when there is a shortage of accountants or engineers. 
Yet as Roger Geiger puts it, on the whole “labor markets and education markets 
are on separate tracks.”23 The two sectors, higher education and work, are hetero-
geneous. The transition from higher education to work is articulated by structural 
factors—the stratification of families and institutions; social networks; ethnicity, 
locality, and gender segmentation; job selection; information flows—that do not 
embody a human capital logic.
Macro-level research on the relationship between the economy and partici-
pation in higher education has reached similar conclusions. In their data-based 
study of world participation trends, Schofer and Meyer note that “the rapid expan-
sion of higher education in the 1960s does not coincide with especially large his-
torical changes in occupational structures, job skill requirements, or labor market 
demands that would create a need for massive expansion of higher education.” 
After the 1960s, the relationship between the growth of participation and econom-
ic factors became weaker.24 Similarly, a country-by-country comparison between 
economic growth rates and rates of growth of tertiary education enrollment in 
2000–2012 suggests a weak to moderate association. There is a stronger correla-
tion between rates of urbanization and country-specific GTERs.25 This does not 
mean that urbanization “causes” participation growth, or that skilled work has not 
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grown. Rather, the demand for skills, urbanization, and educational growth are 
all functions of the larger process of capitalist modernization. Compared to rural 
living, urban settings provides more favorable socioeconomic and cultural condi-
tions both for the expansion of the middle class and the provision of education 
infrastructures and for the extension of aspirations and participation to poorer 
families as well. Though other cities across the world mostly look very different 
from California’s cities, they share the California educational dream, nuanced with 
local characteristics.
GROW TH TO C OME
The economic consequence of universalizing higher education is that in many 
countries, the pool of potentially high-skilled graduate labor will eventually con-
stitute the majority of the workforce—although the extent to which graduates are 
used effectively is an open question. There is no iron law of either “over- education” 
or “graduate take-up.” It is certain that in an increasingly mobile world, more 
 labor will move offshore in the hunt for career opportunities or simply jobs. Still, 
 remarks Peter Scott, “much more radical may be the social effects of mass partici-
pation.” Already,
the fact that so many people now have some experience of higher education has 
created a new kind of society, with multiple effects. For example, initial education 
has been prolonged and entry into the labor market delayed. Student lifestyles have 
morphed into mid-life consumerist lifestyles. The prevalence, and popularity, of “cre-
ative” and portfolio careers have been boosted. . . . There has been an explosion in the 
number of knowledgeable (or, at any rate, knowledge-hungry) citizens transforming 
the role played by professional expertise in our society. Levels of participation, albeit 
in virtual as well as physical forms, have been enhanced. Older social demarcations 
have been eroded (without necessarily leading to greater equality). . . . Educative ca-
pacity has leaked out into wider society not only through the future lives of graduates 
but also, more immediately, through the mass media, transforming culture, politics, 
social behaviors, consumption habits.26
There is much more Martin Trow universalism to come. In their Brookings/
OECD research, Kharas and Gertz remark that in the next twenty years “the world 
evolves from being mostly poor to mostly middle class.” In their estimates, the 
middle classes will increase from 1.85 billion persons in 2009 to 3.25 billion in 2020 
and 4.88 billion in 2030. Most of the estimated growth is in Asia Pacific, from 0.53 
billion to 3.23 billion, principally in China and India. In Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the growth is from 181 million to 313 million. Using a more restricted 
definition of middle class, the World Bank expects the middle class share of global 
population to more than double by 2030.27 These families will all want higher edu-
cation for their children. Across the world, middle classes have similar aspirations. 
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Education is driving cultural globalization and facilitating economic globaliza-
tion. It is also part of the evolution of a more plural global power system. Kishore 
Mahbubani calls this process “the great convergence”: “There is no reason for the 
West to be pessimistic. The West will not lose power. It will have to share power. . . . 
The massive new middle classes emerging all around the world have begun to ac-
cept many of the aspirations and values of the Western middle classes.”Mahbubani 
attributes this to the education of emerging country elites in Western countries, or 
in Western-style universities at home. “In the past few decades, the world has pro-
duced the greatest flock of university-educated brains ever seen in human history. 
Never before have we nurtured talent at the scale occurring today. The rising tide 
of new talent is one of the key driving forces producing the great convergence.”28
A doubling of global participation is in prospect, in a single generation. This 
heralds a different world. Across the world better-educated populations will deal 
more effectively with governments, corporations, and each other. It is less clear 
how higher educational expansion will be paid for, where the jobs will be for grad-
uates, and whether there will be concurrent increases in upward social mobility. 
In these questions and problems, California is again being replicated everywhere 
across the world.
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When Clark Kerr wrote The Uses of the University in 1963, world scientific ca-
pacity was concentrated in North America, Great Britain, Western Europe, and 
Russia. There was limited exchange between the Western nations and science in 
Russia. Japan built its government science laboratories and research universities 
in the 1970s. Though from time to time nationals from other countries contrib-
uted important discoveries, they nearly always did so in the laboratories of one 
of the leading science powers. In some science systems, including those of the 
English-speaking nations, research capacity was primarily concentrated in large 
higher education institutions of the multiversity type. In others, including France, 
Germany, and Russia, separate public research agencies played the primary role 
in many fields of science, leading doctoral training or sharing it with the univer-
sities. In Russia many of the universities were specialist institutions confined to 
specific disciplines and linked to particular government ministries, though the 
national flagship Moscow State University was comprehensive in form. Following 
the Russian example, China also adopted the dual model of scientific research 
and established more specialist higher education institutions than multiversities. 
Before the 1990s, research in China was underdeveloped and had a negligible 
global role.
In sum, the spread of scientific capacity was limited, as was the reach of the 
multiversity, and they were not always in the same places. Some nations in Europe, 
Latin America, and Asia had comprehensive universities of the multiversity type 
in terms of disciplines but were minor players in the science literature. Many na-
tions sent bright students to the United States, Britain, or Western Europe for doc-
toral training, but only some of those that returned remained active in research.
10
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In the 1990s communicative globalization changed the structure of scientific 
practice. This was another development led from California: information and 
communications technologies at Stanford and Berkeley and in Silicon Valley in 
the 1980s led to the personal computer and then to the World Wide Web. In the 
early 1990s Internet penetration began to spread. In The Rise of the Network Soci-
ety, first published in 1996, Manuel Castells explains the economic logic of network 
growth: “The morphology of the network seems to be well adapted to increasing 
complexity of interaction and to unpredictable patterns of development arising 
from the creative power of such interaction,” states Castells. “Yet this network-
ing logic is needed to structure the unstructured while preserving flexibility, since 
the unstructured is the driving force of innovation in human activity.” Further, he 
argues, “when networks diffuse, their growth becomes exponential, as the ben-
efits of being in the network grow exponentially, because of the greater number of 
connections, and the cost grows in a linear pattern. Besides, the penalty for being 
outside the network increases with the network’s growth because of the declining 
number of opportunities in reaching other elements outside the network.”1
In a partly networked environment, the opportunity costs of exclusion grow 
over time. Yet in electronic networks, the unit cost of each new connection is neg-
ligible. These two facts together drive explosive growth until universal coverage 
is reached. So it has been with the Internet. There were 14 million users world-
wide in 1993, 121 million in 1997, and 501 million in 2001, 8.1 percent of the world’s 
population.2 Scientific communities and research universities were often early 
adopters, ahead of business and government. All research universities became im-
mediately visible to each other as part of a single networked community. Cross-
border e-mail ballooned. Potentials for active collaboration were much expanded. 
The Internet enabled complex data transfer and as bandwidths and technology 
improved, so did the use of video communications for meetings. In disciplinary 
conversations in research universities, suddenly everyone was in synchrony with 
everyone else. With journals and papers published on the Web instantly accessed 
from everywhere, the Internet soon came to constitute a single world library of sci-
entific knowledge that was continually updated. Because of the dominance of the 
English-speaking countries (principally the United States) in business, research, 
and the Internet itself, that single world library and most cross-border research 
communication were in the English language. The older global roles of French, 
German, and Russian faded. Spanish, Chinese, and Arabic had global potentials 
but were yet to establish themselves in more than regional science.
Here the growth and diversification of disciplinary knowledge, with its end-
less multiplication of specialisms (a process long endemic to higher education, as 
Bob Clark had pointed out), became joined to the new multiplication of networks, 
nodes, and participants. Conversation splintered and combined within one com-
municative grid. In this setting, strategic institutional creativity and intellectual 
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creativity catalyzed each other, though they were not the same process. Bob Clark 
captures the international dimension emerging in the late 1990s in Creating Entre-
preneurial Universities:
Internationally, no one controls the production, reformulation and distribution of 
knowledge. Fields of knowledge are the ultimate uncontrollable force. .  .  . Just by 
itself, the faculty of a university, department by department, expresses an inexhaust-
ible appetite for expansion in funding, personnel, students and space. Rampaging 
knowledge is a particularly penetrating demand, rooted in the building blocks of the 
system: it shapes basic-unit orientation, organization and practice. Since it has no 
stopping place, it never ceases. As one field after another stretches across national 
boundaries and brings more parts of universities into a truly international world of 
science and education, growth in the knowledge specialities also becomes the ulti-
mate internationalizing force for the higher education sector of society.3
THE GLOBAL SCIENCE SYSTEM
The Internet has mediated the emergence of a single system of global science and 
technology in English. Charles Vest calls this “an evolving global meta-universi-
ty.”4 Prior to the Internet, there was a worldwide conversation in most disciplines. 
What has changed is the fluency and volume of that conversation, so that the 
visible pool of common knowledge has larger presence and coherence. In turn, 
this change has reworked the balance between national and global elements. Lex 
Borghans and Frank Cörvers note: “If the transferability of research findings in-
creases, the costs of international research decrease, or the scale effects increase, 
researchers participating in the national debate will switch to the international 
debate when this threshold is reached.”5 The Internet increased transferability and 
decreased the costs of collaboration, while enhancing the number of researchers 
that could be brought in. It also rendered communications instantaneous. These 
effects were all substantial.
The global science system has not consumed national science systems. It has 
changed and relativized them. In all countries apart from the United States, the 
vast bulk of innovations, whether in basic research or in commercial applications, 
are sourced not from national science systems but from the global science system. 
Even in the United States, global knowledge has become crucial in most disci-
plines. The majority of high-citation papers are now published by non-Americans, 
a significant change. According to the National Science Foundation, 26.6 percent 
of the journal papers published in 2008–2010 had American authors, as did 46.4 
percent of the leading papers by citation rate (the 1 percent of world papers most 
cited) through the year 2012. American science was very strong in 2012 but was 
not as dominant as it had been ten years before, in 2002, when 57.0 percent of the 
top 1 percent papers had American authors. In other words, the citation measure 
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indicates that between 2002 and 2012 the role of non-American countries in lead-
ing science expanded from 43.0 to 53.6 percent of top 1 percent papers.6
Since World War II there has been a continuous expansion in the role of knowl-
edge-intensive production, a trend that exercised Clark Kerr in The Uses of the 
University. For all nations, the ability to access the global science and technology 
system is now essential to scientific effectiveness and industrial competitiveness. 
To access the global science system, nations need their own trained scientific ca-
pability. They need to be able to interpret, understand, and apply global science; 
to do this, they must actively engage in it. This means that they need their own 
trained personnel, capable not only of understanding research but also of mak-
ing it and collaborating with others who do so. This means that nations also need 
their own infrastructure, including doctoral training in at least some disciplines. 
Those that lack indigenous research capacity are locked into continuing depen-
dence and locked out of new technologies and knowledge-intensive production. 
The outcome is that research science is no longer the preserve of North America, 
the United Kingdom, Western Europe, Russia, and Japan. It has moved from the 
margins to normal business in both established and emerging states. All nations 
need science capacity—though not all can pay for it—just as they need clean water, 
stable governance, and a globally viable finance sector.
In policy, the spread of science is imagined as an arms race in innovation. Yet 
states lack purchase on innovation. International comparisons in that domain are 
elusive and few governments direct business activity (China is one exception). 
Policy makers provide tax breaks and other schemes to encourage industry-relat-
ed R & D but more directly focus on science output in universities and state-sector 
laboratories, where they provide the funds, enjoy policy sway, and have visible 
indicators. Global research rankings allow states to compare nations and identify 
their competitive position. It is ironic that the shift in the balance between na-
tional science systems and the global science system has fostered national capacity 
building in many countries, and the growing importance of research and com-
mercial applications in industry and national security has strengthened the policy 
emphasis on building basic science.
Global rankings also point policy towards basic science. Emphasis on science 
has been central to American federal policy since the Manhattan Project, Hi-
roshima, and Vannevar Bush’s report Science: The Endless Frontier (1945).7 At a 
world level, the policy emphasis on science—not just research but education in the 
STEM disciplines (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics)—has been 
intensifying for the last fifty years. This tendency in policy is associated with the 
growth of total scientific output, the spread of science capacity to more nations, 
the growing impact of global rankings on state policies and institutional manage-
ment and on increasing the number of high-prestige science universities, and the 
global hegemony of a post-Kerr version of the California multiversity—the large, 
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comprehensive science university that is not only multiple but entrepreneurial and 
increasingly performance managed, to ensure that science output is maximized 
and brought into dock with industry.
The output of published journal papers in science and social science has grown 
steadily at world level in the last two decades. Output rose from 564,645 papers in 
1995 to 827,705 in 2011, or 46.6 percent growth in sixteen years, at an annual rate 
of increase of 2.4 percent (table 10.1).8 Part of the growth reflects an expansion of 
capacity. Part of the growth reflects pressures to publish in performance-oriented 
universities, especially in countries keen to accelerate their evidence of scientific 
progress: an expanding journal list feeds these ambitions. Nevertheless, signs of 
the new science countries are unmistakable. Most of the growth has been concen-
trated in emerging science systems in East and Southeast Asia, Southern and East-
ern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America. The standout 
is China. In China between 1995 to 2011 the annual output of science papers rose 
by 892.0 percent, at the remarkable rate of annual increase of 15.4 percent. In Iran, 
journal paper numbers increased from just 280 in 1995 to 8,176 in 2011, constitut-
ing a growth rate of 23.5 percent a year, the highest in the world among significant 
research nations. Much of this output was concentrated in the physical sciences. 
Other nations with rapid growth in journal output included South Korea, Turkey, 
and Brazil. Table 10.2 has details. In 1995, thirty-seven nations each published at 
least one thousand research papers per year, a benchmark which indicates an in-
digenous capacity to generate science in at least some disciplines.9 By 2011 the 
number of such nations with their own science system was fifty, now including 
Chile, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Tunisia, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, and 
Thailand.
In the established research countries, some of the same performance pressures 
apply, but the growth of scientific output has been much more modest. Between 
Table 10.1. Annual output of published journal papers in science, 1995–2011





World 564,645 630,459 710,294 799,599 827,705 1.47  2.4%
United States 193,337 192,746 205,565 209,542 212,394 1.10  0.6%
European Union 195,897 222,688 235,121 250,031 254,482 1.30  1.6%
Russia  18,604  17,181  14,425  13,500  14,151 0.76 ---
China  9061  18,479  41,604  79,991  89,894 9.92 15.4%
Source: Adapted by Author using data from NSF 2014. Original data from Thomson-Reuters Science Citation 
Index and Social Science Citation Index
Note: Includes selected social science but not humanities.
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1995 and 2011, there was low growth in journal papers in Germany and France 
and little change in the United Kingdom. U.S. journal-paper output, three-quar-
ters of which was generated in universities, rose 9.9 percent, at an annual rate of 
0.6 percent. In Japan, paper volume rose by 21.3 percent between 1995 and 2000 
and then fell by 17.5 percent between 2000 and 2011. In Russia output fell dramati-
cally, by 23.9 percent between 1995 and 2011. Research infrastructure built in the 
Soviet period has not been adequately renewed, and Russian science and technol-
ogy are not as strongly engaged with global science as those of many other coun-
tries. In some sciences the published conversations are largely conducted in the 
Russian language.10 However, Japan and Russia are exceptional. Elsewhere global 
scientific output has been stable or has grown.
At the same time, foreign collaboration has increased at pace within the ex-
panding networks of global science, reflecting the ease of collaboration via the 
Internet. Between 1997 and 2012, the proportion of papers with international co-
authorship rose from 16 percent to 25 percent. In many countries a majority of 
papers are coauthored across borders: in 2012 there was intensive coauthorship 
within the Europe Research Area and between Asian countries. People working in 
large science systems, such as that of the United States, are less likely to coauthor 
abroad because a high number of domestic partners are available. However, the 
United States had high-intensity collaboration in Canada, Mexico, Chile, Israel, 
China, South Korea, and Taiwan relative to the overall pattern of collaborations by 
each pair of nations.11
Table 10.2. Fastest-growing national science systems, by country, 1995–2011
Published journal papers in:
Average annual growth, 
1995–20111995 2011
Iran  280  8,176 23.5%
China  9,061 89,894 15.4%
Tunisia  143  1,016 13.0%
South Korea  3,803 25,593 12.7%
Thailand  340  2,304 12.7%
Malaysia  366  2,092 11.5%
Turkey  1,715  8,328 10.4%
Portugal  990  4,626 10.1%
Pakistan  313  1,268  9.1%
Singapore  1,141  4,543  9.0%
Brazil  3,436 13,148  8.7%
Taiwan  4,759 14,809  7.4%
Source: Adapted by author, using data from NSF 2014.
Criteria: 1,000 papers in 2011, growth rate of more than 7.0% per annum.
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The increased focus on basic science in many countries, consistent with Clark 
Kerr’s 1963 discussion of the growing social role of knowledge and a point he re-
turned to in successive revisions of the Godkin Lectures,1 is associated also with 
strengthened support across the world for the kind of research multiversity that 
he described.
First, while patterns of research provision continue to vary by system, the over-
all tendency is to center an increasing proportion of science in the comprehensive 
research universities. Where there is an inherited structure of state academies and 
laboratories, for the most part it survives, but the role of the academies is con-
tracting overall. In China and, to a lesser extent, Russia, where in both cases the 
national academy of science continues to conduct a high proportion of funded 
scientific research,2 the state has nonetheless encouraged mergers in which spe-
cialist universities have become part of comprehensive institutions,3 while some 
activities previously sited in research academies are now in universities. This has 
increased the proportion of all researchers found in higher education. The fact that 
these countries and others with strong national institutes—such as France, Chi-
na, South Korea, and Germany—have all focused recently on investments in the 
global performance of their leading research universities4 will over time diminish 
the nonuniversity research organizations. This again strengthens the hegemony of 
the multiversity form.
Second, in some countries where elite professional preparation was separated 
from research universities, government has focused on bringing the two strands 
of higher education together, again moving closer to the multiversity. The classic 
case is France, where the 2010 IDEX program rewards cooperation between the 
11
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profession-focused grandes écoles, comprehensive research universities, and the 
private sector.5
Third, in all these countries and many others (though not all), governments 
have implemented funding and performance management policies designed to 
elevate the globally referenced research outcomes of a designated group of elite in-
stitutions (“world-class universities”) akin to the University of California. Global 
referencing is most often applied on the basis of global ranking. Global rankings 
are mostly lists of individual institutions, so that they, too, normalize the compre-
hensive multiversity.6 Large institutions with broad coverage of research do best in 
rankings, because they maximize the weight of research output and concentrate 
resources and international prestige. Between them the global rankings variously 
measure publication and citation volume and quality, reputation via multinational 
surveys of academic and employer opinion, the proportion of staff and students 
with international origins, income for research, and faculty as a resource. Rank-
ings will be examined first and then the various national programs to create world-
class universities, or WCUs.
GLOBAL UNIVERSIT Y R ANKING
Global higher education is a complex field in which institutions and national sys-
tems engage with each other in a lattice of relationships of cooperation and com-
petition. Global rankings have radically oversimplified that field, normalizing it 
as a market competition between research universities and countries, stratifying 
it on the basis of the template of the American multiversity, and summarizing the 
complex activities of multiversities with a handful of ordinal numbers.7 Yet the 
work of policy makers and university leaders everywhere is shaped by this global 
template. Through it, Clark Kerr’s multiversity, or rather a highly reified sketch of 
the multiversity of The Uses of the University, has become the idea of a global mul-
tiversity. This in turn has encouraged the homogenization of real-life universities 
along American lines.
The three principal rankings are those of the Shanghai ARWU, the Times Higher 
Education, and the QS, a marketing and consulting company that has built world-
wide business services on the back of its global ranking. Though the three rank-
ings use varied methodologies with varied rigor,8 all valorize the Anglo-American 
science university. The top-50 lists strongly overlap. There is more diversity at 
lower levels.
The indicators used by the Shanghai ARWU were outlined in table 8.1. The 
Times Higher Education uses thirteen separated indicators: reputational sur-
veys for research and teaching constitute 34.5 percent; bibliometric indicators, 
34.5 percent; income indicators, 10.75 percent; PhD studies, 8.25 percent; interna-
tionalization (the proportion of students and staff who are of international origin 
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and international copublication), 7.5 percent; and the student-staff ratio, 4.5 per-
cent. The individual rankings in each of these areas are not closely correlated.9 
Though the Times Higher ranking purports to be a measure of all aspects of higher 
education, there is no direct measure of teaching quality or learning achievement; 
there is only the survey of reputation for teaching and the student-staff ratio. In 
total, 73.25 percent of the Times Higher ranking is constituted by one or another 
aspect of research performance: research reputation via survey, citations, research 
volume, research-related income, international research collaboration, and PhDs. 
The use of surveys suggest that the Times Higher ranking has been designed as a 
reputational table, not a performance table.10
The same comment can be made about the QS ranking, which is 50 percent 
survey dependent and 20 percent determined by citation indicators, with the re-
maining indicators related to staff-student ratios and internationalization.11 The 
QS ranking is the least research metric dependent of the major rankings and, not 
coincidentally, is also the least rigorous. However, shifting the balance between 
academic opinion surveys and research metrics does not greatly change the rank-
ing outcome. This is because the quantity and quality of research play a central 
role in shaping the global reputation of institutions of higher education, while at 
the same time, there is a reciprocal movement from prestige to research outcomes. 
Global reputation is instrumental in drawing talent, ideas and resources from all 
over the world.
Research by Ellen Hazelkorn and others finds that outside the United States, 
global rankings shape the choices of many international students and influence 
the investment decisions and judgments of foundations, donors, and companies, 
not to mention high-performing faculty and prospective doctoral students. Highly 
ranked universities are global magnets for talent. Highly ranked universities also 
attract income from the sources that sustain their position. For many university 
presidents, improved rankings have become the principal performance indicator. 
By installing strategies designed to increase measured research inputs and outputs 
and other indicators that feed into rankings, university leaders normalize resource 
priorities, developmental strategies, and faculty management according to the 
content of the global rankings.12 These effects are magnified when system manag-
ers directly focus on higher rankings as an institutional objective. Remarkably, the 
overprecise and undercertain technologies of global university rankings have also 
become installed in the funding and decision regimes of many nation-states. For 
example, in 2007 immigration policy in the Netherlands was revised to include a 
provision that defined as a valued skilled migrant anyone who graduated from a 
world top-150 university as measured by one of the principal rankings. The gov-
ernments of Qatar, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia, among others, allocate scholar-
ships for foreign study to universities ranked in the world top 100, ensuring that 
about half of their globally mobile doctoral students will go to the United States.13 
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Rankings shape people’s lives. And as in France, many other governments have 
set strategic goals based on increasing the number of national universities in the 
world’s top 500, 200, 100, or 50, just as individual research universities set ranking-
related targets for themselves.14
WORLD-CL ASS UNIVERSITIES
Global ranking feeds into the flourishing “world-class university” industry with 
its conferences, papers, special journal editions, monographs, reports, consulting 
companies, and superannuated professors in the market in strategic advice. In this 
industry, creating a world-class university (WCU) is universally understood to 
mean achieving a globally ranked institution. WCUs have a number of meanings 
for national governments: WCUs signify research innovation power and, through 
that, economic status; WCUs’ programs resource local social elites; and WCUs at 
home might be seen to challenge Anglo-American neoimperial sway in higher 
education. “Developing prestigious institutions helps to legitimize the state as a 
national power.”15
In 2009 the World Bank published The Challenge of Establishing World-Class 
Universities by the coordinator of its tertiary education program, Jamil Salmi. Dot-
ted with examples of system and institutional transformations, the book sets out to 
“explore how institutions become tops in their league to guide countries and uni-
versity leaders seeking to achieve world-class status . . . [and] to explore the chal-
lenges involved in setting up globally competitive universities (also called ‘world-
class,’ ‘elite,’ or ‘flagship’ universities) that will be expected to compete effectively 
with the best of the best.”16 Salmi argues that the “superior results” associated with 
leading ranked universities—“highly sought graduates, leading-edge research, and 
technology transfer” derive from “three complementary sets of factors.” These are
(a) a high concentration of talent (faculty and students), (b) abundant resources to 
offer a rich learning environment and to conduct advanced research, and (c) favor-
able governance features that encourage strategic vision, innovation, and flexibility 
and that enable institutions to make decisions and to manage resources without be-
ing encumbered by bureaucracy.17
The Challenge of Establishing World–Class Universities emphasizes that the role 
of government is crucial, particularly in research infrastructure: “It is unlikely that 
a world-class university can be rapidly created without a favorable policy environ-
ment and direct public initiative and support, if only because of the high costs 
involved in setting up advanced research facilities and capacities.”18 At the same 
time, American autonomy and an entrepreneurial approach are also seen as vital, 
much as Bob Clark had argued in 1998. Salmi finds that universities in the United 
States are the best because of their “relative independence from the state” together 
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with “the competitive spirit that encompasses every aspect of it.” In the United 
States “the environment in which universities operate fosters competitiveness, un-
restrained scientific inquiry, critical thinking, innovation, and creativity.”19 At the 
institutional level Salmi emphasizes “strong,” visionary, and performance-focused 
executive leadership with “a clearly articulated strategic plan to translate the vision 
into concrete targets and programs,”20 as well as the use of internationalization 
strategies, especially in research.21
Salmi’s argument shows that it is difficult for most nations to mount top-100 
global multiversities because of cost. At the same time, he argues that money alone 
is not enough. Nations must play to their contexts, strengths, and resources. Strat-
egies to develop WCUs should be nested in plans to augment education as a whole 
and in larger national strategies for economic and social development.22 Impor-
tantly, and ironically, given that this is a how-to-do-it primer on WCUs, Salmi ar-
gues that not all should so aspire: “The hype surrounding world-class institutions 
far exceeds the need and capacity for many systems to benefit from such advanced 
education and research opportunities. . . . Not every nation needs comprehensive 
world-class universities, at least not while more fundamental tertiary education 
needs are not being met.” It might be better to have sustainable polytechnic-style 
institutions nested in social realities and local needs.23 No doubt this last piece of 
realistic advice has been scarcely noticed in the headlong rush towards imagined 
global status.
Salmi’s version of the multiversity joins the global rankings template to the New 
Public Management recipe for transforming higher education using quasi-markets 
and entrepreneurial leadership. In this body of thought, academic creativity and 
corporatist competiveness are all of a piece under the rubric of business strategy 
and business plans. It is Bob Clark’s 1998 idea but with a little less emphasis on 
the autonomous “academic heartland.” Though Salmi discusses the Master Plan 
with approval, he does not tease out the virtues of the cross-campus collaboration 
within the University of California. On the other hand, his argument is not a pure 
neoliberal one. He factors in a larger role for state agency than Anglo-American 
states now claim, at least openly. He emphasizes that government planning and 
funding are central to WCU development, especially the successful cases of rapid 
development.
Governments pursue two broad strategies to build a stronger research subsec-
tor. One strategy uses competition to drive differentiation and concentration in 
existing top institutions (“rewarding quality”). The second strategy is to build new 
capacity in old or new institutions identified by government (“picking winners”). 
The first strategy allows government to evade direct responsibility for making 
choices between institutions, though the outcomes of competition are often pre-
dictable. At one extreme, this pathway allows government to avoid making spe-
cific additional investments and merely use quasi-market research competition 
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for existing resources and status to create the concentration through the Matthew 
effect.24 In the second strategy of capacity building, state investment is manda-
tory. The English-speaking countries tend to follow the first pathway. The United 
Kingdom, the United States, and Australia all allocate a majority of research sup-
port through competitive project and program funding. They also manage a larger 
framework of competition in higher education, for all resources and prestige, of-
ten including teaching-related funding. This framework tends to favor the leading 
institutions and enables them to strengthen their relative national position over 
time,25 elevating their global position also. The United Kingdom buttresses the top 
layer of research universities by allocating additional resources on the basis of a 
census of research performance, the Research Excellence Framework.26
In contrast, many other countries have implemented capacity-building world-
class university programs in universities identified as actual or potential WCUs. 
Such schemes often involve competitive bidding for inclusion in the program. 
Salmi identifies nine countries that have funded universities as institutions, and 
another nine that have funded departments or research clusters directly. In all, in 
the 2005–2009 period alone there were nineteen programs in Europe and twelve 
in East and Southeast Asia, though only one in Africa (Nigeria), two in the Middle 
East (Israel and Saudi Arabia), one in North America (Canada), and none in Latin 
America. These programs include the Excellence Initiative in Germany, which be-
gan in 2005; Operation Campus in France (2008); Project 211 (1995) and Project 
985 (1998) in China; the Brain 21 program in South Korea (1999); a series of pro-
grams in Japan including Global 30, Global COE, the Program for Promoting the 
Enhancement of Research Universities, and the Top Global University Program; 
and parallel initiatives at greater or lesser levels of funding and effectiveness in 
Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other countries.27
STR ATEGIES OF INTERNATIONALIZ ATION
In 2011, together with Philip Altbach, Salmi released a set of case studies, The Road 
to Academic Excellence: The Making of World-Class Universities. The first half of 
the book echoes the method of Bob Clark in Creating Entrepreneurial Universi-
ties (1978). It consists of four narratives of successful development in East Asia: 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University in China, Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology, the private Pohang University of Science and Technology in South 
Korea, and the National University of Singapore. Other chapters cover universi-
ties in India, Nigeria, Chile, and Russia where the ideal trajectory is less apparent. 
Salmi identifies several “accelerating factors” assisting the successful cases, which 
are mostly strategies of “internationalization” that secure effective conformity with 
the global multiversity template. These strategies have been especially important 
in East Asia.28 However, internationalization has differing meanings, governed by 
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where the country and its universities sit in the global order. In English-speaking 
countries, its impact is benign: stronger cross-border relationships and growing 
awareness of other systems, without having to transform at home. In non-English-
speaking environments, it means importing the global multiversity into the home 
setting. Internationalization becomes Americanization, which is not benign and is 
often problematic, especially for faculty not working in the STEM disciplines, for 
whom national language is the essential medium and sometimes also the product 
of their work.29
These internationalization strategies include research concentration in the 
STEM disciplines; encouraging citizens who have completed their doctoral stud-
ies abroad, mostly in the United States, to return to the nation; measures to attract 
foreign research talent; adopting English as the main university language; incen-
tives for English-language publishing; encouraging faculty to spend time in top 
universities abroad; and benchmarking of research units and teaching programs 
with American, British, or Western European comparators. At Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University, Qi Wang, Q. H. Wang, and Niancai Liu report that about 15 percent 
of all discipline-based courses are bilingual. The university conducts joint degree 
programs in the United States, Germany, and France. A quarter of all first-degree 
students spend periods aboard; the target level is 50 percent of students by 2020. 
Selected doctoral students go abroad, supported by scholarships that cover tuition 
fees, travel, and living expenses.30 Internationalization policy also implies “different 
concepts of university governance and management” and “international standards 
to improve quality in all aspects.”31 Pohang University of Science and Technology, 
which is bilingual in English and Korean, announced in 2010 “that it would invite 
10 Nobel laureates or Fields medalists as full-time professors” for a three-year peri-
od. Each invited scholar was to be given US$1 million for salary and US$4 million 
for research and living costs.32 Salmi identifies a number of “accelerating factors” 
that can hasten the ascension to WCU status, including bringing back the national 
research diaspora, using English, making the campus more accessible to foreign 
talent, niche focus on particular STEM disciplines, international benchmarking, 
and innovations in curricula.33
“The U.S. research university model is widely considered the gold standard 
and is emulated globally,” proclaims Altbach in The Road to Academic Excellence. 
“The quintessential U.S. public research universities are those of the University of 
California system. . . . The California Master Plan for Higher Education of 1960 
constitutes an effective way of organizing a differentiated public higher education 
system to cater to research excellence as well as to access and massification.”34 
What other countries have taken from the California Idea, above all, is a layer of 
peak research universities above a hierarchical education system. This intellectual 
order is readily rendered congruent with elite formation without disturbing the 
social order.
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GLOBAL SAMENESS
The world science system, global rankings, and the WCU movement on the basis 
of the global multiversity template all tend to facilitate convergence. Kishore Mah-
bubani states:
All the better universities know that they have to have strong science and engineer-
ing faculties to get any kind of global recognition. Equally importantly, the language 
of science and engineering is a global language. The laws of physics equally apply 
to all corners. Hence the global spread of education in science and technology is 
another major driving force in the creation of one world.35
By facilitating open global systems, global homogenization makes it easier for 
all parties to communicate freely, to cooperate, and to build joint research and 
teaching programs. Arguably, this maximizes collective output on a world scale. 
However, the homogeneous systems used in universities and research are not read-
ily nuanced and customized for each locality, and this has a number of downsides.
First, the universal rollout of the American multiversity as the iconic form of 
higher education, cemented in place by the normative power of global rankings, 
has negative implications for other institutional forms in higher education—small 
universities and colleges; very large universities with uneven research intensity; 
universities that do not pay high salaries to faculty in global demand; institutions 
primarily focused on teaching (including some such as American liberal arts col-
leges that are intellectually and socially elite, though it must be said that some lib-
eral arts colleges do a surprising amount of non-STEM research); institutions fo-
cused on underrepresented populations; specialist universities confined to one or 
two disciplines in business, medicine, media, or the arts; and technical-vocational 
institutions focused on applied research and industry training. It also has negative 
implications for universities emphasizing the humanities and the humanistic so-
cial sciences or nationally specific research in professional disciplines that do not 
figure in the world journals (perhaps law, and some work in business and educa-
tion). Despite Altbach’s comment, the ranked-university universe breaks contact 
with the California Idea in significant ways. One difference is that each individual 
research university is positioned as competing with all, rather than as a member of 
a collaborative system in which the success of one is the success of all. Another is 
that, unlike the California system forms, ranking does not encompass institutional 
diversity. It bears down hard on nonmultiversities. It drives them upwards towards 
a global research-intensive form that not all can perform, not all should perform, 
and none can finance. All nations, rich and poor, need institutions other than sci-
ence universities, but the elevation of the multiversity as the one single emblematic 
form undermines the status and resources of all other institutions.
Second, the uniform global multiversity tends to suppress national-cultural di-
versity. The global multiversity form creates a strategic dilemma in all universities, 
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in all countries that publish in languages other than English—that is, the majority 
of the higher education world. The effect is felt most completely in smaller nations 
that are propelled into global English quickly because of the returns to scale.36 
It also undermines the potentials of larger language groupings, such as speakers 
of French and German, which have some claim as global languages. Across the 
world, national-cultural tradition is manifest also in institutional form and iden-
tity. The global multiversity discriminates against alternate configurations of high 
science, scholarship, and social prestige, including other long-established institu-
tional norms.
Here the hegemonic impact of the global multiversity recalls earlier critiques 
of education as cultural imperialism.37 Consider the great Latin American national 
universities such as the University of Sao Paulo in Brazil, the University of Buenos 
Aires (UBA) in Argentina, and the Autonomous National University of Mexico 
(UNAM) in Mexico City. These institutions, which almost parallel the church in 
their scope and centrality to the state and national life, are larger than the multi-
versity and have a broader remit. UNAM has over 300,000 students, dozens of 
sites, and carries out a quarter of all research in Mexico. It houses many leading 
research centers and is also a large provider of social access to higher education. 
It also sustains a significant part of Mexico City’s cultural life, not to mention one 
of the leading football teams. Its social and cultural missions handicap its posi-
tion in global rankings. A broad range of nonresearch roles, and large numbers 
of teaching-only faculty and service personnel tend to dissipate potential research 
resources and reduce faculty research performance on a per capita basis. Yet given 
the national expectations surrounding UNAM’s role as a flagship university in 
Mexico, a ranking outside the top 100 hurts it in the eyes of public and govern-
ment. Global rankings of the Shanghai ARWU and Times Higher Education type 
create a no-win situation for UNAM. Should it reduce its national mission to meet 
the global template? If it narrows mission, it loses national funding and perhaps 
status. If it does not narrow mission, its ranking and again its status and perhaps 
also its budget are depressed. Also, what happens to its extensive Spanish-language 
scholarship in the humanities, doubly excluded by language and discipline? The 
global multiversity circuit brings the world, especially scientists, together. Yet 
when it is regulated by ranking, this reduces diversity in knowledge, ideas and 
cultural forms. Higher education should expand the capacity for self-determining 
agency, not narrow its range and rob it of its confidence to be itself.
C OMPARING SYSTEMS
The effects of the WCU movement among non-WCUs raises the question of the 
implications of ranking for national systems of higher education. A study by Leon 
Cremonini and his colleagues suggests that policies designed to create stronger 
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WCUs in Finland, France, and Germany have neglected the issue of benefits for 
the national system as a whole, which cannot be seen as automatic.38 One ranking 
that tackles this issue directly is the Universitas21 (U21) ranking. This compares 
national systems, not institutions. The composite index used in the U21 ranking 
includes orthodox values for research outputs and quality. It also covers social 
participation in higher education and the autonomy and connectedness of in-
stitutions.39 These additional factors are again sensibilities called up by the U.S./
California experience. At the same time, the U21 ranking is consistent with a range 
of missions and a division of labor between research-intensive universities and 
the other institutions. All else being equal, it also rewards cooperation between 
research universities, rather than modeling them solely as competitors, as do other 
rankings. However, the U21 system ranking does not prevent the suppression of 
global cultural and linguistic diversity. No mechanism of cross-national compari-
son in higher education has solved that problem.
The U21 system ranking has achieved little prominence, however. It is a foot-
note to the common fascination with league table hierarchies based on individual 
research universities, which imagine the global multiversity as a stand-alone firm, 
with little attention to the national contextual elements that condition performance 
and none to the relative quality of mass education institutions. In this framing the 
California Idea’s notion of a multilayered interdependent system slips from sight.
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System design and stratification have many different configurations. Except in 
very small systems, there is normally a hierarchy of institutions, formal or infor-
mal, associated with stratification in the social value of participation and mostly 
attuned also to the segmentation of incoming students. Even in the egalitarian 
Nordic societies, certain research universities enjoy more prestige than do other 
institutions.
The tendency to stratification of institutions on the basis of unequal value is 
inevitable where there is inequality of wealth and status and social competition 
for a limited number of well-paid professional jobs. When institutions and stu-
dents choose each other (rather than students being allocated places on the ba-
sis of location or by government decision), the primary stratification takes the 
form of bifurcation.1 A bifurcation is a binary division into separate and opposing 
subgroups that together constitute an interdependent system. Institutions divide 
between “selecting” (or “status-seeking”) universities and colleges, where there 
are more applications than places, and “student-selected” (or “student-seeking”) 
institutions that are easy to enter. This tendency to elite/non-elite bifurcation of 
institutions is ultimately driven by the absolute scarcity of highly valued social 
opportunities, or in the theoretical terms of social science, the zero sum character 
of positional competition.2 The number of stellar careers is limited and only some 
university “brands” and degrees carry a high probability of such careers. This is an 
ultimate barrier to egalitarian higher education, unless higher education is leveled 
downwards and taken out of social allocation (as in China during the Cultural 
Revolution of 1966–1971). If higher education ceased to be an avenue for positional 
advancement, a large part of its social role would evaporate.
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When the participation rate advances, the mass education segment of higher 
education grows in size relative to the elite segment. The proportion of relatively 
low-value places tends to grow: the base of the pyramid expands more quickly 
than the peak that it supports. Social access widens but the average probability 
of reaching the elite level is reduced. When all else is equal, the expansion of par-
ticipation is associated with a tendency to steeper stratification of the system. The 
1960 California Master Plan institutionalized the relative expansion of the base 
by largely concentrating future growth in two-year community colleges. In addi-
tion, as noted, by fixing enrollment shares between the subsectors, it blocked the 
downward spread of the research university role. The research sector could never 
reach more than 12.5 percent of the age cohort. California public higher education 
became “steeper” than systems in which a larger proportion of young persons ex-
perienced research universities. This formula concentrated degree value at the top 
of the system, protecting the University of California and enabling it to compete 
with the leading private universities, while sustaining a large sector with relatively 
low diploma value likely to decline over time.
POLICY AND SYSTEM SHAPE
As the example of the Master Plan shows, stratification is not solely a natural pro-
cess. System and structure are constructed by policy, regulation, and resourcing. 
National, federal, and provincial jurisdictions are in play, sometimes in complex 
combinations. It differs by country. Private sectors are sometimes regulated to-
gether with public institutions and sometimes regulated separately, or scarcely 
regulated at all. Governments can modify the natural tendency to stratification. 
They can also enhance that tendency, in general or in a nuanced fashion. They 
can attempt to fix an institutional hierarchy, and they can allow it to float freely. In 
some countries, all places in tertiary education enjoy social status and provide a 
solid platform for the workforce, while in other systems it is not so. There is broad 
scope for policy choices.
The steepness of the hierarchy is reduced when governments move beyond 
mere rhetoric about parity of esteem and apply policies that actually equalize the 
status and resource base of institutions. A number of Western European systems, 
notably those in the Nordic countries, sustain unitary public systems based on the 
principle of institutional parity of esteem. Private higher education plays a lesser 
role in Finland and Norway and a negligible role in Sweden and Denmark. The 
commercial subsector is absent. No tuition is charged to citizen students in public 
institutions. Thus Nordic governments work against the grain of natural stratifi-
cation and utilize higher education as a means of reducing rather than enhanc-
ing Matthew effects. These nations offer all of their citizens high-quality higher 
education as a matter of right. Not by coincidence, these nations have relatively 
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high levels of intergenerational mobility in higher education3 and relatively low in-
equalities of income and wealth, reflecting and facilitating an egalitarian approach 
to educational policy (which is not to say that social equality is simply “caused” 
by educational equality: see part 3). The crucial achievement is that in terms of 
quality, they level up and not down, within a freer atmosphere than applies in 
most systems. While universities such as Helsinki and Copenhagen are the most 
attractive places for faculty to work, it is possible to be a world-leading researcher 
in any Nordic university. University leaders also have scope to pursue differing 
paths to high performance. Their work is facilitated by Nordic school systems with 
high and egalitarian learning achievement and high levels of state-driven R & D 
investment. The Nordic model is under pressure to move to state-managed quasi 
markets, and there are tensions deriving from competition for research funding 
and managerial intervention in academic work, but it remains a more completely 
public policy than California.4 It shows what public educational provision can 
achieve when there is broad consensus about taxation and its use for common 
social purposes, including education.
In Germany and the Low Countries, all research universities traditionally 
enjoyed parity of esteem, though as in some Nordic countries, they were distin-
guished from nonresearch university institutions. Germany has now moved away 
from parity of esteem by applying the Excellence Initiative in selected research 
universities. The Netherlands maintains formal parity within the research univer-
sity sector. While universities such as Utrecht, Amsterdam, and Leiden stand out, 
the top group is much larger, a broader distribution of elite research capacity than 
in the English-speaking world. The difference between the positional leaders and 
other research universities is less than in the United Kingdom, where Cambridge 
and Oxford are in a category of their own, and in the United States, with the Ivy 
League and the flagship publics.
In contrast to the Nordic approach, in many countries the steepness of the in-
stitutional hierarchy is increased by policy—when resource levels and quality of 
provision are differentiated because it is too expensive to provide all students with 
“world-class” teaching, facilities, and income support; when nations enhance the 
support given to selected WCUs without boosting status and resources at other 
levels; and especially when competition is a principal medium for determining 
status and resources. As noted, competition naturally generates Matthew effects 
that strengthen elites. When competition is joined to unequal starting points, as 
is the case in nearly all systems, and/or joined to unequal resource allocations, as 
in the many systems that allocate research funding on a competitive basis, then 
the stratification of institutions is magnified. These effects reinforce the already 
self-reproducing nature of the university hierarchy. In higher education it is more 
difficult to displace the established sector leaders by meritocratic pressure from 
below than is the case in most other industries—for example, those that produce 
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cars, mobile phones, or financial services.5 Over time the leading firms in those 
industries tend to change. In higher education the positional leaders stay on top. 
Some of them have been there for hundreds of years.
Most (though not all) nations do not collect enough tax revenue to offer univer-
sal access to research-intensive teaching universities. Institutions need a threshold 
level of resources to be global research players. Many cannot achieve it. This gen-
erates institutional differentiation based on the research role plus resource levels. 
When research universities partly sustain their research on the basis of tuition, the 
resulting price barriers generate asymmetries in access that are based on tuition 
cost, reinforcing the stratification of students and hence the natural binary struc-
ture of systems. The research role is a primary marker of elite status and a medi-
ating factor in the pairing of elite institutions with elite students. In competitive 
systems, institutions become strung out in a vertical status hierarchy, in which re-
search performance, financial resources, student selectivity, and degree firepower 
are all more or less aligned. In the United States this hierarchical segmentation 
is not left entirely to the free play of market forces (money and reputation). It is 
regulated on the basis of classifications with separate institutional missions, gen-
erating subcompetitions of high-research universities, other doctoral institutions, 
four-year institutions, and two-year colleges.
American stratification is not driven just by positional competition and re-
source scarcity. It is sustained also by the need for definition and identity in the 
face of the large, open, and opaque higher education system, labor market, and 
society. Classifications provide a place for all. Community colleges offer locality 
and perhaps “community.” The in-between CSUs suggest social mobility. Voca-
tional colleges promise a job. Research universities promise the world. The overall 
hierarchy facilitates both some upward mobility and also Bob Clark’s “cooling out” 
function, whereby institutions in the lower echelons help students to temper their 
ambitions and lower their expectations.6 Through institutional classifications, the 
hierarchy of unequal institutions performs the same function as a free market 
in position—it aligns unequal social origins, as well as unequal academic merit, 
to unequal social outcomes—but in a more predictable way. The broad range of 
“uses” to which higher education is put encourage all-round movement towards 
the greater certainty and more tradable value, along with the nuanced sense of be-
longing and opportunity, that subsectoral categories bring. This formal hierarchy 
does not guarantee equality of opportunity, but it no doubt contributes to a stable 
social order.
SYSTEM VARIET Y
The shape of systems varies according to national tradition and history, policy as-
sumptions, social expectations, and the professions and labor markets. As noted, 
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some societies use a horizontal division of labor between institutional types, with 
parallel academic and technical-vocational streams. If there are vertical implica-
tions in such distinctions, they are modest and understated. Other nations pres-
ent distinctions as vertical in the manner of California. Commitment to upward 
transfer arrangements is highly variable. Purposes also vary. In some societies, 
vocational preparation is expected to dominate the sector. In other countries, such 
as the United States, generalist first degrees are standard practice. All other nations 
had different starting points from that of California. Once established, higher edu-
cation structures are path dependent. People invest in them. They do not readily 
transform. Mergers, new subsectors, and the fall of structures are traumatic and 
protracted events.
In established higher education systems of Western Europe and the English-
speaking countries, both elite research universities and institutions of mass ed-
ucation have emerged, as in the United States. Some universities combined the 
missions. The fact of different missions does not in itself lead to a fixed division 
of labor of the California type. Formal classifications are used in only some coun-
tries. Certain others, such as Russia, apply formalized classification to the leading 
group of research universities rather than all institutions.7 Subsectors more often 
compete on the boundaries than remain quiet. Middle institutions press against 
the limits of their role and press upwards for status, hoping that resources will fol-
low; yet they are dependent on resources to make the climb upwards in the first 
place. Though machinery for coordination takes many forms, subsectors rarely 
enjoy California’s autonomy, and coordination is often directly controlled by the 
state. Long-term planning is rarer than it was, having often given way to quasi 
markets and principal-agent steering, but these mechanisms allow governments 
to maintain control. Classifications are usually regulated by government rather 
than by autonomous civil organizations as in the United States. Two-year colleges, 
for-profit activity, and online provision and certified on-the-job training are less 
likely to be regulated by institutional definitions and firm intrasectoral demarca-
tions. Private provision is normally looser than public provision, especially online 
higher education, which by its nature is impossible to fully regulate, especially 
when in cross-border mode.
Many examples could be cited to demonstrate the variety of arrangements. 
Both Australia (1988) and the United Kingdom (1992) abolished binary systems 
based on the distinction between universities versus polytechnic-style institutions 
and teachers’ colleges. In these now unitary systems, degree-providing institutions 
are not formally segmented but are constituted as a single quasi market. There is 
parity of esteem, but only in a formal sense. All can become registered as provid-
ers of full-fee international education in the global market for students (one of the 
rationales for the official parity) and all may compete for public research fund-
ing. Yet there are widely understood distinctions in research intensity, resources, 
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and social standing. This plays out in the differential values attached to degrees, 
though government normally sustains the fiction of unitary parity of esteem—for 
example, by not measuring rates of return by institution and focusing on differ-
entiation only by field of study. In the outcome, the research-oriented sector is 
stretched on a vertical continuum from leading global universities to institutions 
almost solely teaching- and service-focused, with a handful of doctoral students 
and a little applied research and consultancy. Thus the UK/Australia unitary sys-
tem form includes universities of both the UC and the CSU type in terms of social 
standing and real research role. Between the selecting and the student-selected 
universities lies a group of middle institutions, pushing upwards, carrying some 
research but never enough to become elite. In Australia, policy and research fund-
ing support have aligned so as to ensure that the majority of funded universities 
are located in this middle group and all carry research-university credibility in the 
market for international students.8 The striking differences with California are that 
in both the United Kingdom and Australia, as also in New Zealand, most full-time 
higher education students are located in universities with a formal research mis-
sion, and the system is managed through a competitively ordered market segmen-
tation rather than in classification-based segments. American higher education is 
more unabashed in embracing the notion of itself as a “market,” yet the UK and 
Australian systems are more marketized than the California Idea.
In 1963 Martin Trow criticized the report of the British Robbins committee for 
“making the universities with their high standards and expensive practices, the 
numerically dominant form of British higher education.” He suggested that British 
higher education would be better off with a California-style pyramid rather than 
an inverted pyramid.9 Certainly the pyramid makes for a more stable system. The 
elite is unambiguous. Yet whether there is more or less opportunity for upward 
university mobility in California is unclear. Nominally, the middle-level British 
and Australian universities can climb to positional leadership, but with the pos-
sible exception of the University of Warwick, singled out for study by Bob Clark, 
none have actually done so.
Both the United Kingdom and Australia also maintain a further/vocational ed-
ucation sector with weaker social standing than that of the degree-providing uni-
versities, as evidenced in student entry scores and rates of return data. This sector 
is not dignified with the title “higher education.” Further education in the United 
Kingdom has something of a community college function.10 It provides two-year 
diplomas and is moving into three-year degrees. But it is smaller and weaker than 
in California. Its access role is shared with lower-status universities. The sharply 
vertical relationship between universities and further and vocational education 
in the UK/Australian approach contrasts with the binary systems in Germany, 
Taiwan, South Korea, and the Netherlands, where the respective standing of the 
subsectors is more ambiguous. While the most prestigious institutions, and those 
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where the highest paid professionals are prepared, are in the academic-research 
sector, Germany, Taiwan, and Korea support high-quality technical-vocational 
universities at degree level. These institutions service large-scale advanced manu-
facturing industry sectors. In the Netherlands, the hogescholen in the second sec-
tor are more generalist in character and focused on local employment. They have 
less standing than the fachhochschulen in Germany and seek to advance their posi-
tion through a larger research role, a development so far resisted by the established 
research universities and the state.11
Unlike the system structures in the Netherlands and Germany but like those 
in most of East Asia, the research university sector in Taiwan and South Korea 
is highly differentiated. Seoul National University in South Korea towers over all 
other higher education institutions, enjoying perhaps more social and occupation-
al prestige within its nation than does Harvard in the United States. This is true 
also of the University of Tokyo in Japan, and Tsinghua and Peking Universities in 
China. In contrast the Hong Kong University Grants Council pursues policies de-
signed to ensure that most universities have similar size, mission, and status. The 
small island city has five universities in the world’s top 500 and three in the front 
ranks—the University of Hong Kong, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and 
the fast-rising Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.12
Modern Chinese higher education has been largely built in the last twenty years, 
in accelerated fashion and on a monumental scale, on the base of the traditional 
institutional landscape leveled during the Cultural Revolution. A low level of par-
ticipation together with the capacity of the post-Mao state to execute long-term 
planning and infrastructure financing constituted a remarkable opportunity; in 
the 1990s China adopted a California template. Its system design joined research-
intensive universities focused on global science to provincial universities, the 
equivalent of the CSU campuses, and to two-year colleges with a generalist man-
date, the equivalent of California’s community colleges. These distinctions were 
held in place by a classification system along American lines. The government also 
facilitated mergers to form comprehensive institutions, prior to the takeoff in en-
rollments at the end of the decade. The 211 program for one hundred modernized 
universities began in 1994. The 985 program, which allocated $10 billion in extra 
funding to thirty-nine selected research universities, began in 1998.13 Spending per 
student in elite institutions has always been much higher than in nonelite institu-
tions, but the gap has increased. In 1997 elite universities were funded per student 
20 percent more but by 2007, following allocations under the 985 program, they 
had twice the per-student funding of nonelite institutions.14 Although the leading 
research universities have grown in size, the overwhelming bulk of the expansion 
in China has taken place in second- and third-tier institutions, as in California. 
Over time there have also been divergences from California. The national govern-
ment encouraged the growth of private institutions developed under the auspices 
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of public universities as a way to broaden access to high-demand public institu-
tions while facilitating private funding. The private sector is more closely regu-
lated in China than in California. In addition, in 2014 it was announced that six 
hundred institutions would be remade as vocational institutes, creating a dual-
track higher education sector parallel to Germany and Korea. China’s first voca-
tional gaokao (end of school examination) was conducted in June 2014.15 Low-tier 
generalist institutions producing flexible credentials have lost some standing. The 
new vocational sector is nested in a strategy to shift part of China’s export sector 
from middle level to advanced manufacturing. This shift from California forms to 
German-origin forms looks significant.
As noted, across the world, the most common elements in higher education 
systems are the multiversity and an accessible mass higher education sector. The 
social reach of research universities—their extent of coverage of the population—
is varied. Credential hierarchies and institutional size, shape, specialization, and 
configuration take many forms. The size and scope of the ambiguous middle in-
stitutions also varies, and mass higher education is less globally standardized than 
is elite higher education. Some evidence suggests that stratification in systems 
is becoming steeper16 because of growth effects in broadening participation at 
the base, WCU agendas, and the use of quasi-market competition, and increased 
reliance on private funding in many countries. Whether the national hierarchy is 
steep or not, mass higher education varies in quality. Some mass education, while 
nonselective at point of entry, provides solid programs and credentials that are 
pathways to occupations and solid graduate earnings advantages in comparison 
to nongraduates. At the other extreme are institutions and degrees that are fraud-
ulent or otherwise lacking value. There is much variation in the role and quality 
of private sectors, and within that group, in the role of commercial providers. 
There are relatively few elite private universities across the world, in part because 
of the high cost of funding research science, which in economic terms is a public 
good that cannot be funded in markets. Outside the United States, the Philip-
pines (where private universities have become de facto leaders because of the 
impoverishment of national universities) and perhaps South Korea, nearly every 
leading university is a state sector institution. In this respect the world diverges 
from American higher education, though not from the forms of California’s pub-
lic higher education.
PROBLEMS OF MASS HIGHER EDUCATION
The state underpins the research university and shows no sign of retreating from 
that role anywhere. Even the Ivy League is massively subsidized by research grants 
and student loans funding. Worldwide, the state’s role in mass higher education is 
more variable. Some regimes take full responsibility for the quantity and quality 
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of higher education as a whole, whether provided in public sectors or on a shared 
public and private basis. In some other nations, the state’s contribution to mass 
higher education is in retreat. In a third group of nations, that role is partly or little 
developed.
In the English-speaking world, most of Europe, the post-Soviet zone, and parts 
of Asia, there are public institutions, many of them large, offering state-shaped 
and often state-provided mass higher education. These subsectors are akin to the 
community colleges in California. As in California, for the most part the system 
dynamic of mass public institutions is not one of buyer-seller markets. It paral-
lels large-scale, bureaucratically driven wartime mobilization and the large state 
systems of basic education or public health that handle high volumes of people 
processing with moderate effectiveness. In contrast, nations such as India, Indone-
sia, Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil have large private sectors carrying 
most of mass higher education. In the first three cases, the private colleges tend 
to be small, antiquated, and poor in quality. There is also a growing commercial 
component in many nations, more like modern firms and similar to (and often 
owned by) the for-profit sector in the United States. In Peru, for-profit universi-
ties account for 38 percent of undergraduate enrollments; in Brazil they enroll 
36 percent.17 The problem for mass commercial education is that almost always, 
like mass public education, it is positioned as low quality in terms of use value and 
positional value. Subsidized research-intensive universities, public or private, re-
main dominant. This limits the scope for commodification in both the upper and 
lower reaches of national systems.18
Across the world, elite research-intensive universities are travelling relatively 
well. They have powerful social support, and states believe that research is a stra-
tegic necessity. Mass higher education is not travelling as well in many countries. 
As in California, the expansion of participation is often accompanied by declining 
resources per head, increases in tuition costs, and a flattening of the absolute earn-
ings returns to graduates, though the average graduate retains an advantage over 
nongraduates. As systems move beyond 50 percent participation and approach 
full universality, in the lower reaches of the status hierarchy, especially in generic 
disciplines, there is a flattening of the status advantages that high education brings. 
When everyone is a graduate, this no longer confers a distinction. There may come 
a point when the disadvantages attached to nongraduation are eclipsed by the fi-
nancial costs and opportunity costs of enrollment, especially if the actual learning 
experience is weak. Quality-assurance techniques are installed in most mass high-
er education systems. But while quality assurance encourages internal institutional 
reflexivities, it does not generate a broad-based momentum for measurable quality 
improvement. Often it is used to bed down performance management regimes 
and to augment marketing, enabling institutions to show they are going well even 
when they are not.
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Some mass higher education is healthier, perhaps more like California in the 
1960s than California today. There is no necessary trade-off between growth and 
quality when government enhances both. Foreign examples, good and bad, mat-
ter more than they did. In the global higher education space that is a function 
of communicative convergence, all system cases—private sector dominated and 
public sector led, highly stratified or fairly flat—can now be seen by every other. In 
a world in which higher education has converged in certain ways, particularly in 
levels of participation and in the forms of Clark Kerr’s multiversity, it is also more 
apparent than it was in 1960 that higher education anywhere can be done differ-
ently. All national systems have something to learn from others.
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So this is the global setting in which American universities find themselves when 
they lift their sights above the domestic concerns that normally dominate the 
agenda. It is a setting in which all research universities are globally networked 
and aware and in which American research universities move with confidence, 
albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm. It is a setting in which relations are both 
collaborative and competitive, as at home. Amid global time-space compression, 
the strategic possibilities are open and expanding, with scope for innovation in 
missions, structures, and products,1 in contrast to home where regulations, con-
ventions, and habits are set. But as noted, in the global setting American and non-
American institutions are differentially positioned. Universities outside the United 
States face a dilemma about how much to Americanize and whether to displace 
national traditions, language, and objectives.2 In contrast, American universities 
are under no pressure to conform to foreign standards, languages, or models, and 
as yet they are under little pressure to acquire deep knowledge abroad. Whereas all 
25 million students in Chinese higher education have learned English, in 2013 only 
61,055 American students in higher education were learning Chinese.3 Likewise, 
the world watches American higher education, not vice versa. In the Webometrics 
ranking of universities on the web, MIT leads the world for impact, the number 
of hits on the website. Harvard leads the world in openness, the amount of data 
it makes available. Both universities provide courseware on a free access basis. 
Harvard ranks number 1 in Webometrics overall, followed by MIT, Stanford, and 
UC Berkeley. UC Los Angeles is thirteenth.4 The first thirty-five universities in 
web impact are all found in the United States, aside from Oxford and Cambridge 
in the United Kingdom.
13
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In 2006 the author conducted fifteen research interviews in a public research 
university in the Midwest with a large portfolio of cross-border activities and a 
reputation for a strong international orientation. One question was “In your view 
are there any universities or programs, in any other country, from which American 
universities have something to learn?” Of the fifteen interviewees, twelve ignored 
the reference to other countries, naming solely American examples. Three execu-
tives named the National University of Singapore (NUS). The Midwestern public 
university had just negotiated an agreement with NUS, and the university’s execu-
tive had become aware of NUS’s outstanding global strategy, in which it was ahead 
of all American universities in international engagement in both teaching and re-
search, and its research output was climbing steeply.
Does it matter whether American universities are globally aware and engaged? 
It was not an issue at the time of the Godkin Lectures. It is now. The arguments for 
the spread and deepening of a global consciousness, and against continued paro-
chialism and American exceptionalism, are fourfold.
The first is the most basic, though the most difficult to accept. All is not well 
in the American society, polity, economy, and education. Self-correcting mecha-
nisms are not the only possible resource. Other countries, and their ideas, may 
suggest answers. Consider the more stable family in most of Asia, the higher and 
better-spread school achievement in Finland and East Asia, and the stronger tax-
spend compacts, more moderate tuition, and more stable higher education financ-
ing in many countries.
Second, global mobility of people in higher education is growing in volume as 
total tertiary participation grows, and global talent is strategic to all national inno-
vation systems. In the last half century, the flow of students from Western Europe 
to the United States has not increased as a proportion of all European students,5 
but the flow out of East and South Asia has become larger and more significant at 
both ends. Between 1980 and 2012, the worldwide number of foreign students in 
higher education increased from 1.1 to 4.5 million persons.6 Between 1980–81 and 
2013–14 the number of international students enrolled in American higher educa-
tion increased from 311,882 to 886,052 and to 4.2 percent of the student population, 
though this was a low percentage by international standards. From the American 
viewpoint, the most important role of foreign students is at the doctoral level. 
Doctoral students comprise 15 percent of all international students.7 In 2011, 34.2 
percent of all American university doctoral graduates in science and engineer-
ing were noncitizens. In 2010, 28.8 percent of all doctoral graduates in full-time 
American academic positions in science and engineering were foreign born. Of 
those in postdoctoral positions, 48.7 percent were foreign born, and nearly all of 
that group were noncitizens.8 The public universities play the major role in train-
ing foreign nationals at the doctoral stage. For example, in 1996–2005, foreign doc-
toral graduates were the majority of all doctoral graduates at Texas A&M Universi-
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ty (2,018), Ohio State (1,945) and Purdue (1,944), and they were a large component 
at others, including Illinois (1,933), Texas at Austin (1,786), Michigan (1,720) and 
Wisconsin–Madison (1,709). The largest cohort in the private sector was the 1,639 
at Stanford. UC Berkeley educated 1,608.9
American society has a notable capacity to absorb immigrants. Aside from the 
years immediately after 9/11, when immigration from East Asia as well as the Mid-
dle East was tightened, the country has long offered an open door to high-skilled 
foreign nationals, to its benefit. Of the foreign recipients of U.S. doctorates in sci-
ence and engineering in 2008–2011, 49.5 percent had definite plans to stay, includ-
ing 50.4 percent of those from Europe, 54.9 percent from China, and 57.8 percent 
from India. However, these percentages had fallen. Of the 2000–2003 recipients 
of American doctorates who were citizens of China, 63.6 percent had evidenced 
definite plans to stay.10 In the eight-year span, there was spectacular growth in 
Chinese universities and science, and alternate opportunities for these doctoral 
graduates had improved.
Research universities in many nations are dependent on global talent, and 
American doctorates have almost universal currency. But American universities 
can no longer assume they have overwhelming preponderance as the favored des-
tination: most foreign graduates retain strong affective ties to home and many 
will return if they can obtain attractive opportunities there, and European nations 
are now working harder to draw foreign researchers. To attract and hold talented 
people, it is essential to understand the larger world setting in which they emerge 
and in which they develop their careers.
PLUR ALIZ ATION OF RESEARCH POWER
Third, as noted, the majority of high-citation science is produced outside the Unit-
ed States. In an increasingly plural world knowledge system, the rest of the world’s 
share will keep growing. To maximize their effectiveness and sustain a leadership 
role in research, American universities will maintain working networks with all 
other major research producers in each field via people exchange, joint projects, 
and publishing. It is more than a matter of self-interest. Research-based knowledge 
is a global public good,11 and cross-border collaboration is central in areas such as 
global climate change, high-energy physics, epidemiology and public health, and 
urban systems.
While the United States houses most of the thirty leading research universi-
ties and half of the top 100, as measured by publication and citation counts, its 
share will fall over time as non-American universities strengthen their relative 
positions. Trend analysis of the Shanghai ARWU data shows that the number of 
West European universities in the top 80 has grown, and there has been much 
diversification of the top 500. In the 2004 Shanghai ARWU ranking, there were 
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just three universities from East Asia, in addition to those from Japan, in the top 
200. There were none from China. In the 2014 ranking, there were twelve East 
Asian universities outside Japan in the top 200, including six from China—Tsin-
ghua, Peking, Shanghai Jiao Tong, Zhejiang, Fudan, and the University of Science 
and Technology—two from Hong Kong, two from Singapore, and one each from 
Taiwan and South Korea.12 In 2004 there were eight mainland Chinese universities 
in the top 500; in 2014 there were thirty-two. The number of top 500 universities 
in Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, Brazil, and Chile also increased. Iran, Egypt, 
Turkey, Malaysia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Hungary had universities in the top 500, 
and Saudi Arabia had four in the top 500 and two in the top 200.13 This paral-
lels the sharp growth of published journal papers in many emerging systems (see 
above). The progress of the Asian universities in the ARWU, especially in the top 
100 and 200, is retarded by the ARWU’s use of the Nobel Prize indicators. Only 
Japan has a significant history of Nobels. China and the other East Asian systems 
look better in rankings based solely on publication numbers and citation counts, 
such as those of Leiden University and Scimago Lab.14 For example, in 2010–2013 
NUS in Singapore published almost two-thirds as many high-citation papers as 
the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom, though as yet NUS has received 
no Nobel Prizes.15
It is certain the pluralization of science capacity will continue, given the pattern 
of investments in R & D in the last decade. There is a close relationship between 
public investment in scientific research and ranking position, but there are lags 
between investment in research and increased output, between increased output 
and citation, and between citation and the effect in rankings (which reflect longer-
term as well as short-term patterns). Universities in China, Korea, Singapore, 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other countries with accelerated investments derive their 
current rankings from the government funding inputs of five to ten years ago. In 
another decade, the present investments in R & D will show fully. There will be 
many more East Asian universities in the top 200 and some pushing upwards in 
the top 100. The United States is still the largest fish in the pond by far. But it no 
longer owns the pond.
Fourth, in the growth of research science in post-Confucian East Asia, there is 
something more at work than just the pluralization of global capacity. In 2011, total 
R & D investment in East Asia was $448 billion, just behind North America, at 
$453 billion, and well ahead of Western Europe and the United Kingdom, at $320 
million.16 By the time of writing, the investment in East Asia will have moved well 
ahead of North America. Asian higher education is rapidly assuming a larger role 
in the world.17 In particular, university science across East Asia is both massive 
and very dynamic. Not only is the annual number of English-language scientific 
papers growing rapidly across East Asia, except in Japan, quality is also improving 
quickly, as will be discussed in the next chapter. There are common cultural ele-
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ments at work in the East Asian region, on a game-changing scale. A transforma-
tion in global relations of knowledge power is taking place. As Kishore Mahbubani 
states: “There is no reason for the West to be pessimistic. The West will not lose 
power. It will have to share power.”18 North America and Europe will share power 
in science and higher education with East Asia, especially China, within the terms 
of a knowledge system that evolved largely in Western countries.
It is time to look more closely at the transformation in East Asia, where Clark 
Kerr’s institution is flourishing, but as a multiversity with Chinese characteristics.
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Historian Charles Holcombe argues that East Asia is “a culturally and historically 
coherent region, deserving of serious attention as a whole,” and not simply as a 
group of countries that happen to be geographically contiguous.
East Asia is most usefully defined as that region of the world that came to extensively 
use the Chinese writing system, and absorbed through these written records many 
of the ideas and values of what we call Confucianism, much of the associated legal 
and political structure of government, and certain specifically East Asian forms of 
Buddhism.1
Though there are many differences between East Asian nations—for example, 
in language and politics—East Asia is a shared civilizational zone, akin to “Western 
Europe” or perhaps to “Europe plus America.” Its origins lie in Northern China of 
the Shang, Zhou, and Warring States periods. The last was a creative time of great 
diversity in ideas, prior to the first territorial state to secure broad centralized con-
trol, the highly effective Qin empire (221–207 b.c.e.). The Qin was followed by 
the Han dynasty (202 b.c.e.–220 c.e.), which built on the forms established in the 
Qin. In the long Han period, many continuing features of the Sinic (Chinese) state 
and society became institutionalized, including the state approach to education. 
The Qin and Han dynasties developed a statecraft that combined Confucian eth-
ics with a legalist system of bureaucratic rule. Under the Han, politics was domi-
nant over the military and commercial sectors, a primacy maintained throughout 
Chinese history.2 The Han state saw itself as responsible for the good order of soci-
ety and the conduct of its members. Though the central state habitually devolved 
authority to the regional and local levels, it could intervene anywhere at will in the 
interests of social order. It was believed that at any given time only one dynasty 
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could hold the “mandate of heaven,” but the mandate was revocable: the continued 
survival of the dynasty depended on good government and thus was ultimately 
founded in popular consent.3 This anticipated elements of European political phi-
losophy by 1,800 years or so.
Under the Han, meritocratic selection of scholar-officials began, on the basis 
of an examination in the Chinese classics. By the end of the dynasty, there were 
thirty thousand students in the Imperial Academy. This was the beginning of in-
stitutionalized higher education in East Asia and of its role in social allocation. 
After the fall of the Han, literary cultivation moved to the homes of aristocratic 
families. During the Tang dynasty (618–907 c.e.), Sinic statecraft, social systems, 
and education spread to Korea, Japan, and North Vietnam, and the role of acad-
emies, examinations, and scholar-officials was expanded. Much of the academy 
activity took place in the private educational sector. Under the Song (960–1279 
c.e.), self-learning and educational ambition became part of many middle-class 
families. State and private academies were opened in many parts of China. Confu-
cian education was always ambiguous. It was an expression of hierarchical order, 
adherence to authority, and devotion to parents. It was also a source of individual 
agency and upward social mobility. Both sides of Confucian education entailed 
a contribution not only to self and family but the public good. These themes still 
shape education in the Sinic world, though its notions of scientific knowledge have 
modernized. Holcombe explains the two-sided “Confucian equation”:
The expectation of hierarchy inherent in this ideal of serving parents filially and 
not offending superiors also highlights one of the key contradictions in Confucian 
thought. On the one hand, Confucians idealized the memory of a highly aristocratic 
ancient Zhou social order and conservatively sought to perpetuate it. “I transmit but 
do not create” is one of Confucius’s more famous sayings. Some of the most impor-
tant Confucian virtues, moreover, such as filial piety and loyalty (zhong), can only 
be expressed through hierarchical relationships. This is one side of the Confucian 
equation. The other side of the equation, however, was a pointedly egalitarian and 
meritocratic strand of Confucian thought. Anyone, it was assumed, could potentially 
perfect himself or herself through self-cultivation and then lead the world by his or 
her example. As Confucius said, “in education there should be no class distinctions.” 
China had ceased to have a hereditary aristocracy already by the third century BCE, 
and the meritocratic line in Confucian thinking would eventually find realization 
under the empire in the remarkable Chinese civil service examination system, under 
which government officials were selected on the basis of anonymously graded per-
formances on written tests.4
The educational practices of family and school became more deeply entrenched 
with each dynasty. There is remarkable continuity in China. On the one hand, the 
rule of the Communist Party of China (CPC) can be understood as manifestation 
of the Leninist form of organization, applied first in the Soviet bloc. On the other 
hand, the CPC can be seen as yet another dynasty, one of the most successful, in 
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China’s long history. The CPC dynasty, like its forebears, knows that its rule will 
be maintained as long as it provides order and prosperity—that the continued au-
thority of the state rests on its capacity to serve the people,5 and the right to trade 
must flourish but is subordinated to social conduct and order. History suggests 
that Chinese dynasties have deeper roots and last longer than Leninist forms. If 
there were equivalent continuity in Europe, the Western Roman Empire would not 
have vanished in the fifth century but would have returned in successive iterations 
for two thousand years of European history. This does not mean that East Asian 
civilization is tradition bound. It is also inventive and renewable, or it would not 
have survived. Its present dynamism, its capacity for practical innovation, is clear.
East Asian educational tradition rests on layer upon layer of practice. For ex-
ample, China was the first country to develop paper, books, and printing and pub-
lished more books than the rest of the world put together until at least 1500 and 
possibly later.6 At the time that China, Japan, and Korea were forcibly engaged by 
European and American power, the literacy rate in Japan was as high as anywhere 
in Europe. This long Sinic continuity, particularly deep educational cultivation in 
the family, is the foundation on which today’s East Asian higher educational sys-
tems are erected.
FAMILY AND STATE
The family and the state are relatively strong in East Asian. Civil society and in-
termediate institutions such as cities and professions tend to be weaker than in 
Europe and North America. Sinic countries do not sustain the state/society and 
state/market tensions that are typical of the English-speaking world, with its lim-
ited liberal states in the Adam Smith tradition, and the recurring antistatism of its 
political life. It is very unlikely there will be a California-style tax revolt in Asia. 
Whether in single-party or multiparty regimes, states in East Asia typically have 
broad social support, stable continuity, a long-term view, and high social status. 
Graduates from elite families often aspire to enter the leading departments of 
state. Leaving aside the closed and repressive regime in North Korea, all of mod-
ern Japan, South Korea, and China have demonstrated an impressive capacity to 
mobilize a high level of popular support for policies of social and economic trans-
formation, in part because they have provided their growing middle classes with 
expanded social opportunities through education. Thus in East Asia, government 
leadership of educational reform is a given, and all modernizing East Asian states, 
with the partial exception of Vietnam, place higher education and science on a 
high priority.
Japan developed a front-rank university and research system between the 1960s 
and 1980s, though its dynamism in higher education has now slowed. South Korea 
established impressive government research institutes in the 1980s,7 with many 
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of their personnel moving into industry R & D in the late 1990s and onwards, at 
the same time as the nation expanded and modernized its universities. Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong SAR also accelerated the evolution of the higher edu-
cation and research in the 1990s. The takeoff in China began in the late 1990s. 
Through higher education, East Asian states provide their populations with social 
esteem and opportunity, and like many governments, they see graduates, science, 
and technology as keys to future productivity and industrial innovation. State in-
terventions are strategically focused and closely linked to performance measures. 
Typically, the state sets targets, applies resources, achieves the benchmark, and 
moves on, taking policy to the next level. In every East Asian system, the state 
played the crucial role in triggering the rapid expansion of mass higher education: 
lifting secondary school enrollments, providing higher education infrastructure, 
reforming structures, encouraging mergers to facilitate growth, training univer-
sity teachers, and expanding the budget for tuition subsidies and student income 
support and loans. Typically, once the state signaled its support for growth, enroll-
ments surged in classic Trow fashion, as first the middle class and then the whole 
population began to seek social advantage for their children through education. 
As noted, in South Korea the GTER was 98 percent in 2012, Taiwan’s GTER was 
84 percent, and Hong Kong and Japan exceeded 60 percent.
After 1998 the growth of participation in China surged ahead of the rate of 
growth in per capita income, though the latter was exceptional by world standards.8 
The annual intake of new students leapt from 1.1 million in 1998 to 5.5 million in 
2006, growing at 23 percent a year. The admission rate, which was 10 percent in 
the elite system of the early 1980s, rose to almost two-thirds of those sitting the 
gaokao at the end of school.9 By 2012 there were 25.6 million regular higher educa-
tion students, 14.3 million in four-year institutions, and 283,810 at doctoral level.10
State policy on education and science is especially effective in East Asia because 
it works in tandem with family ambition and the deep Confucian well of learning 
in the home. It would be difficult to transplant the East Asian educational dyna-
mism to countries without Sinic families. The symbiosis between state and family 
shows itself in two ways: the financing of education and the level of measured 
student learning.
While government leads the development of higher education, it does not buy 
its role by providing most of the funding. East Asian educational effort is not sus-
tained by large government budgets. Central government revenue in China was 
11.3 percent in 2011, compared to 16.6 percent in the United States in 2012. Singa-
pore’s was a little higher, at 17.8 percent in 2012.11 The family provides not just pa-
rental time and energy but financial resources. Unlike continental Western Europe 
but like North America, the typical approach is mixed public and private funding, 
with the private share increasing over time. The family commitment to education 
is so strong that many poor families invest heavily in formal education and extra 
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schooling and tuition outside school hours.12 In South Korea, private spending on 
all forms of “shadow schooling” has reached a remarkable 3 percent of GDP, more 
than many countries spend on their whole schooling system.13 Shadow schooling, 
with its extra hours of learning, is a key factor in the exceptional PISA (Program 
of International Student Achievement) performance in all East Asian education 
systems, including Vietnam (see table 14.1). The proportion of the costs of formal 
schooling and higher education paid by households is high in world terms. OECD 
data show that in South Korea in 2011, 44.1 percent of the spending of tertiary 
education institutions was financed by households and 28.9 percent from other 
private sources, a total of 73.0 percent from all private funding. The respective 
figures in Japan were 50.9 percent and 65.5 percent in total. For comparison, in 
2011 private funding in the United States financed 65.2 percent of all spending, and 
the OECD average was 30.8 percent.14 Private funding also plays a major role in 
Singapore, where most enrollments are below research university level and in the 
private sector. In China between 1997 and 2007, the proportion of higher educa-
tion revenue funded by private tuition rose from 14.9 to 33.7 percent, though it fell 
back to 26.5 percent in 2012. The proportion of revenue funded by public sources 
in China dropped from 78.4 percent in 1997 to 44.1 percent in 2007, rising again to 
58.3 percent in 2012.15 Shared state and family funding of tuition makes it all work, 
freeing states to invest strategically in infrastructure, research, top students, and 
world-class universities
In all East Asian systems, public subsidies per student are higher in elite re-
search universities than at other levels. In the top universities, the proportion of 
total costs covered by government is again relatively high. This is true in most of 
Asia, and also Russia and some other post-Soviet systems.16 Private costs are high-
er in middle universities than in top universities. Further, and in sharper contrast 
to social practice in California, households in East Asia pay a high proportion of 
costs in low-status institutions. In East Asia, high private costs at the bottom of the 
pyramid do not seem to subtract from participation rates. This is because strong 
family demand for higher education is near universal and has low economic elas-
ticity. Families dream of achieving the highest level, a place in the leading univer-
sity, such as Tokyo or Peking University. If families have discretionary money it 
tends to go first to the children’s education.
The central role of the family shows also in pretertiary student learning. The 
OECD’s PISA compares the learning achievements of 15-year-olds across the 
world in three disciplines: reading, mathematics, and science. East Asian students 
outperform students in the rest of the world by a large margin, with only Finland 
within reach.17 As table 14.1 shows, the seven top systems in mathematics were all 
in East Asia. Vietnam had only 10 percent of American per capita income in 2013 
but shares the Sinic educational tradition (North Vietnam was occupied by China 
from the early Han to the end of the Tang). It does better than the United States in 
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all three PISA disciplines. The 30-million-person Shanghai region has a long lead 
over all other school systems in the world. Even the poorest and lowest achieving 
provinces of China had 2012 PISA results just below the world average. These low-
income zones share the social esteem for teaching that is a feature of all East Asian 
countries and contrasts with the relatively low standing of the teaching profession 
in the United States and other English-speaking countries.
However, it can be argued that the family element is more important than the 
school. This is demonstrated by John Jerrim in a 2014 study of the 2012 PISA per-
formance of school students of East Asian descent who were second-generation 
migrants in Australia. Their average PISA score in mathematics, 605,18 was not far 
below Shanghai (613) and well ahead of Singapore (573), Hong Kong SAR (561), 
and Taiwan (560). Despite the fact that these 15-year-olds were Australian citi-
zens attending Australian schools, they outperformed their Australian peers by an 
average of more than 100 PISA points. The difference is equivalent to two and a 
half years of schooling. “Moreover,” states Jerrim, “while PISA test scores of native 
Australians declined substantially between 2003 and 2012, the scores of children 
Table 14.1. Student achievement in PISA reading, science, and mathematics at age 15 years: Top 10 











students at top 




est PISA level, 1 
(%)
OECD average 496 501 494 12.6 23.1
Shanghai, China 570 580 613 55.4  3.8
Singapore 542 551 573 40.0  8.3
Hong Kong SAR 545 555 561 33.7  8.5
Taiwan 523 523 560 37.2 12.8
South Korea 536 538 554 30.9  9.1
Macau SAR 509 521 538 24.3 10.8
Japan 538 547 536 23.7 11.1
Lichtenstein 516 525 535 24.8 14.1
Switzerland 509 515 531 21.4 12.4
Netherlands 516 522 523 19.3 14.8
United States 498 497 481  8.8 25.8
Vietnam 508 528 511 13.3 14.2
Finland 524 545 519 15.3 12.3
Germany 508 524 514 17.5 17.7
United Kingdom 499 514 494 11.8 21.8
Canada 523 525 518 16.4 13.8
Source: Adapted by author using data in OECD 2014b.
Note: SAR = Special Autonomous Region of China.
102    Crossing the Waters
with East Asian heritage improved rapidly.”19 When in-school effects and between-
school differences were accounted for statistically, the difference in performance 
was still one year of schooling, underlining the role of the home and extra tu-
ition.20 The East Asian–heritage students, the majority from families that did not 
speak English at home, spent an average of fifteen hours a week in study outside 
school compared to nine hours for the native students, and 94 percent expected 
to enter university, compared to 58 percent of native Australians.21 The outstand-
ing performance of East Asian–heritage students in Australia parallels the suc-
cess of Asian American families in SAT and university entrance. Migrant families 
typically exhibit exceptional drive to achieve, and East Asian–heritage parents are 
often themselves relatively well educated. But John Jerrim found that when the sta-
tistical effects of these factors were eliminated, much of the superior performance 
of East Asian–heritage students remained, although the performance of other mi-
grant children came back to the average.22 The fact that the PISA performance of 
East Asian–heritage students in Australia is similar to that of East Asian students 
is striking.
East Asian countries emphasize the STEM disciplines.23 The majority of China’s 
school students in China are on a STEM track. Mathematics, which enjoys prestige 
as a selector into university programs and the basis of technology, is compulsory 
to the end of school. The largest cohort of South Korean graduates are not in busi-
ness, as in English-speaking countries, but in engineering, though many gradu-
ate engineers go to business occupations. South Korea’s “STEAM” program joins 
STEM to the arts, aiming to broaden the appeal of STEM studies while encour-
aging creativity in technology. Although East Asian professors in the humanities 
argue that their disciplines are overlooked, it is not wholly so: PISA reading scores 
are almost at high as mathematics, most university students are at least partly bi-
lingual, and there are liberal studies in some elite universities, including Peking 
University and a joint Yale-NUS program in Singapore.
If East Asian higher education is not fully inclusive of the disciplines, it does bet-
ter with social inclusion. Sinic societies are not highly egalitarian and have varied 
Gini coefficients. University hierarchies are steep, and the socially advantaged—
in China this includes the children of party cadre in middle-level positions and 
above—dominate entry to top institutions. On the other hand, PISA performance 
in Sinic systems is egalitarian. The size of the highest-achieving student group is 
large, and few students are in the lowest achieving group (table 14.1). In Singapore, 
40 percent of students are in levels 5–6 in PISA mathematics compared to 9 percent 
in the United States. Only 8 percent of Singapore students are in the bottom group 
in PISA mathematics compared to 26 percent in the United States. These systems 
sustain high overall performance without an equity/excellence trade-off, indicat-
ing the universality of parental desires for educational achievement, plus the fact 
that states organize school systems so as to facilitate learning by all. The common 
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assumption is that hard work, not talent is decisive, and anyone can work hard. The 
downside of high expectations and extra work is that many students carry a heavy 
burden, and some are measurably unhappy. One of the questions in the 2012 PISA 
asked students if they agreed with the statement “I feel happy at school.” The hap-
piest students were in Indonesia, Albania, and Peru. Students in Singapore were 
ranked twelfth out of sixty-four systems. All other East Asian populations except 
South Korea were above the OECD average.24 Students in the United States were 
slightly below the OECD average for self-reported happiness. Interestingly, Fin-
land was near the bottom. Last was South Korea. Perhaps all the shadow schooling, 
on top of day school and anxious parents, is a bit too much.25
THE EC ONOMIC PL ATFORM
In addition to Sinic states and education-focused parents, two other conditions 
are at work. The first is the desire, deeply felt across East Asia, to catch up to the 
West after 150 years of imperial violence, economic exploitation, and relentless 
modernization. To catch up is to restore self-respect and protect the nation from 
future intervention. The desire for global parity powers the strategies of bench-
marking with American higher education, especially in Singapore and China. 
Perhaps benchmarking would otherwise violate autonomy and identity. As noted, 
internationalization on American terms creates contradictions; national identity 
is periodically reinserted, but the tension is read differently when benchmarking 
is a means of building individual and national agency, rather than losing it. The 
outcome of the encounter between Sinic tradition and Western science and mod-
ernization is neither an imported Westernized education nor a reworking of the 
old tradition. It is a hybrid of the two, something new, a post-Confucian form of 
higher education system. As Martin Jacques remarks in relation to China, more 
than one kind of modernization is possible.26
The second condition is economic growth. Except in China and Vietnam, East 
Asian economies have per capita incomes at Western European levels or above 
(table 14.2). Singapore ($76,237) is one of the richest countries in the world, and 
Hong Kong SAR’s income ($51,509) is at the American level. South Korea is catch-
ing up quickly. China experienced phenomenal growth after the late 1970s, at first 
through the abolition of collective farms in rural areas and then through export-
oriented manufacturing and modernization in the cities. Between 1990 and 2013, 
GDP in constant 2011 prices rose from $1,689.3 to $15,643.2 billion, at an average 
annual rate of 10.2 percent. Its lowest rate of annual growth was 7.6 percent in 1999 
amid the Asian financial crisis.27 This has lifted China from a poor developing 
country to a middle-income power with GDP equal to the United States in pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) terms. There are marked regional inequalities, but per 
capita incomes in the Beijing and Shanghai regions are already at European levels. 
104    Crossing the Waters
Growth of 10 percent a year is a strong platform for advances in both public and 
private financing of higher education.
Most other systems in East Asia have also benefited from economic growth that 
is relatively high by world standards. Between 1990 and 2013, the economy grew 
by an annual average of 6.2 percent in Singapore, 5.1 percent in South Korea, about 
5 percent in Taiwan, and 3.9 percent in Hong Kong, though just 1.0 percent in 
Japan.28 With GDP growing rapidly, the East Asian nations have taken the oppor-
tunity to increase public and private investment in R & D as a proportion of GDP. 
Figure 14.1, which shows investment in R & D as a proportion of GDP in 2000–
2013, illustrates how in three of the five East Asian systems, R & D investments 
have risen above the U.S. level in terms of the proportion of GDP. Singapore’s pro-
portional investment in R & D is lower than that of the United States only because 
Singapore’s GDP, the denominator in the ratio between R & D spending and GDP, 
is very high in world terms. As table 14.2 shows, per capita GDP in Singapore was 
50 percent higher in 2013 than the U.S. level.
Between 2000 and 2013, South Korea’s total spending on R & D rose from 2.18 
to 4.15 percent of GDP. In 2013 it was second in the world to Israel. Korean R & D 
grew by 0.15 percent of GDP per year after the year 2000, sustained by global com-
panies such as Samsung as well as government. The rise of Korean science, tech-
nology, and higher education can be mapped against the evolution of the Korean 
economy as an exporter of knowledge-intensive products. The 2012 OECD review 
of Korea’s industry development policy notes that whereas in the late 1970s 35 per-
cent of Korean exports had medium-knowledge content and only 2 percent had 









Macau SAR  0.6  78.2 138,025
Singapore  5.4  411.6  76,237
Hong Kong SAR  7.2  370.2  51,509
Taiwan China  23.4  894.5  38,238
Japan  127.3  4,535.1  35,614
South Korea  50.2  1,642.6  32,708
China (mainland) 1,357.4 15,643.2  11,525
Vietnam  89.7  459.7  5,125
United States  316.1 16,230.2  51,340
United Kingdom  64.1  2,372.7  37,017
Source: Author, adapting data compiled by World Bank 2015; CIA 2015.
Notes: Constant 2011 US$. Taiwan data adjusted using US CPI. Taiwan population 2014.
PPP = Purchasing Power Parity. SAR = Special Autonomous Region of China.
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high-technology content, in 2009, 80 percent of exports were medium-technology 
products and 10 percent were high-technology.29
Taiwan has a similar trajectory. The growth of leading-edge research in elec-
trical engineering and computing has coincided with exports in information 
technology. Taiwan’s R & D expenditure of 3.06 percent in 2013 exceeded the U.S. 
GDP spending ratio of 2.81 percent in 2012, while Japan’s R & D investment of 
3.49 percent in 2013 was well above all nations in the English-speaking world.
In China R & D spending rose from 0.91 percent of GDP in 2000 to 1.31 percent 
in 2005, and then to 2.02 percent of a much larger GDP in 2013.30 That is an increase 
of almost 0.1 percent a year. The policy target is 2.5 percent of GDP. The gap be-
tween China and the United States, in terms of the proportion of GDP allocated to 
R & D, halved between 2000 and 2013. If the present trends continue, China’s total 
investment in R & D will pass that of the United States by 2015. Only about 8 per-
cent of China’s R & D money goes to the universities, which is half the proportion 
of the United States. Most of the R & D investment is settled on the state-controlled 
enterprises that lead the Chinese economy. It is unlikely that all of this allocation to 
the state enterprises is spent specifically in research. Regardless, enough of the fast-
growing research budget trickles down to the research universities to power growth 
of more than 15 percent a year in journal papers in the English-language literature.
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Korea 2.18 2.34 2.27 2.35 2.53 2.63 2.83 3.00 3.12 3.29 3.47 3.74 4.03 4.15
Japan 3.00 3.07 3.12 3.14 3.13 3.31 3.41 3.46 3.47 3.36 3.25 3.38 3.35 3.49
Taiwan 1.94 2.06 2.16 2.27 2.32 2.39 2.51 2.57 2.78 2.94 2.91 3.01 3.06 3.12
Singapore 1.82 2.02 2.07 2.03 2.1 2.16 2.13 2.34 2.62 2.16 2.01 2.16 2.02
China 0.91 0.96 1.07 1.13 1.22 1.31 1.35 1.39 1.46 1.66 1.75 1.84 1.95 2.02


















Figure 14.1. R & D expenditures as proportion of GDP, East Asia and the United States, 
2000–2013.
Note: n.a. = data not available
Source: Author, using data from OECD 2015
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EAST ASIAN SCIENCE
Figure 14.2 illustrates the rapid growth of published science papers in East Asia 
relative to the output of the United States. In 1995 regional output was only one-
third that of the United States. Less than a generation later, in 2011, total output 
from East Asia had almost caught that of the United States, and China alone was at 
almost half the number of U.S. papers. If present trends continue, China’s output 
of published science will exceed that of the United States well before 2025. When 
the world’s most populous country increases scientific production at 15 percent a 
year for a decade and a half, it is certain much of future human knowledge will 
come from that source.
In an overview study of the “great American university,” Jonathan Cole poses 
this question in relation to research universities: “Is it possible to imagine that 
the great American university could lose its dominant position in the world of 
higher learning to the Chinese over the next half century?”31 Though the with-
drawal of state funding from the public research universities is a problem, this 
almost certainly will not happen. At present the United States is overwhelmingly 
the strongest nation in scientific knowledge. Its leading research universities are 
in a very different quality league from those in East Asia, as measured by citations 
per paper and per faculty, and are world leaders in every major field of knowledge. 
Nevertheless, in the physical sciences and engineering, the gap in quality is begin-
ning to close.
In 2000, China produced 3.7 percent of all papers in chemistry, compared to 
20.3 percent in the United States. Twelve years later, in 2012, China produced more 
of the world’s papers in chemistry than the United States, 16.9 percent compared 
to 16.2 percent. This was a major change, but more significantly, China’s share of 
the top 1 percent papers by citation rate increased from 0.6 percent in 2000 to 16.3 
percent only twelve years later, in 2012. That year China produced almost half as 
many high-citation papers as the United States, at 33.5 percent. There was a similar 
pattern in engineering: from 2000 to 2012, China lifted its share of high-citation 
research papers in engineering from 2.5 to 12.2 percent, compared to the United 
States’ 37.5 percent in 2012. China also produced 16.7 percent of high-citation work 
in computing, 8.4 percent in geosciences, 7.3 percent in mathematics, 5.9 percent 
in agriculture, and 5.2 percent in physics. Research is focused on fields associated 
with accelerated modernization, including construction, materials, communica-
tions, transport, resources, energy extraction and economy, urban systems, and 
ecological aspects of development. There is a bias towards physical sciences and 
engineering in all East Asian countries. Research in the life sciences, medicine, 
and social sciences is much weaker, with the exception of agriculture. In 2012 China 
produced only 2.0 percent of the world’s most highly cited papers in biological sci-
ences and 1.5 percent in medicine, compared to the United States’ 56.0 percent in 
biological sciences and 51.0 percent in medicine.
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China was weaker in the social sciences: in 2012 it produced only 0.3 percent of 
highly cited papers in psychology and 1.0 percent in other social sciences. Argu-
ably, in China, and more generally in East Asia, the social sciences have yet to es-
tablish the ambiguous role of independent public servant, critic, and instrument of 
the state and social order, which is essential to their functions in Western Europe 
and North America. Another problem is the low standing of the humanities in 
East Asia, despite traditional literary scholarship. There is no instrumental eco-
nomic rationale for investment in either the critical social sciences or the humani-
ties, and they contribute little to ranking performance. Yet they constitute public 
and government reflexivities, social language, and powerful knowledge and are 
indispensable bearers of national cultural identity.
THE POST-CONFUCIAN MODEL OF HIGHER EDUCATION
The post-Confucian model of higher education in East Asia has gaps. Its achieve-
ments are still in the making. All the same, those achievements are remarkable 
but also familiar: an older theme with new twists. Participation that grows with-
out limit has become part of every East Asian higher education system, as Trow 
forecast. As in California, the premier institution is the multiversity. Much money, 
energy, and talent goes into nurturing research excellence. There is also a system 
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Figure 14.2. Annual production of published science papers, United States, China, and other 
East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore), 1995–2011.
Source: Author, using published data from NSF 2014, derived originally from the Thomson-Reuters Web of 
Knowledge.
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number of high-research institutions with middle institutions focused on profes-
sional training and an access-oriented mass sector. However, system and institu-
tion are more directly supervised by the state than in California. Though the state 
grants operational institutional autonomy, on the whole university leaders have 
less room to move (though this can fluctuate). This is true of both the democra-
cies and of China’s dynastic party-state. Unlike California higher education, in 
East Asia there is a conscious policy of internationalization: the templates of best 
practice are not all found at home.
The dynamism of the 1960 California Idea of higher education was sustained by 
economic growth and resources sufficient to support infrastructure and low or no 
tuition, a social consensus that the public good lay in expanding equality of edu-
cational opportunity, a democratic polity that responded to growing demands for 
access, and individual and collective optimism about the benefits of higher educa-
tion. The dynamism of the post-Confucian model is rooted in Confucian educa-
tional cultivation and ambition in the home, a social consensus on the familial and 
national benefits of higher education, modernizing states that anticipate demand 
for higher education as much as responding to it, and the determination of those 
states to direct priorities and sustain the momentum of progress. The East Asian 
state is busier than its 1960 California counterpart. There is also the momentum 
deriving from the collective project of catching up to the West, supported by inter-
nationalization in research universities. Shared public and private resourcing and 
effort combined with rapid growth of the middle class and the state’s capacity to 
increase R & D funding at a remarkable rate have enabled a faster rate of develop-
ment than in California. At the same time, a similar mood of universal excitement 
is apparent. All these features of the post-Confucian model are especially obvious 
in the mainland system of China but are shared by Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, 
and South Korea. There is a common dynamic, a recognizable spirit, across most 
of the Chinese civilizational zone.
This raises the question of why the same dynamism is not evident in higher ed-
ucation and science in Sinic Japan and Vietnam. Vietnam has some of the condi-
tions of the East Asian takeoff but not others. It has Confucian educational cultiva-
tion and ambition at home, channeled by society-wide examinations at the end of 
school. Vietnam’s excellent PISA results indicate that the foundations for a highly 
educated population are in place. The other element in the state-family dyad, the 
state, is much weaker. With a per capita income of $5,125 (2013), Vietnam lacks the 
public means to build global science while providing growth infrastructure and 
full access at an adequate level of quality. There is symbolic talk about world-class 
universities, but the state lacks not just resources but an authentic long-term per-
spective and the capacity to concentrate resources in high priority areas. Govern-
ment needs reform. Its practitioners are underpaid, and corruption is widespread. 
Conduct often reflects the norms of the late Soviet era in which many leaders were 
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trained, rather than Sinic meritocracy. Returning diasporic doctoral graduates are 
underutilized.32 Time will tell whether Vietnam can follow the East Asian pathway 
as resource levels improve.
Japan was the first nation to implement the post-Confucian model in higher 
education and research, successfully turning itself into one of the world’s leading 
nations in science long before the takeoff occurred in the other East Asian systems. 
Science and technology continues to feed developments in industry innovation, 
but in the last two decades, as noted, the Japanese economy has grown at just 
1 percent a year, the public sector has been weighed down by the OECD’s largest 
public debt as a proportion of GDP, and government fiscal policy is closer to UK 
austerity than to that of an investment-led East Asian polity. University funding 
is held down; government focuses on controlling output through plans and audit, 
which is conservatizing; so far, Japanese universities have been unable to fully in-
ternationalize. It is unclear whether this malaise is common to the post-Confucian 
model, suggesting the loss of dynamism will eventually affect China, South Korea, 
and Taiwan, or if it is specific to the political economy and culture of the distinc-
tive variant of Sinic civilization in Japan.33
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Will science and higher education in East Asia equal or overtake that of the United 
States, or even the United States and Europe together? Much is said about state 
authority, university autonomy, and academic freedom in East Asia, particularly 
China, and the implications for creativity. This is not a simple problem. China is 
not like Soviet Russia was in higher education and science. Kishore Mahbuba-
ni observes: “Although China is still a somewhat politically closed society, it is a 
closed society with an open mind.”1 The universities welcome visitors and learn 
freely from abroad. They publish in the global literature. Stereotyping claims that 
East Asian classrooms are inherently didactic, and critical thinking is absent, are 
not confirmed by research. Given the growth of high-citation papers in the sci-
ences, it is difficult to argue that East Asian science in general lacks critical thought 
or creativity, though recurring interventions by China’s officials in what should 
be academic peer decisions about research are a serious problem (one that is not 
confined to China, or to East Asia). The evolution of higher education in China is 
more top-down than in America,2 but as noted in the previous chapter, universi-
ties sustain a devolved authority within the comprehensive Sinic state. At the same 
time, for good or ill, the central state retains the scope to intervene in individual 
institutions as it sees fit.
In Singapore and Japan, the university president is selected by the governing 
council of the university, not the state. Nevertheless, in all East Asian systems, 
normal operations depend on a high degree of synchrony between institutions 
and the state. This can be conservatizing, particularly in relation to disciplines 
that touch the work of government, though from time to time, state intervention 
may also contribute to creative output by lifting the performance bar, encouraging 
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internationalization measures, and shaking up conservative academic cultures. In 
China, government appoints the two university leaders, president and party sec-
retary. Both are invited to regular party schools. Leading research universities are 
never far from national purposes. This is not the California Idea based on arms-
length autonomy and civil society-like mechanisms of coordination. It is closer to 
the regulated autonomy of neoliberal systems with principal-agent relations, but 
with active potential for direct intervention. Yet Chinese universities exercise local 
autonomy and have scope for strategy, including considerable freedom in their 
day-to-day dealings with American and other non-Chinese universities. There are 
cases of institutions advised by government to merge that have refused to do so, 
citing their preference for their own, different development plan, and doing so 
without penalty. From time to time, the state media carries sharp criticisms of 
policy by university presidents.3 There are also times when the central government 
intervenes unexpectedly in local affairs. It is difficult to discern a permanent, clear-
cut pattern. Both local autonomy and central agency are active.
However, there are two larger difficulties facing the post-Confucian model. 
First, education and research in North America and Western Europe benefit from 
an open zone of free conversation between academic research, public discussion, 
and the take-up of new ideas in industry and government. This zone is smaller and 
less stable in East Asian countries. Civil traditions are weaker, and intermediate 
organizations, public but not governmental, such as think tanks and foundations, 
are thinner than in the United States. In China the state limits the Internet as an 
independent space, and media are constrained. Here the post-Confucian model is 
both a strength and a weakness. On one hand, the universities are understood as 
a semiautonomous branch of state and, at best, new data and ideas readily move 
into government and can have real impact in policy and its implementation. Some 
state officials have PhDs. They value intelligent advice. On the other hand, in the 
absence of universities with a broad public role and adequate means of dissemina-
tion, including unimpeded access to old and new media, ideas that are not imme-
diately potent in government and acceptable to it can sink from sight.
The second problem is the episodic repression of individual scholars, especially 
humanist critics of the regime. Here again the issue is more ambiguous than it may 
first appear. In China, more so than Singapore or Japan, feisty political debate is 
normal to the interior cultures of state institutions (as often the case in dynastic 
regimes). There is routine criticism of party decisions, sometimes of individual 
leaders and ministers, inside leading research universities. These universities are 
part of the state. Criticism behind closed doors is accepted and often welcome, 
part of the process of debating policy options and generating new ideas for gov-
ernment, a within-state version of what Jürgen Habermas calls the “public sphere,” 
an ongoing site of reflexivity on the periphery of the decision-making core.4 How-
ever, when similar criticisms are made in open public forums in China, that is 
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a different matter. What was seen as constructive criticism of particular policies 
inside the state becomes a destructive public attack on the general authority of the 
state. In Chinese tradition, sharp public criticism by persons with the authority of 
university professors has always been seen as significant, a high-stakes challenge 
to the regime.
Outspoken public dissent by Chinese scholars is not read in terms of academic 
freedom but in terms of a second tradition in China, that of heroic challenges to 
the state by single scholars on the grounds that the regime has lost the mandate of 
heaven, the right to govern. Historically, such scholars often paid a severe price for 
making the challenge.5 Thus what appears as China’s heavy-handed management 
of individual scholarly dissidents rests not only on the Leninist instinct for politi-
cal monopoly but on the longstanding beliefs, going back to the Han, that what 
scholars say is important, that the proper conduct of the scholar is to advance the 
public good and orderly social conduct, and that scholars criticize the ruler only 
when they believe that the regime must be overthrown. This tradition has some 
resonance across the whole Chinese civilizational zone. Even in multiparty Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan, public academic critics are less strident and carry more 
weight than in the United States (where public dissent by faculty is freely tolerated 
and largely ignored). East Asian professors tend to be supportive of the state and 
consensual in public values. Hence while networked discussion on the Internet 
has changed the terms of politics all over the world, the Internet’s ease of trivial 
criticism and its quicksilver messages and data flows are particularly challenging 
for China. Free Internet is at odds with the state’s long supervision of political con-
duct, as part of its duty to social order, and the Internet’s style of conversation is at 
odds with the traditional gravity of political matters.
On the other hand, the embrace of the Internet in South Korea shows that its 
normal operations can be compatible with East Asian society without fracturing 
the flexibility of state-maintained order and the maintenance of East Asian family 
and social values.
In Western terms, jailing academic critics for what they say in public is sup-
pression of academic freedom. This is consistent with the definition of academic 
freedom as negative freedom, freedom from constraint (usually understood as 
constraint by the state). No scholars in any country in the world want to be told 
by government what they can say. Chinese scholars are not different in that re-
spect. However, in China academic freedom is also seen in another way. Academic 
freedom is understood in positive terms. In this practice of academic freedom, 
scholars enjoy strong traditional authority and a formative responsibility not only 
to their discipline but as models of personal conduct. This positive notion of aca-
demic freedom is empowering and attractive for professors and would not be set 
aside lightly.6 The coexistence of the two traditions that affect scholarly conduct—
the tradition of positive academic freedom, which obliges the scholar to speak his 
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or her mind in forums in which public authority is not affected, and the other 
tradition about high-stakes challenges to the regime—makes it difficult to find a 
middle path in which critical noise is normalized. This robs China of some cre-
ative possibilities. But the point is that in China, dissident scholars are an issue 
not of academic freedom but of political conduct. What is at stake is the space for 
self-determining forms of individuality and the evolution of forms of social order 
and public space. China is slowly liberalizing. In the long run, that trend seems 
unstoppable. Urbanization, the higher education of the middle classes,7 and the 
internationalization of the universities are part of the process of liberalization. This 
will eventually lead to the development of new customs. China is not there yet.
The party-state in China, many of whose leaders had a cosmopolitan higher 
education and know the United States, has set this liberalization in train itself, 
with unknown consequences. Nevertheless, from time to time, persons within the 
leadership hesitate and balk, part of the longer-term pattern of oscillation between 
centralized liberalization and centralized control. The regime has yet to find a way 
to consistently accommodate open criticism. As Qiang Zha puts it: “As long as one 
doesn’t challenge the legitimacy or capacity of the CPC to rule China, a scholar 
will be free to follow the normal routines of scholarly and social life.” Neverthe-
less, the problem of public order is always threatening to spill out from under 
the blanket of state order. “Ordinary Chinese people now do assume the liberty 
to discuss the wrongs of the CPC in the past six decades.”8 China is unlikely to 
move soon towards a post-dynasty contestable, multiparty polity. If this happened 
nearly overnight in Gorbachev fashion, it would be a recipe for chaos and national 
decline, which nobody in China wants. It may never happen. It is not the only 
possible pathway for a liberalizing system. There is scope for the evolution of a 
more transparent party-state, a more open public order, and richer public dis-
course within the terms of dynastic rule, in which the management of criticism is 
decentralized, and ultimately reduced or evacuated, without precipitating social 
fragmentation. There is a lot of water yet to flow under this bridge. Relationships 
between universities in China and universities in the United States are among the 
factors that will shape the future inside and outside China.
Robert Rhoads and Katalin Szelenyi argue that “Just as we have used our sharp-
est university minds to advance science and technology, we must do the same in 
terms of advancing global social relations.”9 If there is to be a stable world society 
and polity capable of handling the major challenges ahead, it is likely that it will 
be a hybrid between Anglo-American traditions and Chinese civilizational tradi-
tions in political culture and social organization.10 At the global level, each bloc 
is too weighty to be decisively subordinated to the other. In the evolution of a 
productive hybrid, universities will be crucial in drawing together policy makers 
and intellectuals, combining projects, sustaining long-term cross-border conver-
sations, and fostering bilingual concepts and ideas. This suggests that part of the 
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internationalization strategy in American higher education must be the building 
of a broad highway for two-way exchange with universities in East Asia, especially 
but not only in China.
Many research universities in the United States have developed programs 
focused on East Asia.11 UC San Diego’s Graduate School of International Rela-
tions and Pacific Studies, founded in 1986, was an early and successful example. 
American initiatives within China itself are numerous and include joint pro-
grams and purpose-built branch campuses and international study centers. U.S. 
universities have been more active in China than those from Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and most of Europe. The data on research paper collaborations show 
that only Germany and Australia have pursued relations in China with a similar 
energy, while the United States is well ahead of other non-Asian countries in deal-
ings with South Korea and Taiwan. Australia is stronger than the United States in 
Singapore.12 Nevertheless, and although American higher education is well known 
in China, Chinese and East Asian higher education remain largely unknown with-
in the mainstream of U.S. higher education. Flows of personnel are predominantly 
one-way, primarily Asian students coming to the United States. The flow of ideas 
and influence is almost entirely in the reverse direction. Relations continues to 
verge on the neocolonial, despite the fact that the East Asian systems now together 
constitute one of the world’s three principal zones of higher education and sci-
ence and deserve greater respect. Certain factors are holding back the evolution 
of fuller relations.
AMERICANS ABROAD
One factor is the small scale of American study abroad in Asia. In 2012–13 a total 
of 289,408 U.S. students engaged in study abroad, but only 3 percent stayed for the 
full year, with 60 percent spending just summer or eight weeks or less. This was 
just over one-third of the number of incoming international students, 819,664, 
who stayed in the United States for a full year. Of the total study-abroad group, 
whether involved in short or long stays, only 14,413 (5 percent) went to China, 
5,758 to Japan, and 3,042 to dynamic South Korea. Much the largest group went to 
the United Kingdom, followed by Italy, Spain, and France in Western Europe. The 
14,413 American students who spent time in China in 2012–13 compares with the 
235,597 Chinese students who enrolled to study for a year in the United States.13 To 
encourage American students to travel to East Asia in sufficient numbers, it is nec-
essary to subsidize them until critical mass is reached and the flow is normalized.
Second, as noted, there is the same asymmetry in language learning. Chinese 
students all learn to read and write in English and many have some conversational 
English. Less than 0.4 percent of American students learn Chinese at university. 
Surveys by the Modern Language Association show that in the year of the Master 
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Plan in 1960, 16.2 percent of all students in higher education were enrolled in a 
foreign language. In 2013 that proportion stood at only 8.1 percent, the lowest level 
since 1998. The majority of students studying a language other than English were 
learning Spanish. Of the 1,522,070 students studying a language, 61,055 (4.0 per-
cent) were learning Chinese, an increase of just 1,179 since 2009, and 12,299 were 
learning Korean.14 The lack of bilingual fluency limits not only the potentials of fu-
ture American graduates but also the present capability of faculty and executives. 
While many people in China’s higher education are familiar with America, China 
below first-level tourist contact is a mystery to most of their American counter-
parts.
Third, as these problems suggest—and despite the exchange schemes, joint pro-
grams, and branch campuses—contact with East Asia remains largely peripheral 
to the core business of American institutions. Few universities have taken decisive 
steps to bring East Asia into the mainstream of American university life in the 
way that East Asian universities have profoundly internationalized themselves by 
drawing on the strengths of the American university tradition. One exception is 
the global strategy of New York University (NYU). NYU students spend at least 
a semester in each of NYU’s three campus sites, in New York, Abu Dhabi, and 
Shanghai. NYU Shanghai is in partnership with East China Normal University, 
the final member of the 985 group in China and as such one of the top thirty-nine 
research universities in the country. NYU Shanghai entails deep engagement. It 
brings the formation of future leaders in China together with a parallel group of 
students from the United States, while also embedding NYU in the Chinese higher 
education system at a senior level. In this kind of prolonged encounter, many stu-
dents will begin to develop language skills and knowledge of culture, society, and 
the economy in China. Faculty and administrators will live in China for long peri-
ods and will also develop language competence.15
GLOBAL SYMMETRY
It is not easy for any university to take a step as bold as NYU has done—the kind of 
initiative that involves setting aside customary habits and ways of seeing. Edward 
Said notes: “We are all taught to venerate our nations and admire our traditions: 
we are taught to pursue their interests with toughness and disregard for other so-
cieties.”16 John Dewey remarks that “the notion of an inherent universality in the 
associative force at once breaks against the obvious fact of a plurality of states, 
each localized, with its boundaries, limitations, its indifference and even hostility 
to other states.”17 People normally look at the world through the lens of “method-
ological nationalism,” which is the idea that “the nation/state/society is the natural 
social and political form of the modern world,”18 and that one’s own nation-state 
should color the lens. It takes a leap of the imagination to understand all culture 
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as multiple and relational, to understand one’s own society as just another culture, 
albeit one’s own, and to see life as others see it.
The United States is entering a world in which it will no longer be overwhelm-
ingly dominant, though for the foreseeable future it will remain the strongest pow-
er. In learning how to navigate the new balance of power, American universities 
will make a crucial contribution. It is a large effort to understand life from more 
than one viewpoint at the same time, for Americans to cease to be nothing but 
 American, becoming more plural in their thinking while still being  American. 
However, in the longer run that capacity for what Amartya Sen calls “trans-
positional” thinking19 is essential if we are to grapple with the challenges of a world 
in which diverse histories come together in a common space, and people can build 
on the achievements of each other’s societies without setting aside the virtues 
of their own. As Peter Singer states: “Our newly interdependent global  society, 
with its remarkable possibilities for linking people around the planet, gives us the 
 material basis for a new ethic.”20 Higher education is a place where people learn 
to think differently and where new thinking can flourish. This is one of the prin-
cipal reasons for the existence of universities—to help their nations to innovate as 
conditions change. In the future American universities will be crucial to the larger 
kind of worldwide thinking that will be needed.
NYU’s framing of learning in multiple locations creates favorable conditions 
for the development of graduates with the capability of multiple, global think-
ing. The most important feature of the NYU experiment is that in it, Chinese and 
American students, and American and Chinese faculty, meet each other on equal 
terms. The suggestion that East Asian higher education and research might have 
something to teach American higher education, as well learning from America, 
would have carried little weight in 1960. The question for Clark Kerr’s genera-
tion was how American educational soft power could help to install a dynamic 
of self-improvement in higher education and science in East Asia. The world has 
changed. Clark Kerr’s mission has succeeded in East Asia in remarkably short time. 
As a result the Eagle and the Dragon now have something to offer each other. They 
also need to find ways of living together and to educate their societies accordingly.
In the worldwide radiation of the California Idea, Chinese universities have 
already drawn from America its practices of access, the multiversity, the system 
forms, and global science. They have yet to fully explore the creative benefits of 
free critical discussion and of the public discursive role of universities and to de-
velop a rounded approach to the nonscience disciplines as well as the physical 
sciences. Perhaps American higher education could take from China and Korea 
ideas about how to strengthen student engagement in the STEM disciplines in 
settings in which law and finance are all too alluring and the benefits of uniting 
education in the home with the school and college. And there are the gains to be 
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made by setting plain hard work, grit, and mental exercise above habits of party 
school “networking” and grade inflation.
Dewey also makes the point that it is an illusion to suppose that there is “a 
model pattern which makes a state a good or a true state” or that we can meaning-
fully rank states according to how close they are to our own.21 Though it is a mark 
of strong organic traditions that they have a sense of certainty about themselves 
and see no need to open their horizons to elements which have no history in their 
own affairs, in reality no way of life has all the answers to the needs of the human 
condition. In the encounter between higher education in the Sinic and American 
traditions, East Asian countries might consider how American universities work 
the broad public space around them to engage dynamically and creatively with 
economy, society, and government, and how higher education is central in the 
advance not just of human capabilities and of technological applications, but of 
self-determining freedoms. English-speaking countries might think about their 
present difficulties in surmounting the great issues such as climate change, the 
fact that people in those societies seem to work together properly only in wartime 
or depression, and the way that East Asian states, societies, and higher education 
systems routinely take a longer-term view than do societies in the English-speak-
ing world. Anglo-Americans might also consider how it is that East Asian higher 
education seems to be able to meet public and private objectives simultaneously—
rather than defining private good as something to be achieved separately from the 
good of all, the public good.
Clark Kerr and the 1960s California Idea harmonized individual needs and the 
collective good in a society that then found it comfortable to combine the two. 
This is something that has been lost. In working towards a new American synergy 
between private interest and public goods, a synergy that is essential for the health 
of any society, the high points in other traditions can help to illuminate the way.

PART THREE
Bringing It All Back Home
The California Idea in a More Unequal America
Taxation is perhaps the most important of all political issues. Without taxes, 
society has no common destiny, and collective action is impossible.




In the final 2001 chapter on The Uses of the University, in his last words on the 
topic, Clark Kerr remarked on “the lessened prestige and public standing of the 
cities of intellect since the 1960s when they were at the peak of public favor and 
influence.” He also listed a range of issues facing higher education, especially the 
multiversity.
These issues included the impact of globalization, and of fluctuating American 
productivity, on the economy and the returns to graduates; the growth of mature 
student demand and the “changing demographics of state populations”; “the rise 
of for-profit competitors to nonprofit higher education” (of which more below); 
and the partial shift in governing power to trustees and state governors, coupled 
with external pressures to use resources more effectively.1 Kerr was also concerned 
about the role of technology in higher education, which for him, as for many oth-
ers, loomed larger because it was ill-formed and unknown. Among the disciplines, 
Kerr noted that the life sciences were accumulating ever more power and resourc-
es, while faculty in the humanities were especially unhappy. The latter problem 
bothered him through his career, not least because humanities faculty had a talent 
for grievance, and there were inherent tensions in housing the liberal arts within 
science-oriented research universities.2 Jennifer Washburn reports that in 2001 
Kerr was also worrying about the potential of commercial ties to undermine the 
integrity of research. As he saw it, the problem was that faculty and administra-
tors who needed money might make concessions that did not trouble them but 
were bad for the institution. “The university ought to remain a neutral agency 
devoted to the public welfare, not to private welfare,” he said.3 At the time, former 
Harvard president Derek Bok had similar concerns.4 Other issues that Kerr did 
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not mention in his final list in The Uses of the University but which he wrote about 
elsewhere included the politics of diversity and the politics of gender in higher 
education, both of which grew in importance throughout his working career and 
increasingly flourished in the time of his active retirement.5
The issues identified by Kerr continue to play out. None are disabling, none 
threaten to interrupt the trajectory of the multiversity or to undermine the capac-
ity of public systems of higher education to combine excellence and access. Differ-
ences between disciplinary worldviews and debates on the purposes and conduct 
of higher education are chronic. Universities have long been contested as a site 
of advantage, and the multiversity is always pulled in different directions: this is 
Kerr’s point. Despite the concerns expressed in his final chapter, average graduate 
premiums have been maintained in the United States, and in a highly stratified 
labor market, they continue to be high by world standards6 (it is the marginal 
rates of returns that are in question, especially the returns to community college 
diplomas).7 Research science continues to gather strength. In short, higher educa-
tion remains central to American society, and as part 2 of this book showed, the 
multiversity is growing rapidly everywhere else, along partly American lines. Yet 
in California, and in the United States, public higher education faces deeper prob-
lems than it did in 2001.
These problems include the state fiscal evacuation of higher education, not just 
in California but in most parts of the country, especially after the 2008–2010 reces-
sion; the rising cost of tuition in public institutions and the faltering in participa-
tion rates, combined with the personal and national cost of student loans; the poor 
rate of upward transfer between tiers and, more generally, the limitation of social 
access; and the growing competitiveness between institutions, the widening gap in 
market-determined college quality between tiers, and, more generally, the weak-
ening of institutions below the level of the multiversity. The scarcity of resources 
has exacerbated ongoing problems such as the relative growth of nontenured fac-
ulty8 and the assertion of entrepreneurial ends over educational values—for ex-
ample, in the drift into a disproportionate focus on noncore activities so as to 
raise revenues. All is not well in the student body either. An increasing number 
of researchers and scholars point to undue focus on the status value and network-
ing value of higher education rather than vocational skills, let alone intellectual 
curiosity, mental formation, and human capacity as ends in themselves, and to the 
drift into lesser cognitive challenge, lighter study, and grade inflation in settings 
where students-as-consumers rule on faculty, as well as vice versa.9
These are all problems of higher education as a status market in which the pub-
lic funding of public institutions has been thinned out and the steadying influence 
of that funding has weakened. When its level can be confidently predicted, as in 
the early years of the Master Plan, public funding sustains a reassuring bedrock 
of values. It guarantees that public institutions belong to all, that they serve the 
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common good and are accessible to every family, and that there is no limit to what 
can be expected of their quality or their care for students. Fluctuating and falling 
public funding, coupled with a more complete shift to a status market in higher 
education and public institutions beginning to resemble private institutions, has 
ushered in different values. The mission of public higher education that was in-
herited from the Master Plan era has been destabilized and partly broken. The old 
blueprint (merit, excellence, equality) survives, but what of the will to sustain it, 
especially in government, which is the only place where the public interest can be 
concentrated?
But what is the public interest, in general and in higher education? In govern-
ment offices, in civil discussion, and in many university offices, the mixed econ-
omy that Clark Kerr learned about in the New Deal era and fine-tuned in higher 
education with precision while working at the University of California and at the 
Carnegie Commission has become blurred. Often it seems that public interest and 
private interest have been inverted, so that “private” is good, and “public” is sus-
pected of ulterior motives. Or rather, it seems that the correct public interest action 
is to elevate the economic market and its play of private interests to the organizing 
principle of society, and universities, and government itself. Public means private.
The malaise of the public sector does not derive from higher education, it 
originates in politics and government. Faith in the capacity of government to 
pursue public goods is at low ebb. The tax base has been weakened. The mood is 
cynical. Politicians are seen as bought and self-aggrandizing. In a more unequal 
economy and society, the social goal of equality of opportunity, which provided 
the Master Plan with much of its charisma and sustained the Great Society, has 
lost much of its bite. “Public” higher education remains a function of policy and 
accountable government; it remains “public”—confirming that the pretense that 
it is a market of almost private, quasi firms is just that, a pretense—so it is caught 
in the same downward spiral as the rest of the public sector. In this setting, high-
er education has been re-represented as a competition in the production and 
sale of marketable goods: private earnings and employability and the brands of 
leading universities. This is a competition that public colleges, with their broad 
burdens, can never wholly win. But who wants them to win? Private institu-
tions carry a special glow of common approval. The (common) public institu-
tions have lost luster. This is not just a contest between opposing sets of symbols. 
The data on faculty salaries10 and comparative research outputs suggest that top 
American public universities have lost ground to their private counterparts. In 
a 2015 paper summing up higher education in the United States, prepared for a 
global audience in London, Robin Helms, a research specialist with the Ameri-
can Council on Education in Washington, DC, stated that “increasingly, higher 
education is seen as a private rather than public good. . . . Concerns about acces-
sibility for students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds persist, but 
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momentum to address the situation is lacking due to the public-to-private-good 
shift in mentality.”11
Part 3 explores the conditions in which political and fiscal support for the com-
mon public good in higher education became more doubtful and was partly frac-
tured. There was a shift in the realm of ideas. Monetarist economics made the size 
of government an issue, and rational-choice political science provided an intellec-
tual framework in which, remarkably, the “public interest” was defined as impos-
sible. Ideas become important when they are joined to power. In this case, power 
had its origins in neoconservative think tanks and grassroots campaigns in the 
1970s and coalesced in the antistate and antitax individualism of the New Right, 
which was pioneered in California and moved into the political mainstream with 
the presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981–1989). Underlying the politics and drawing 
momentum from it was a long-term historical shift in the political economy of the 
United States. Measured economic inequality increases from about 1980, the year 
that the Reagan presidency began. This seemed to confirm the potency of the new 
individualism, at one and the same time meritocratic and hierarchical, in politics 
and higher education.
Rising inequality and the political swing to the right, in association with the 
continuing expansion of mass higher education as forecast by Martin Trow, have 
altered the landscape in which the California Idea of higher education plays out. 
Part 3 reviews the implications of these changes for the two pillars of the merito-
cratic edifice that still shape our understandings of higher education: education 
as human capital and education as equality of opportunity and social mobility. 
The shift in the political economy led by Clark Kerr’s nemesis, Ronald Reagan, 
proved to be as influential in its own way as Roosevelt and the New Deal, and it 
has lasted almost as long. This shift has reshaped, and in some respects decisively 
limited, the economic and social potentials of American higher education. If the 
California Idea of higher education was partly utopian, then the Reagan-era politi-
cal economy has heightened the utopian element, pushing further from reach the 
1960s egalitarian vision.
But at the same time, the alternative utopia, that of the market society driven 
by ever more unequal competition in society and higher education, has failed. 
In society, poverty has increased markedly, upward mobility has slowed, and the 
middle class faces declining living standards and declining prospects in the next 
generation. In higher education, on all of the indicators except high-research per-
formance (where the multiversity has been protected from wholesale privatiza-
tion by intrinsic market failure, federal research funding, and academic cultures), 
American higher education has declined. Higher education is less well funded and 
less affordable, participation is wavering, academic learning is in question, and 
quality below the top institutions appears to be falling without limit. Some upward 
mobility still occurs, but the balance of effect in American higher education favors 
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the reproduction of inequality rather than upward mobility. Clark Kerr and his 
contemporaries were working on a smaller scale and with more favorable condi-
tions than now prevail. They underrecognized gender and diversity and loaded 
too much of the enrollment into bottom-tier two-year colleges. Nevertheless, it is 
obvious their Idea was better than what followed.
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In the 1950s and 1960s, as the California Idea of higher education emerged, within 
the policy framework of the mixed public and private economy inherited from 
the New Deal era, a different set of ideas about government and the public good 
was also being developed. In 1951, defense intellectual Kenneth Arrow published 
a paper on social choice and individual values, first prepared when he was work-
ing as a summer intern at the RAND Corporation in 1948, in which he inquired 
into whether it was possible to derive collectively rational decisions from the 
aggregation of individuals’ preferences. Arrow used set theory to prove that when 
two or more individuals were making decisions over three or more alternatives, 
it was logically impossible to derive collectively rational group decisions from the 
individual preferences, whether through voting, social welfare policy, or markets. 
There was no prospect of achieving a common decision consistent with each per-
son’s individual preferences. In instances of collective decision making, one or 
the other assumption would have to give way: either the outcome of individual 
preferences would not be collectively rational or individuals would lose their free-
dom to determine personal ends. This conclusion became known as the “impos-
sibility theorem.” Crucially, it was grounded in Arrow’s starting assumptions: that 
methodological individualism prevailed, meaning that all goods were individual-
ized, and there were no collective social goods distinct from the aggregation of 
individual goods,1 that individuals made rational decisions based on utility, that 
individuals’ preferences were unrestricted and inviolable, and that individuals’ 
preferences were incomparable.2 Within the terms of these premises, Arrow pre-
sented his theory as universally applicable in all social sites and all cultures.3 It 
was not grounded in an empirical anthropology of human social behavior. In a 
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sympathetic commentary, S. M. Amadae concludes that “Arrow’s theory of social 
choice was entirely normative.”4
In the period between the 1930s and the 1960s, many intellectuals concerned 
themselves with how to dismantle the coercive authority of fascism and Stalinism. 
John Dewey and others wanted to do this via democratic collective deliberation 
and decision in the public sphere.5 Arrow set himself against these strategies. His 
high individualist approach was radically different. He argued that only “uphold-
ing individual freedom over personal preferences” could be “the basis of legitimate 
rule.” Working democracy based on majority rule tended to infringe on liberty 
by violating the preferences of at least one citizen. State administration of social 
policy was a potential disaster and redistributive taxation was a certain disaster, as 
it was impossible to manage a redistributive policy so as to meet the preferences 
of all citizens, including those whose wealth would diminish. The impossibility 
theorem rendered as intellectually incoherent the very notion of “social welfare.” 
This finding was consistent with the belief of contemporary welfare economics 
that there was no basis for an objective statement of collective welfare.6
Nevertheless, the impossibility theorem did not negate the practical possibil-
ity of an agreed subjective policy determination of collective welfare through the 
democratic process or by government administration; it merely negated the pos-
sibility of Pareto optimality—that is, a condition in which no individual would be 
worse off. Strictly, the impossibility theorem was not applicable in situations where 
individuals took the preferences of others into account, or when they started from 
an assumption of common preferences, or they began from the assumption that 
all had a minimum entitlement, or more generally, where they took into account 
the health or fairness of the system or other distributional norms. In other words, 
it did not apply when people behaved as citizens with shared social values rather 
than as utility-maximizing homo economicus. Arrow emphasized that in his con-
struction, “all social choices are determined by individual desires” and are not 
“imposed by considerations external to individuals’ preferences,”7 which could 
include law, the taxation regime, or public policy. There was no place in the ideal 
Arrow world for principles such as social equality of opportunity in education or 
for taxation of inheritance designed to redistribute resources between families and 
provide each child with a more equal start or public economic intervention during 
a depression on the grounds that all persons should be able to work for a living. 
States S. M. Amadae: “His theorem rejects the possibility that a social consensus 
on ends could emerge as a result of a philosophical ideal transcending individuals’ 
desires as a guide to collective decision making.”8 Arrow’s impossibility theorem 
also excluded utilitarian judgments, which assumed individual utilities could be 
compared, dealing a further blow to classical welfare economics.
The impossibility theorem rested on unrealistic conditions: a self-centered uto-
pia in which autarkic individual freedom was absolute and the shared conditions 
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enabling that freedom to be exercised and enjoyed were taken for granted—despite 
the fact that such social conditions would be fatally undermined when all persons 
pursued their absolute self-interest without any regard for others. To quote Ama-
dae again:
Agents share a world of objective logic or fact, but privately determine values and 
ends. Arrow’s social world is one in which individuals have personal preferences, and 
the world of things and other individuals serves as background in which individu-
als realize their private ends. . . . Arrow does not so much envision a shared social 
world as he does a collection of individuals whose identities are defined by their well-
ordered set of preferences, and who strive to achieve their most preferred outcomes.9
However, by no means all social scientists oppose the use of unrealistic assump-
tions, and many set out to transform the world using normative methods.10 The 
imaginative landscape of the disciplines is populated by many ideal forms and 
cases. Arrow’s kind of individualism, absolute negative freedom without the J. S. 
Mill constraint (I am free only to the extent I do not infringe the freedom of oth-
ers), was attractive to many.11 The impossibility theorem became widely noticed. 
It evolved into the foundation of social choice theory, which in the United States, 
though not Western Europe, largely replaced the older tradition of welfare eco-
nomics.12 The effects in other parts of economics were less transformative. The fact 
that Arrow had demonstrated that markets were incapable of collectively rational 
decisions was not seen to undermine Adam Smith’s invisible hand theorem. Mar-
kets had never been expected to achieve Pareto optimality. Homo economicus had 
no intrinsic concern about collective decisions. On the other hand, the effects in 
political science were subversive and generative. The most dramatic effect was that 
not just social welfare but the “public,” the “public interest,” and “public good” 
were rendered meaningless by the impossibility theorem once its high individual-
ist assumptions were accepted. This was the starting point for the development of 
public choice theory, which described itself as “the economics of politics.”
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
The principal leader of public choice theory, James Buchanan, set out to detonate 
the “normative delusion” that “the state was, somehow, a benevolent entity and 
those who made decisions on behalf of the state were guided by consideration of 
the general or public interest.”13 The foundational text of the theory, The Calculus 
of Consent (1962), written with Gordon Tullock, rested on Arrow’s finding—estab-
lished not through empirical observation but through logic erected on the base of 
Arrow’s high individualist assumptions—that there is no such thing as the public 
good.
Again, the intent of public choice theory was normative: to change expecta-
tions about the state. Buchanan and Tullock stated that they were interested not 
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in what the state was, but in what it ought to do.14 What it ought to do was trade. 
In public choice theory, both politics and government were understood as simi-
lar to an economic market and populated by self-seeking agents. “The theory of 
markets postulates only that the relationship be economic, that the interests of his 
opposite number in the exchange be excluded from consideration.”15 Hence joint 
or collective interest was ruled out from the start. How then did communities de-
termine a just social order? Buchanan believed that individuals should use politics 
to seek forms of justice and social organization that best uphold their individual 
interests. Political leaders might claim to be responsible to persons or causes other 
than themselves, but they were not. Those who espouse general principles did so 
in order to advance their self-interest, by using the mask of altruism to lift their 
standing and secure the trust of others so as to either more effectively pursue their 
self-interest or to secure a general order that will guarantee and maintain it.16 It 
was not so much that there was no public interest expressed in government; rather, 
there were multiple “public interests,” with each one conceived by an active indi-
vidual. Group decisions were simply the sum of the individual decisions combined 
through a decision-making rule.17
Buchanan’s notion of forms of common justice as an outcome of competition 
and trade contrasts with Adam Smith’s views in The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
([1759] 2004). For Smith, human sympathy was foundational to society, and sym-
pathy was neither motivated by self-interest nor served it indirectly.18 Adam Smith 
saw a world of mixed public and private goods in which humans were motivated 
by, on the one hand, sympathy and sociability and, on the other hand, by self-in-
terest and self-love. He believed that it was essential that humans keep self-regard 
in check. Buchanan saw only self-interest and no check, and private goods that 
were obtained in market production and exchange. Clark Kerr and the other 1960s 
builders of California’s higher education would have recognized themselves more 
readily in Adam Smith than in James Buchanan.
Public choice theory took a different tack than earlier theories that posed prob-
lems of government failure alongside problems of market failure. While the vision 
of self-serving politicians and bureaucrats was mobilized by Buchanan as a nega-
tive referent to weaken the credibility of government while detonating the notion 
of public good, this was also the mode of government that he saw as not only in-
evitable but desirable. The negative referent was readily switched to positive. After 
all, self-regarding competitive behavior was the motor of progress.
Within the constraints that he faces, the bureaucrat tries to maximize his utility. He 
is no different from anyone else in this respect. He can hardly be expected to further 
some vaguely defined “public interest” unless this is consistent with his own.19
The notion of politics as another market legitimates practices that some would 
describe as the corruption of public values—for example, politicians who are 
owned by corporate interests that finance their campaigns or public servants who 
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exchange favors for cash. However, Buchanan saw economic freedom as the basic 
form of human freedom, making possible other forms of freedom such as political 
freedom.20 Given that public values were a mirage, nothing could be lost. When 
politics was managed by lobbyists working for large companies, there were no 
ethics to violate. These precepts in their raw form were not universally adopted, 
but the public choice arguments continuously seeped into the polity, so that there 
became more tolerance towards the role of money in Congress than there had 
been in Clark Kerr’s time, and politics became more often interpreted in terms of 
self-interest than in terms of the general interest. In turn, such behaviors and such 
interpretations appear to confirm the core assumptions and narrative of public 
choice theory. Public choice theory also helped to weaken faith in the potential of 
public programs, including educational programs, to improve social conditions. 
As Buchanan notes,
public choice theory, along with complementary empirical observation, has defused 
enthusiasm for collective solutions to social problems. In this negative sense, public 
choice has exerted, and continues to exert, major ideological impact.21
Nowhere did this become more apparent than in the politics of taxation. Taxa-
tion is the key to the capacity of the state to pursue its programs—as Piketty notes, 
without taxation there is no material basis for the common interest.22 For public 
choice theory, taxation was also the soft underbelly of the New Deal–type state, 
the point where it was most vulnerable to political critique. Though the citizen-
beneficiaries of social programs tended to like those programs, who would not 
want to pay less tax?
Buchanan opened up this issue carefully. He stated that for him, government 
embodied a dilemma. On one hand, each person was “a participant in government 
(a citizen)” and in that sense complicit in collective decisions and collective action. 
On the other hand, government by its nature forced some citizens to acquiesce to 
behaviors inconsistent with their preferences, such as “the confiscation through 
taxation of goods he treats as ‘his own.’ ”23 In that circumstance, “coercion is appar-
ently exercised upon him in the same way as that exerted by the thug who takes 
his wallet in Central Park.”24 Buchanan argued that the state must be structured so 
as to protect individuals from coercion, both by other individuals and by the state 
itself. He devised the idea of a two-tier state, consisting of a basic constitutional 
framework of rights enforced by law, the “protective state,” and the domain of con-
tractual exchanges in those rights, the “productive state.” Most day-to-day govern-
ment activity occurred in the productive domain. The concern was to ensure that 
governments did not overstep the boundary and tamper with rights and liberties 
in the protective domain. If government intervened in this area, “its acts may be 
regarded as ‘criminal.’ ”25 Here, again, taxation could be construed as an invasion 
of liberty.
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At the same time that public choice theory began to achieve large-scale im-
pact in social science, in the 1970s, the world of public policy was becoming more 
receptive to promarket values and notions of limited government and taxation. 
The stagflation of the mid-1970s, in which growing unemployment and inflation 
coincided, led to the abandonment of Keynesian demand management as a policy 
tool and a partial shift from fiscal to monetary management as was being urged 
by Milton Friedman. The collapse of global currency coordination in 1971 paved 
the way for greater financial deregulation. Buchanan provided robust support to 
the arguments against Keynesian economic management.26 Friedman recipro-
cated, endorsing Buchanan’s proposition that politics should be seen as a market 
of self-interested individuals rather than the site of a collective public interest.27 
These views were becoming part of the intellectual and policy mainstream. Fried-
man’s call for the strengthening of markets forces in education through vouchers 
and his sharp critique of state-subsidized tuition in higher education as regres-
sive in terms of social distribution also became widely noticed.28 Buchanan agreed 
with Friedman’s position. Student radicalism had occurred, he argued, because 
students received education at a price that was well below its cost of production, 
especially in the public higher education institutions. Clearly, they did not value 
the product. The introduction of full-price tuition would empower students in 
a more useful way, while disciplining them to make effective use of their invest-
ment. It would also bring the universities and the faculty into lines with student-
consumer needs.29
The new politics of limited government and taxation, and education markets, 
was to have a major impact on public higher education—directly, by truncating its 
public funds and financing private sector competitors, and indirectly, by chang-
ing the society in which it worked. The anti-Keynesian state manifested a declin-
ing interest in elevating society, for example, by fostering equality of opportunity. 
Such programs always led to demands for more expenditure. Consistent with 
social choice and public choice theory, some in government and others in think 
tanks, lobbying organizations, and media circles began to talk down expectations 
of the state. It was some time before the practical implications of these new ideas 
were apparent. For California and for the California Idea of higher education, they 
showed first in relation to tax.
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Clark Kerr’s most difficult challenge was the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, 
which began on October 1, 1964. It was the first crest in the successive waves of 
student power, grassroots activism, and the counterculture that for a decade swept 
across the campus, San Francisco,1 the United States, and much of the world. Kerr 
refused to use force at Berkeley, and in any situation, he always negotiated when 
he could. However, he never found a way to reach agreement with the New Left. 
The two parties lived in different worlds. If both were committed to the public 
good, they had contrary notions of what was in it, and they differed fundamentally 
on the meaning of the multiversity. Kerr saw the multiversity as the best hope of 
society and wanted to protect it by reestablishing civil peace on campus. For the 
students, whose confrontations with authority were a public amphitheater within 
which they were building a new and alternate society, the university was part of 
the system, part of the problem, and negotiations with Kerr were an irrelevant dis-
traction. The multiversity was the incubation chamber for their sustained creative 
experiment—and also its collateral damage. Still, the student revolt did not stop 
the machine of California’s higher education from working. Alongside the almost-
continuous activism, the 1960s continued as a fecund building time. Through the 
decade, under Clark Kerr and his successors, the University of California devel-
oped its campuses and its research, and the number of community college stu-
dents rapidly increased. The main political effect of the prolonged period of stu-
dent activism was indirect: it weakened the standing of the multiversity within 
mainstream political culture in California.
The public reaction to student activism was a contributing element in the rise 
of the Republican right, first in California and then in the nation. This conjunction 
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of elements showed first in Ronald Reagan’s 1966–1967 gubernatorial campaign 
promise to “clean up the mess at Berkeley.”2 Ultimately, Reagan’s political career, 
in which he served as thirty-third governor of California (1967–1975) and as a 
popular and transformative fortieth president of the United States (1981–1989), 
was highly consequential for public education in California, though more so in 
national office than as governor. In conjunction with the shift in economic and 
financial management from Keynesianism to monetarism and while fostering 
the populist antistatist individualism that took root in the country in the second 
half of the 1970s and the 1980s, Reagan and the Republican right broke continu-
ity with the stream of policies originating in the New Deal era, one of which was 
the Master Plan. Nevertheless, the Republican right may well have triumphed in 
California without the stimulus provided by the student revolt at Berkeley. Kerr 
remarked later:
I have observed that no other state except New York has experienced more exam-
ples of influence by the left than California: in Hollywood, in San Francisco on the 
waterfront and in the Haight-Ashbury district,3 and in Berkeley during the 1960s. 
Also, few states have seen more spectacular flourishes of influence by the right than 
California: the political successes of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, the support 
given to the John Birch Society, and the attention given to reports of the state Senate 
Committee on Un-American Activities. To understand modern California, however, 
it is more important to acknowledge the longer-run domination by the right than the 
shorter-run glimpses of the influence of the left in the second half of the twentieth 
century.4
There were some signs of later outcomes early in Reagan’s first term as gover-
nor. Soon after taking office and following his engineering the dismissal of Clark 
Kerr from the UC presidency, Reagan announced that the state budget was in 
crisis. Taxes were too high and spending had to be cut. In the University, “there 
are certain intellectual luxuries that perhaps we could do without,” he told a media 
conference. Taxpayers shouldn’t be “subsidizing intellectual curiosity.” Higher ed-
ucation was about preparing people for jobs. Dan Berrett argues that this was the 
moment when a more utilitarian approach to higher education began to take hold, 
an approach focused on career and earnings, and broad support for liberal higher 
education began to slip. The trend was strengthened in the economic downturn 
precipitated by the 1973 oil shock. Periodic polls of student attitudes allow the shift 
to be mapped. “In the early 1970s, nearly three-quarters of freshmen said that it 
was essential to them to develop a meaningful philosophy of life. About a third felt 
the same about being very well off financially. Now those fractions have flipped,” 
said Berrett in 2015. Business studies commanded 12 percent of enrollments in 
Reagan’s first year as state governor in 1967. By the time he was president in 1981, 
business had become the largest single major, a position it still holds.5 Neverthe-
less, it would be far-fetched to claim the fortieth president was primarily responsi-
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ble for the slippage in the popularity of liberal education. In the longer run, his an-
tistate, antitax, and pro-deregulation positions would have more impact on public 
higher education. While in office, Reagan fostered disillusionment with the role 
of government and with the idea of public interest or public good, along the lines 
suggested by public choice theory, decisively tilting the public/private balance in 
policy towards the private side, and fragmenting the fiscal-social compact that had 
supported the Master Plan in its first two decades.
These longer-term effects were not all foreshadowed during Reagan’s time as 
state governor. He largely managed California in 1967–1975 according to the then-
prevailing Keynesian fiscal norms. Roads and infrastructure were funded. Spend-
ing and taxation rose. The University of California experienced a run of tough 
budgets under Reagan, concurrent with a slowing in enrollment growth because 
of demographic change,6 but at the time it was assumed that its budget problems 
were an expression of the governor’s well-known and publicly expressed political 
hostility to the University rather than his fiscal norms. When community college 
enrollment exceeded the Master Plan forecast, money was found. However, when 
Keynesian economic management was jettisoned and the shift in political econo-
my occurred in the second half of the 1970s, Reagan became a leading enthusiast 
for the new conservative populism.
In California the politics of small government and small tax mushroomed into 
a vibrant mass movement. As in the works of Buchanan and public choice theory, 
the tax revolt made little distinction between taxation and theft. In 1978 the antitax 
movement succeeded in securing majority support for the California ballot initia-
tive Proposition 13, which sharply reduced property taxes and capped property tax 
rates. Property taxes provided the main source of income for local counties and 
school districts, and after Proposition 13 was passed, the drop in revenues from 
property taxes was equivalent to 40 percent of total county revenues. The state 
moved to protect schools, cities, and local communities, but in doing so placed the 
other items in the budget in jeopardy, including higher education. A host of fur-
ther tax cutting and tax-related measures emerged, accumulating a long-term le-
gal and fiscal nightmare for state government. In 1980 Proposition 9, which would 
have halved state income tax, was defeated, though only after it had led in the polls 
for most of the campaign period.7 In 1988, partly to compensate for the outcomes 
of Proposition 13, the state adopted Proposition 88, which allocated 40 percent of 
state income to schools and community colleges. This provided some protection 
for the mass public education institutions, but not the CSU and UC systems.
After the spending mandates and tax limitations were taken into account, only 
15 percent of the California state budget was unallocated. This 15 percent, the only 
part of the budget that could be freely varied downwards, included higher edu-
cation. Higher education found itself competing with many other priorities in a 
state more dependent than before on forms of taxation that, unlike property val-
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ues, routinely fluctuated with the economy: income, capital gains, and sales taxes. 
State higher education funding became especially vulnerable during periods of 
recession.8
In 1980 Reagan campaigned for the national presidency on a slogan stating 
that government was not the solution, it was the problem. It was an exact reversal 
of themes of the Kennedy campaign of 1960 and the Johnson campaign of 1964, 
in which the leaders sought to raise expectations of government and draw public 
support for the pursuit of large, collective solutions to society’s problems. Reagan 
diminished expectations of government in the fashion suggested by public choice 
theory: by weakening the intrinsic notion of a common public interest. This was 
an accurate indicator of what was to follow.
In 1981 the president broke a national air-traffic controllers’ strike by using 
military personnel as substitute labor. This outcome weakened the unions, pro-
viding favorable conditions for the deregulation of wages and working conditions 
across the economy, including the growing emphasis on executive pay systems 
that were determined by individual performance rather than internal relativities 
within the firm or workplace.9 In the same year, the top rate on the federal income 
tax scale was cut from 70 to 50 percent. In 1986 the top tax rate was reduced again, 
from 50 to only 28 percent. The second top rate was maintained at 33 percent, 
indicating that the tax package was designed to benefit the highest income earn-
ers above all. The bottom tax rate was raised from 11 to 15 percent. The reduction 
in the top tax rate encouraged high-income earners to press for larger salaries in 
the deregulated environment. The trend line in measured inequality in the United 
States, which dates from about 1980, the year Reagan assumed office, surges after 
the tax cuts. There was to be a close relationship between growth in the income 
shares of the top 1 percent and 0.1 percent of recipients and reductions in the rates 
of taxation on high labor incomes and later reductions in the rate of tax on capital 
incomes and inheritance.10
FUNDING OF THE UNIVERSITIES
The tax revolt ensured that the public funding of public higher education would 
never be as strong again as it had been in the 1960s. Table 18.1 summarizes the 
funding trend from 1960 to 2010. It demonstrates the rapid rise in total funding 
in the first two decades of the Master Plan as enrollment grew more rapidly than 
planned in the community colleges. In the 1970s the University budget slowed 
due to the combined effects of Governor Reagan and demography. The economy 
was up in the 1980s, and Governor Deukmejian made higher education a priority, 
granting the University of California a 30-percent increase in its operating budget 
in 1983. Despite the gathering fallout from Proposition 13, it was a good decade 
for the University. State support increased also in the other higher education sys-
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tems, though the Proposition 13 limitation meant that in some years, community 
colleges turned away applicants.
However, higher education was declining overall as a state fiscal priority. The 
share of total state expenditures going to the UC and CSU fell from 11.3 percent 
in the Master Plan year of 1960 to 7.8 percent in 1995. Over the same span, fund-
ing for prisons rose from 2.4 to 7.1 percent of state spending, as Kerr notes.11 The 
1990s saw the end of funding growth in the UC and CSU, though the enroll-
ment grew by 8.5 percent in the UC and 2.5 percent in the CSU. The next decade, 
2000–2010, was considerably tougher than the 1990s. It saw a major reduction 
in fiscal support, much of it concentrated at the end of the decade, reflecting the 
effects of the 2008–2010 recession. State funding of the University of California 
fell by 24.7 percent in real terms between 2000 and 2010, while the enrollment 
increased by a massive 40.2 percent. There was a 14.8 percent decline in California 
State University funding over the same 2000–2010 period, while the enrollment 
rose by 28.2 percent. The funding of the community colleges increased by 14.2 
percent, which almost matched the enrollment growth of 16.2 percent, but the 
community colleges had less opportunity to raise nonstate revenues than did the 
CSU and UC campuses.12
The 2008–2010 recession generated havoc in state revenues and was especially 
bad for the unprotected areas of the state budget. John Douglass reports a cut of 
$813 million in the funding of the UC system in 2009 and 2010.13 Public fund-
ing, the basis of long-term planning in the early decades of the Master Plan, be-
came more volatile and less predictable than tuition revenues and other private 
sources. This brought with it an ongoing danger that educational quality would 
Table 18.1. Student enrollment in public higher education and state and local government financial 
support, California, 1960–2010, by decade (constant 2010 prices)
Year 



















1960  43,748  61,330  97,858 0.727 0.405 0.429
1970  98,508 186,749  526,584 1.852 1.601 2.058
1980 122,761 232,935  752,278 2.387 2.155 3.378
1990 152,863 272,637  818,755 3.465 2.722 4.152
2000 165,900 279,403  999,652 3.439 2.755 5.047
2010 232,613 358,063 1,161,807 2.591 2.346 5.764
Source: Adapted by author, from data from Callan 2012, pp. 67–69.
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be undermined by careless short-term decisions. When Stanford pioneered mass 
open online courseware (MOOC) programs in 2011, state governor Jerry Brown, 
son of Edmund G. “Pat” Brown, the governor who had ushered in the 1960 Mas-
ter Plan, advocated MOOCs as the means of maintaining participation in higher 
education on the cheap, despite the abysmal completion rates that normally attend 
MOOC units.14
University of California campuses began to imagine a future in which state 
funding was negligible. In the decade between 2002–03 and 2012–13, state revenues 
received by UC Berkeley declined from $497 to $299 million in current dollars, a 
reduction in constant price terms of 54 percent.15 Successive state governments had 
learned that they could reduce funding without a severe public backlash, but there 
was more likely to be public opposition if they sanctioned the tuition increases 
necessary for institutions to make up the shortfall. From the 1990s onwards, a new 
pattern was established in which the years of funding recovery were insufficient 
to compensate for years of reductions. Small cuts were not undone and tended 
to accumulate. In this asymmetrical policy framework, and given the continued 
legal and fiscal constraints on the state, California’s recession-induced cuts looked 
largely irreversible.
Like their public sector counterparts in many other states, the UC and CSU 
have found it difficult to secure state support to raise tuition so as to compensate 
for the effects of state cutbacks. Nevertheless, tuition increases sufficient to plug 
the gap in spending also foster long-term political problems for the public sector. 
Public institutions depend on public support both to secure favorable state poli-
cies and, more generally, to function effectively in a highly networked society and 
economy. Public support tends to be undermined by rising tuition, and in Califor-
nia this also threatens the pristine access mission of the University of California. 
On the other hand, public support is weakened also by reductions in service qual-
ity due to insufficient funding. The access mission needs to be subsidized.16
In 2013, after the recession, the student-to-faculty ratio in the University of 
California was 24 to 1, compared to 19 to 1 a decade earlier, and 15 to 1 in the 1980s.17 
The public university campuses found themselves positioned between the Scylla 
of a resource decline that would undermine all objectives, including the research 
outputs and quality on which so much else depended, and the Charybdis of pub-
lic unpopularity and mission compromise. In effect they were forced to become 
more like a private university so as to uphold their public mission effectively in 
social competition with the real private sector. They had limited options. The only 
potential sources of additional resources were research funding, foreign students, 
noncore revenues, private gifts and endowments (which had a very limited role 
on most campuses), and revenue bonds for capital projects (when allowed by state 
legislation). In this setting, the University of California campuses had no clear 
forward strategy.
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The problem as stated here was specific to public higher education. The effects 
of the 2008–2010 recession differentiated between the University of California, 
which depended partly on the California state budget and whose tuition was regu-
lated by the regents, and private universities such as Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and 
Princeton, which were free to manage their prices and carried significantly larger 
endowments than Berkeley, UCLA, and San Diego. Though both state funding 
and university endowments fell sharply in value in the first two years of recession, 
the trajectory of recovery differed by sector. By 2014 endowments had been largely 
restored in value. The state funding cuts seemed at least partly permanent.
The decline in the relative resource position of the top public universities has 
both short-term and long-term effects. In a study of patterns of American research 
publication, James Adams estimates that in the 1990s there was a slowdown in the 
growth of science papers in the United States. This decline was centered on the 
public universities. Although their share of federal research grants grew in the 
1990s, the decline appears to be associated with the fall in their revenues from 
their respective state governments, which weakened their capacity to sustain re-
search infrastructure and faculty time spent in research.18 Between 2002–03 and 
2012–13, the proportion of Berkeley’s revenues coming from state sources dropped 
from 34 percent to 13 percent.19 This was likely to have more pronounced effects in 
the future trend line of research outputs than had the cessation of funding growth 
in the 1990s noted by Adam.
PROBLEMS OF THE MASTER PL AN
However, as part 1 indicated, the larger problems of the California Idea of higher 
education relate to the access mission rather than the excellence mission. These 
problems are centered on the public schools and the community colleges. “The 
effectiveness of California’s public schools were not an issue for the framers of the 
Master Plan,” states Patrick Callan. Participation, spending, and teacher qualifica-
tions were high in national terms. Within two decades, the task of the schools had 
become more difficult, while Proposition 13 in 1978 had undercut their capacity to 
meet the additional demands. “Proposition 13 set school finance into a downward 
spiral, one that was marked with only brief spurts of recovery in peak state revenue 
years.”20
California’s demography changed fundamentally after the heyday of the equal-
ity of opportunity in the 1960s, when the social consensus underpinning the Mas-
ter Plan was set. The population became larger and much more ethnically diverse. 
The data for 1960 do not distinguish white and Latino categories. In 1970 the state 
was 77 percent white, 12 percent Latino, 7 percent African American, and just 
3 percent Asian or Pacific Islander. By 1990 the proportion categorized as white 
fell from 77 to 57 percent, with the growth in the Latino (26 percent) and Asian/
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Pacific (9 percent) groups. Between 1990 and 2010, the size of the white population 
dropped by 2.1 million, while the size of the Latino and Asian/Pacific populations 
grew by 6.2 million and 2.2 million people respectively. In 2010, 40 percent of Cali-
fornia was white, 38 percent was Latino, 13 percent Asian/Pacific, 6 percent African 
American, and 0.4 percent First Nations American, though there was a high white 
concentration in the wealthiest segment of the population. The age structure of the 
population was unevenly distributed between ethnic categories, reflecting differ-
ences in both fertility and migration patterns. On average the Latino population 
was considerably younger than the white population. In grade 6 in the state public 
schools in 2010, 51 percent of the enrollment was Latino, with 27 percent white, 
11 percent Asian/Pacific, and 7 percent African American. Though the graduation 
rate was lower among Latinos than whites or Asians, Latinos (43 percent) made 
up the largest proportion of the 2010 high school graduate cohort, compared to 
33 percent recorded as white.
In 2009 Latinos made up 28 percent of the enrollment in public higher educa-
tion, significantly less their 43 percent share of school graduation in 2010, com-
pared to 33 percent white and 16 percent Asian or Filipino, though there was a 
large uncategorized group of 15 percent, mostly located in the community colleges. 
At the University of California, the ethnic shares were significantly different again. 
While the UC campuses were more socially representative than the Ivy League, 
as noted, they sat halfway between that measuring stick and the California aver-
age. In ethnic terms, the UC white proportion in 2009 was 38 percent, and the 
Asian and Filipino share was 33 percent, outnumbering the Latino proportion at 
16 percent—less than a third of the Latino presence in middle primary school in 
2010—and the African American proportion, which was just 4 percent of the UC 
enrollment. Latinos were 30 percent of the community college enrollment, and 
African Americans were 7 percent in that sector. The ethnic distribution in the 
CSU was closer to that of the community colleges than the UC.21 These ethnic data 
need to be joined to data on socioeconomic composition, but they indicate the 
stratified nature of participation.
Schooling in California was differentiated by a complex overlap of class, ethnic-
ity, and regional inequalities, within a system design that discriminated in favor 
of families best able to help themselves. It recycled low quality, aspirations, and 
achievement in poor districts, and the obverse in middle-class districts. Middle-
class families, many of them Anglo-American, European American, or of Chinese, 
Japanese, or Korean background, were statistically overrepresented in high-status 
higher education. Latino and African American school populations, like all ethnic 
groups, had mixed class origins, but they were disproportionately concentrated 
in underfunded schools in poor communities, and many Latino students were 
also affected by language barriers. National Assessment of Educational  Progress 
(NAEP) testing found that California’s eighth graders performed well below those 
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in the strongest states.22 In 2012 just 78.5 percent of the high school students 
who started in 2008–09 had graduated, with approximately 8 percent more still 
at school. Latinos students had a graduation rate of 73.2 percent, while that of 
African American students was just 65.7 percent.23 Modest compensatory schemes 
changed little. Typically, efforts to broaden access to Advanced Placement subjects 
in disadvantaged schools were trumped by the schools serving middle-class dis-
tricts, where Advanced Placement offerings rolled out at a faster rate.24
In this context, Proposition 13, which impacted schools directly, and other low 
tax measures signified the unwillingness of part of an ageing white middle class 
to carry the costs of resourcing schooling of good quality across all districts and 
all citizens and noncitizens, including cross-border migrants.25 There was no con-
sensus on whether the families of illegal migrants should receive free schooling.26 
Regardless, by turning their backs not only on illegal migrants but all users of 
public schooling, the proponents of Proposition 13 rendered it impossible for the 
Master Plan to fulfill its founding expectations of equality of social opportunity 
through participation in higher education. Patricia Pelfrey’s summary of the situ-
ation is pessimistic:
The goal of making UC a place that reflects the full diversity of the state remains 
unfulfilled. There is near universal agreement that it will be virtually impossible 
to achieve without the renewal and revitalization of pre-collegiate education—the 
K-12 public schools. There is little evidence that the state is capable of mustering the 
money or the legislative will to get its arms around this challenge, especially in light 
of the initiative-dominated, tax-resistant, limited-government political culture that 
prevails today. Where education is concerned, California, with its outsized ambitions 
and golden dreams, has dwindled into a cautionary tale.27
In higher education the weak component of the Plan was the community col-
leges. In the final edition of The Uses of the University, in 2001, Clark Kerr noted 
that there had been a “movement backward” in the community colleges since the 
1960 Master Plan. There were “enormous discrepancies in . . . transfer programs in 
community colleges between low-income and high-income neighborhoods, dis-
crepancies that increase inequality of opportunity.”28 Sheldon Rothblatt cites a 1995 
range from 8 percent in Southern California to 50 percent in the Bay Area. While a 
small group of community colleges play a prominent role in access to UC Berkeley 
and other University of California campuses, many others have low transfer rates 
to the CSU and UC, with transfers notably lower among African American and 
Hispanic students than white or Asian students.29 Because they have been asked 
to shoulder the great bulk of the growth in participation, without the necessary 
status, and increasingly denied the necessary resources, community colleges’ rates 
of graduation and transfer have languished,30 and patterns of student achievement 
have stratified on regional, social, and ethnic lines, as in public schooling.
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Community colleges were pulled between the need for immediate employabil-
ity and the academic requirements of transfer, which focused on a more liberal 
curriculum.31 The stretch between those two different norms was as great as that 
embodied in the teaching-research nexus in universities, but unlike the UC, the 
community colleges were not fully funded to play both of their roles competently. 
Douglass states that just 22 percent of commencing community college students 
transferred to a four-year degree.32 Often two-year diploma training was insuf-
ficient to secure much impact in the labor markets. The low marginal returns 
associated with the diploma probably contributed to low completion. Four-year 
programs in community colleges were expanding, but they were underfunded by 
comparison with the CSU. Tuition increases were needed to sustain and improve 
quality, but they threatened to reduce enrollment. The problems were long-stand-
ing ones, but they were worsened in the state budget crisis after 2008.
In the California State University campuses, also increasingly underresourced, 
transfer again varied by institution and region, and completion rates were low, at 
about 45 percent. This compared to 90 percent in the UC, which was high on the 
national scale.33
It was apparent by the beginning of the 2010s, if not well before, that the instru-
ments of the Master Plan were no longer adequate in the face of these challenges. 
It could not manage growth or site new developments as required. It was stymied 
by the fiscal retreat of the state, which rendered irrelevant all planning issues, re-
placing them with a permanent problem of crisis management. Callan argues that 
the Plan has lacked an “adaptive capacity”34 for at least two decades. Its mecha-
nisms were unable to plan adequately for demographic growth in the 1990s, and 
the planning of new initiatives had lapsed again into local pork barreling, as was 
the case before 1960 (this very problem had instigated the need for a long-term, 
state-wide settlement in the late 1950s).35 Callan finds that “community college 
enrollment for 2006 was more than 206,000 below projections of a 2000 study 
by the California Postsecondary Commission.”36 Douglass argues that by 2011 the 
Plan was “dead or nearly so” in relation to six areas: access to all who want higher 
education, state subsidization of student places, appropriate balance between two-
year and four-year programs, guaranteed low tuition, sufficient opportunities for 
transfer students in the CSU and UC, and the planning and funding of enrollment 
growth to meet California’s needs.37
Of these issues, the most significant was the failure of the state and of the 
mechanisms of the Master Plan to sustain the central social promise of 1960: the 
provision of access to higher education for all high school graduates who could 
benefit from it. The access promise was honored in full for the first two decades, as 
a central plank of state policy, enabling California to achieve a major increase in 
participation and educational attainment. It was honored intermittently in good 
budget years for the next two decades.38 After that it lapsed, in practice. A common 
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belief in universal access was maintained at the level of the state’s political culture. 
Proposals to increase tuition in any part of public education continued to be hotly 
contested. All the same, for practical purposes, the 1960 promise was dead. As Cal-
lan remarks, “the egalitarian commitments of the plan were the most innovative 
and the most influential,” but “they were also to prove the most fragile.”39
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So far, the travails of the California Idea of higher education have been explained 
in terms of the declining authority of government and of the idea of the public 
interest, the rise of a libertarian individualism in which self-interest is untroubled 
by care for others, and a tax revolt by grassroots activists, joined to high-income 
earners and powerful financial interests, that has crippled state budget capacity. 
Yet the question remains: why? Why was the democratic compact in higher educa-
tion allowed to deteriorate?
The larger answer, beyond education or policy, lies in the changing nature of 
California and U.S. society. Politics and policy are conditioned by underlying so-
cial and economic evolutions, even while they also contribute to the pattern of 
change, and can turn it or shape it at key moments, such as the Reagan ascendancy. 
Policy can set itself against the trend of the times, but this is difficult to sustain. 
Policy has greater potency when it taps into the mood and augments the ongoing 
flow of events. In the United States there has been a clear symbiosis—clear because 
it is visible in the economic data—between on one hand, the 1980 policy turn to 
diminished public goals and lower taxes for the rich and, on the other hand, ris-
ing inequality in the country. Since 1980 the growth in inequality of incomes and 
wealth has been remarkable, with major implications for the conditions, character, 
and potentials of public higher education. The rapidly growing inequality of the 
last thirty years, as much as anything, has pulled higher education away from the 
post–New Deal world, the world of Kennedy and Johnson, that Clark Kerr and his 
colleagues inhabited and served.
Trends in inequality are readily quantified only in relation to incomes and 
wealth. It is true that social mobility can be understood in other terms: for ex-
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ample, intergenerational patterns of occupational status or education. Status and 
income do not always coincide. For example, a successful public service career is 
more likely to bring high status than high income.1 Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
define status in generic terms or to quantify status patterns over time. Income and 
wealth are easier to monitor. Income inequality is the aggregation of inequality of 
income from labor, at every level from the shop floor to the managing director’s 
office, and inequality of income from capital in the form of financial holdings and 
property. More than 99 percent of people earn the majority of their incomes from 
labor. Both labor and capital incomes are affected by tax policy, which can both 
decrease and increase inequality.
The measurement of trends in income has become an active branch of econom-
ics. Thomas Piketty and others have shown that in the Anglo-American countries, 
the concentration of wealth and income in hands of the top 10 percent (one person 
in ten), the top 1 percent, the top 0.1 percent, and the top 0.01 percent (one in every 
ten thousand persons) has risen very considerably since 1980. The increase in in-
come and wealth is particularly concentrated at the very top.2 There is no debate on 
the empirical trend to greater inequality in the United States.3 It is clear, dramatic, 
and unabated. Between 1980 and 2010 in the United States, the income share held 
by the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution rose from 2 percent to nearly 
10 percent. Thomas Piketty finds that income from labor in the United States is 
now “about as unequally distributed as has ever been observed anywhere.”4 At the 
same time the inequality of wealth in the form of property and capital is “less ex-
treme than the levels observed in traditional societies or in Europe in the period 
1900–1910.”5American earned incomes are now more unequal than in apartheid 
South Africa, or colonial India, or the slave-owning Southern states before the 
Civil War. This is a stunning development and one that explains much else that has 
happened in the country.
The analysis by Saez (2013) notes that the top 1 percent of income earners in 
the United States captured just over two-thirds of the total increase in incomes 
between 1993 and 2012, and 95 percent of the income gains made in the recovery 
after the recession, in 2009–2012.6 In 2012 the income share of the top 10 percent, 
at more than 50 percent, was at its highest level since 1913; the income share of the 
top 1 percent, at 22.5 percent, had almost returned to its prerecession level of 2007, 
which was the highest level since 1928; the income share of the top 0.01 percent ex-
cluding capital gains was at its highest level since 1916, and its income share includ-
ing capital gains was 5.5 percent, the second highest level on record, behind only 
the prerecession in 2007.7 Since the 2008–2010 recession, capital incomes have 
only partly recovered but the salaries received by the top income earners have 
soared, reaching even higher levels than before the recession. At the same time, 
according to the 2014 OECD report United States: Tackling High Inequalities, be-
tween 2000 and 2010, the average income of the poorest 10 percent of Americans 
fell by 15 percent in real terms.8
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In the United States the average income of the richest 10 percent is sixteen times 
the average income of the poorest 10 percent. This is the third highest ratio at 
those income levels among the OECD group of countries, behind only Mexico 
and Chile. The OECD average for that income ratio is 9.6. While the United States 
is third in average income in the OECD, it ranks only eighteenth in average in-
come for people in the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution.9 Piketty ex-
pects that by 2030, the top 1 percent income receivers in the United States will 
receive 25 percent of all income, compared to 20 percent in 2010, and the bottom 
50 percent’s share will fall from 20 to 15 percent,10 greater inequality than today.
The broad trend lines in California resemble those in the nation, except that 
income inequality in California has become more extreme than in the nation as a 
whole, in contrast to the state’s relatively egalitarian income distribution at earlier 
times. California now has the nation’s largest concentration of wealth and its high-
est incidence of poverty. In the year 1928, the top 1 percent of income recipients in 
California held 20.0 percent of all income, compared to 23.4 percent in the nation 
as a whole. At that time the West was more egalitarian than the country. In 1979 
in California, after two decades of the Master Plan, only 10.2 percent of income 
accrued to the top 1 percent, just above the national level of 9.9 percent. But in 
2007, just before the recession, the level in California had jumped to 22.7 percent 
compared to a national level of 21.8 percent. The gap between California and the 
whole nation has now increased further. In the three years after 2009, following 
the recession triggered in 2008, all income growth in California accrued to the top 
1 percent of persons in income distribution terms; this was also the case in sixteen 
other states. The incomes of the top 1 percent in California rose by 49.6 percent in 
the recession years 2009–2012, which was the fourth largest such increase in the 
nation. Meanwhile, the incomes of the bottom 99 percent dropped by 3.0 percent.11 
Overall, between 1979 and 2012, which were the years of growing inequality in the 
country as a whole, the top 1 percent in California increased their incomes by 189. 
5 percent, while the income of the bottom 99 percent fell by 6.3 percent.12
In 2008–2011 in California the ratio between the average household income 
for the richest 20 percent of households and the poorest 20 percent was 9.5, the 
third highest ratio after New Mexico and Arizona.13 Over the three-year period 
2011 to 2013, California included 8.871 million persons with an income below the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s Supplemental Poverty Line, one sixth of all such Americans, 
constituting 23.4 percent of persons in the state—the highest poverty level of any 
state in the nation.14 Tami Luhby compares California’s Silicon Valley, where resi-
dents have “the highest level of well-being in the nation,” with average incomes 
almost double the national average and nearly triple the average number of gradu-
ate degrees, with the state’s Central Valley less than a hundred miles away, where 
residents have the nation’s lowest level of well-being. Average incomes for single 
parents with two children are close to the poverty line, and nearly four in ten per-
sons fail to graduate from high school.15
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How do the trends in the California and the United States compare with those 
in other countries? In the United Kingdom between 1980 and 2010, the income 
share of the top 1 percent moved from 6 to 15 percent, the highest level since the 
1930s. In Canada it was 12 percent in 2010; in Australia it was 10 percent.16 The 
other English-speaking countries have also seen the growth of high salaries and 
a concentration of wealth at the top, but the top American salaries are extreme in 
comparative terms.
As this suggests, it is helpful to place American inequality in the larger his-
torical and geographic contexts. In the Nordic countries in the 1970s, the most 
equal modern societies, the top 1 percent received about 7 percent of all income. 
In Europe in 2010, the top 1 percent received 10 percent of income. In the United 
States in 2010 the top 1 percent received 20 percent, the same level as in the aris-
tocrat-led societies of late-nineteenth-century Europe (table 19.1). However, in 
2010 the top 1 percent in the United States achieved its 20 percent of income more 
through labor income and less through capital than was the case in old Europe. 
The more modern form of salary-based inequality is legitimated by an element of 
merit: it is the product of hard work, not just property and capital, though as elite 
graduate recruitment shows (see chapter 20), competition for top labor incomes is 
not a level playing field.
At present, measured economic inequality is increasing in about two-thirds of 
countries around the world. The most striking changes have been the explosive 
growth of managerial salaries in the United States and United Kingdom, and to 
a lesser degree in other English-speaking countries, Western Europe, and Japan. 
In Japan the maintenance of traditional work-based relativities has been a partial 
brake on increased inequality. The average Japanese chief executive officer is paid 
sixteen times the average worker in the same corporation, whereas in the United 
States this ratio is now about 200 times.17
The earlier argument that growing wage inequality in the United States is pri-
marily driven by technological change has fallen from favor. Most industrialized 
countries have undergone similar technological change, but they have divergent 
income patterns.18 In the United States the main incidence of inequality is at the 
top end of the wage structure and centered on managers, especially in certain in-
dustries.19 Piketty calls the United States a “hypermeritocratic society,” or at least, 
“a society that the people at the top like to describe as hypermeritocratic. . . . This 
is a very inegalitarian society, but one in which the peak of the income hierarchy 
is dominated by very high incomes from labor rather than by inherited wealth.”20 
Almost two-thirds of the top 0.1 percent of income earners are managers. Only 
about 5 percent are actors, artists, or athletes.21
Much of “supersalary” development is taking place in the finance sector.22 Finance 
has double the proportion of very high salaries that its growing share of economic 
production would suggest.23 Managers often set their own performance-related 
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remuneration, including bonuses, or negotiate that remuneration with boards of 
like-minded folk and on which they themselves may sit.24 Again, this is inequality 
in a more modern, quasi-meritocratic form, centered on control over work rather 
than on property and inheritance, legitimated by the performance pay concept,25 
and normatively grounded in the “shareholder value conception of the firm” in 
which managers are seen to contribute disproportionately to value.26 With part of 
their remuneration usually tied to stock options, cementing the association be-
tween management and shareholder value, supermanagers can be both superman-
agers and medium rentiers at the same time.27 In the next generation, when today’s 
supermanager salary and managerial stock holdings have metamorphosed into 
tomorrow’s inheritance, more traditional forms of inequality will return to front 
rank. The 1960s vision of the educated-selected meritocracy will recede further. 
Inherited inequality is more difficult to challenge and change.
In the United States, salary inequality is partly balanced by the patrimonial 
middle class, especially by widespread middle-class home ownership. However, 
the middle-class share of wage and salary income is down, savings ratios have 
fallen, and debt has risen;28 moreover, the market value of many homes fell sharply 
in the 2008–2010 recession. Joseph Stiglitz states that average value declined by 
more than one-third as a result of the recession, and between 2005–2009 the aver-
age African American household lost 53 percent of its wealth, while the average 
Hispanic household lost 66 percent.29 The overall position of the “middle-middle” 
and lower-middle classes seems to be declining, with implications also for social 
mobility. This decline reduces the number of positions in the middle of society 
that the upwardly mobile can occupy, and with less opportunity in the middle 
of society, it is harder to move through to the top. Socially, the United States is 











Top 1% by Income
 share of labor income 6% 5% 7% 12%
 share of capital income 50% 20% 25% 35%
 share of total income 20%  7% 10% 20%
Bottom 50% by Income
 share of labor income n.a. 35% 30% 20%
 share of capital income  5% 10%  5%  5%
 share of total income 20% 30% 25% 20%
Source: Adapted by author from data from Piketty 2014, pp. 247–249.
n.a. = data not available.
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now less democratic than Europe. “The chances that a poor, or even middle class 
American will make it to the top in America are smaller than in many countries 
of Europe,” says Stiglitz.30 In the future, American society will almost certainly 
become more closed at the top, with less mobility into and within the elite, while 
income shares continue to decline at the middle and bottom of the pyramid.
Piketty’s argument is that inequality is not self-correcting. The tendencies to in-
equality and to the attenuation of social mobility are endogenous to the capitalist 
economy, so that inequality increases over time—unless the state uses education 
policy, income distribution and taxation policy, welfare and spending on social 
programs, and infrastructure to sustain a democratic balance, as in the Nordic 
world:
A market economy based on private property, if left to itself, contains powerful forces 
of convergence, associated in particular with the diffusion of knowledge and skills, 
but it also contains powerful forces of divergence, which are potentially threatening 
to democratic societies and to the values of social justice on which they are based.31
PLUTO CR ATIC CAPTURE
In the Ronald Reagan years and after, instead of maintaining a balance between 
the endogenous trend to inequality and the state-protected value of each indi-
vidual, U.S. policy allowed inequality to let rip. The trend was political as well as 
economic. The two aspects reinforced each other. Government not only stopped 
compensating, through its tax and spending policies, for the natural tendency to 
inequality, but it deliberately nurtured the high-income earners, moving policy 
and regulation decisively in their favor. In turn, by deregulating financial manage-
ment and cutting taxation, government more fully released endogenous market 
forces. These processes became self-reproducing. The resulting lopsided accumu-
lation of wealth further strengthened the constituencies that supported deregula-
tion, low tax, and the lesser expectations about government.
The 1980s triumph of the rich in the political sphere turned into something 
more permanent. Societies that are relatively static in terms of social mobility, in 
which social elites are concentrating their economic power, are vulnerable to the 
plutocratic capture of politics. Plutocratic capture brings with it the more per-
manent adoption of political ideologies and fiscal and monetary policies that are 
crafted to advance the interests of the elite. Arguably, this is what has happened in 
the United States, as also in the United Kingdom.32
The effects of the 1980s transformation of polity and policy have continued to 
accumulate. The mid 2010s United States is radically different from the country in 
which Clark Kerr did his work and higher education was unequivocally defined 
as a public good. The problem of plutocratic capture of the American polity is 
now routinely discussed in scholarship and research on inequality.33 It is noted 
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by mainstream global policy agencies such as the OECD,34which seek a reduction 
in inequality on the grounds that high levels of inequality undermine economic 
growth and also social cohesion.35 Plutocratic capture also preoccupies global non-
governmental agencies, such as Oxfam, whose work is focused on development 
and poverty reduction:
A recent study presents compelling statistical evidence that the preferences of 
wealthy Americans are overwhelmingly represented in their government, compared 
with those of the middle classes. By contrast, the preferences of the poorest people 
demonstrate no statistical impact on the voting patterns of their elected officials. If 
this trend continues, public policies will most likely reproduce the conditions that 
are worsening economic inequality and political marginalization.36 . . .
Oxfam notes that in 2010, President Obama signed into law the Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act (known as the Dodd-Frank Bill). The objec-
tive was to regulate financial markets to protect the economy from a future crash. 
“However, the financial industry has spent more than $1 billion on hundreds of 
lobbyists to weaken and delay the Act’s full implementation. In fact, in 2012 the top 
five consumer protection groups sent 20 lobbyists to defend Dodd-Frank, while 
the top five finance industry groups sent 406 to defeat it.” By 2014 only 148 of the 
398 Dodd-Frank rules had been finalized, and the financial system remained just 
as vulnerable to crash as it was in 2008.37
Plutocratic capture explains why economic outcomes and economic policies 
that are deeply unpopular are maintained. Stiglitz cites poll evidence which sug-
gests that “there are large discrepancies between what most people want and what 
the political system delivers”;38 that 61 percent of Americans believe the economic 
system favors the wealthy, and only 36 percent think it is fair;39 and that while few 
have a clear picture of the current extent of economic inequality, when offered a 
range of differing descriptions of the economy, people overwhelmingly prefer the 
Swedish income distribution to that of the United States, by a ratio of 92 percent 
to 8 percent.40 Research by Jeremy Reynolds and He Xian on attitudes towards 
the social order in the United States found that young upper-class whites were 
the most likely to see the nation as a place where meritocratic relationships deter-
mine social outcomes. Older people from low-SES ethnic minorities were more 
likely than others to believe that family and social networks determine outcomes, 
rather than study and hard work. Between the 2009 and 2011 surveys, faith in the 
meritocratic domain declined.41 It can be confidently predicted that such faith will 
decline further in future.
The process of plutocratic capture has been linked to financial deregulation and 
the reciprocally associated “financialization” of the economy, meaning the quan-
titative and qualitative increase in the economic weight of the finance sector.42 
According to Jon Wisman, “financial stocks grew from six percent of the stock 
markets’ total value in the early 1980s to 23 percent by 2006.”43 Finance received 
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40 percent of total profit in the Unites States just before the 2008 crash.44 The po-
litical sway and regulatory role of private banks and other financial organizations 
have been advanced in a symbiosis between central government regulation and 
private finance. Stiglitz argues that the Fed and parallel regulatory agencies such 
as the Bank of England are too close to the private banks.45 With a handful of ex-
ceptions, such as Lehmann’s in 2008, the leading financial players are protected at 
almost any cost. This neatly encapsulates the social priorities of the post-Reagan 
public authorities. Stiglitz notes that the $180 billion used to bail out AIG during 
the recession was greater than the total federal allocation to the welfare of the poor 
for the whole period 1990–2006.46
The ongoing effects of plutocratic capture of the polity are well illustrated by tax 
policy. As noted, the dominant aspect of tax policy since 1980 has been to advance 
and protect the position of higher-income earners. The debate has not been about 
whether to do this; it has it has been about how far to go. The top marginal income 
tax rate in the United States moved from 70 percent under President Jimmy Carter 
to 28 percent under Ronald Reagan, back to 39.6 percent under Bill Clinton, and 
down to 35 percent under George W. Bush. It rose again under Barack Obama but 
only to the Clinton level of 39.6 percent. The lion’s share of the Reagan reduction 
in the top rate remained in place. Nor have all the tax reductions taken place under 
Republican administrations. Clinton’s tuition tax credits, which were maintained 
by all his successors, are socially regressive. As a proportion of income, they ben-
efit high-income earners more than low-income earners. In addition, the tax rate 
on unearned income such as property and equity, once greater than the tax rate on 
earned income, has been reduced below the income tax rate. This is a another gift 
for the wealthiest 0.1 percent, who draw the majority of income from this source.47 
Capital gains tax was taken down to 20 percent under Clinton and 15 percent un-
der Bush.48 Across the world, countries are competing for capital by lowering taxes 
on capital income or exempting it altogether,49 separating the wealthy from the 
tax/spend/services economy that engages other citizens. The objective is to stem 
the flow of monies into the offshore havens that now absorb at least 10 percent of 
the world’s wealth, and probably much more.50 However, the procapital stance has 
been taken further in the United States than in many nations. For one year, George 
W. Bush even abolished the estate tax.
In the United States, market-generated inequality as such is not appreciably 
greater than in many other OECD countries. It is only when taxation and govern-
ment transfers are included in the comparison that the full extent of comparative 
American inequality is revealed.51 The change is manifest not just in income distri-
bution but in the political culture. Since 1980 the Republican Party has been closely 
shaped by an antistatist and antitaxation position, with candidates for office differ-
ing only in the extremes to which they will take that position. Though the Demo-
crats are seen as the party of government and maintain a formal commitment to 
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ideas of redistribution and welfare, the parties are not as far apart as this would 
suggest. Both sides of politics are disciplined by lobbyists, campaign funding, and 
the potential for capital flight. A less aggressive version of the antitax posture of 
public choice theory and the tax revolt is mandatory in mainstream American 
politics. It would seem exceptionally difficult for any political party to take govern-
ment without conforming to the finance-sector policy template, including contin-
ued financial deregulation and low taxation.
Given the elite capture of the polity, the main directions of education policy 
are easier to understand. Social elites mostly do not use common public services 
and have no intrinsic interest in their improvement, still less in paying for those 
services (unless members of the elite are altruistic, contradicting public choice 
theory).52 Genuine equality of opportunity would broaden the pool of competitors 
for position. Elite families have an intrinsic interest in a controlled form of edu-
cational competition and the ranking of educational institutions, providing that 
this competition rewards families with starting advantages. When higher educa-
tion is a positional competition, wealthy families can better protect their interests 
within a segmented hierarchy in which the direct competitors are limited. They 
can advance their position though tailored and selective investments while pro-
tecting their children from all-inclusive mixing. The downward pressure on state 
spending and neglect of public schools in poor districts; the federal subsidization 
of for-profit colleges despite low quality and poor student completion rates and the 
support for the for-profit corporations on both sides of the aisle while community 
colleges are neglected53 (the exception is the Obama presidency, which struggled 
with Congress to promote community colleges and limit for-profit subsidies); the 
student loan policies tailored to the interests of commercial lenders, not students 
or access objectives; the tuition tax breaks; the legislative protection of Ivy League 
universities that service the richest 0.1 percent—these are all minor aspects of the 
much larger elite political project.
Yet these developments in higher education not only violate the goal of equality 
of opportunity, they undermine the meritocratic potential of 1960s human capi-
tal theory. Part I reflected on the important part played by higher education in 
American society in the more meritocratic 1950s–1970s era, when relatively open 
social structures were combined with growing social opportunities. Since 1980, 
amid the conditions of a reduced role of government, an increasingly cynical and 
commercialized polity, and a more unequal social order, the economic and social 
potentials of public higher education have been more limited.
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The Dream Is Over will now look more closely at the mechanisms of social distri-
bution in higher education, particularly at the relationship between economic and 
social inequality and inequality in and through higher education—and the way in 
which the equality-inequality equation has worsened since the era of the Master 
Plan in the 1960s.
The primary intrinsic limit to equality of opportunity objectives in any era is 
the persistence of irreducible differences between families in their economic, so-
cial, and cultural resources. Policy can partly compensate for economic differences 
but can scarcely eliminate the potency of the family in cultural capital and social 
networks,1 and as competition intensifies, these effects are heightened. The impact 
of inequalities in family position could be fundamentally reduced only by shifting 
the locus of social selection away from educational merit and the education/career 
nexus, switching the efforts of families into a new domain of social competition. 
(No doubt modern education is preferable to warrior rituals and simulated battle-
grounds.)
Economist John Roemer finds that parents influence outcome for children in 
three ways: social connections that facilitate access to education and jobs, fam-
ily culture and investments affecting skills and motivation/aspirations, and the 
“genetic transmission of ability.”2 The last is arguable, but the first two are support-
ed by a large body of research that points to the impact of inequalities in the family 
on patterns of school performance prior to higher education, on access to selective 
education, on the transition to labor markets, and on career performance. The 
broad effect of post-1980 policy has been not so much to create inequality in these 
domains as to exacerbate that potential and diminish the compensating factors.
20
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In mid-secondary school, aspirations to enter higher education are very broadly 
spread, but the capacity to enter and graduate is socially differentiated, especially 
the capacity to enter selective institutions. Students from low socioeconomic-sta-
tus (SES) backgrounds or in remote locations tend to underestimate their academ-
ic potential. They are also less willing to take risks, more likely to focus explicitly 
on secure and highly paid employment, more concerned to secure a predictable 
pathway from study to job, and more likely to be concerned that they may be lack-
ing the necessary cultural capital. They are also less familiar with performance and 
application strategies. These problems arise not just in countries where there are 
tuition barriers and lofty elite universities; they arise also in free Nordic higher 
education systems, where all college degrees carry significant status.3 In the United 
States these difficulties could be partly overcome by extensive identification and 
tailored assistance to ensure that no bright, hard-working student from a poorer 
background is allowed to miss out. Instead the practical operations of American 
higher education tend to magnify family inequality, and more so now than in the 
heyday of the Master Plan.
As noted in part 1, Soares reports that in 1988 to 2000, 64 percent of the stu-
dents of Tier 1 institutions in the United States were from the richest 10 percent 
of households.4 Given the potency of Tier 1 institutions in American society, this 
is a primary indicator of inequality. Socially unequal entry into Tier 1 is not due 
solely to unequal preparation at school level. First, it is affected by prior economic 
inequalities. Access to elite private universities is moderated by high tuition, which 
since 1990 has risen much faster than inflation. The average income of Harvard 
parents is $450,000, corresponding to the top 2 percent of Americans. Admissions 
decisions are also affected by the legacy factor (children of Ivy League alumni in-
herit a quasi right to enter) and parental donations. Piketty notes that such dona-
tions peak during the college years. “Such a finding does not seem entirely com-
patible with the idea of selection based solely on merit. The contrast between the 
official meritocratic discourse and the reality seems particularly extreme in this 
case. The total absence of transparency regarding selection procedures should also 
be noted.”5
Second, as this suggests, socially stratified entry is also affected by the use of 
nonacademic criteria at the point of entry into elite institutions. In Ivy League 
institutions, the use of nonacademic criteria that favor the white upper-middle 
class, such as culturally specific extracurricular activities and evidence of lead-
ership qualities, is well documented and a source of recurring controversy and 
debate, in part because it weakens the academic mission.6 Equality of opportunity 
is further stymied by informal quotas limiting the number of Asian Americans in 
prestige universities, despite superior performance and, in many cases, possession 
of the required extracurricular attributes as well.7 Even within the upper strata, 
merit is not necessarily honored, however defined. Nevertheless, private colleges 
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are under less pressure than public institutions to honor principles of social access 
and fairness. Equality of opportunity is a public charge, and, if necessary, public 
institutions must compensate for inequalities generated by investment in the pri-
vate sector and by the manipulation of its criteria and processes for entry in favor 
of certain families.
Third, the larger problem, affecting entry to public research universities as well 
as select private institutions, is inequality of information and aspiration. On the ba-
sis of a census-level study of all applicants to higher education in the United States 
published in 2013, Caroline Hoxby and Christopher Avery identify high-achieving 
school students and track their application behaviors.8 “ ‘High-achieving’ refers to 
a student who scores at or above the 90th percentile on the ACT comprehensive or 
the SAT I (math and verbal) and who has a high school grade point average of A− 
or above. This is approximately 4 percent of U.S. high school students.”9 They find 
the vast majority of low-income high achievers at school do not apply to any selec-
tive college, although selective colleges offer them lower tuition prices than many 
nonselective colleges, due to the availability of generous financial aid packages.10 
Hoxby and Avery note that there is a large talent pool of low-income high achiev-
ers at school: “We estimate that there are at least 25,000 and probably about 35,000 
low-income high achievers in each cohort in the United States.”11While school 
achievement is not distributed proportionately across the population, 22 percent 
of all high achievers are in the second family-income quartile and 17 percent are 
in the bottom quartile. Ensuring that these low-income high achievers are identi-
fied and supported should be a central concern if equality of opportunity is to be 
upheld.
The researchers found that the application behavior of most low-income high 
achievers differs greatly from that of their high-income counterparts with similar 
achievement. The latter generally follow experts’ advice to apply to several “peer,” a 
few “reach,” and a couple of “safety” colleges. Most low-income high achievers opt 
for more uniformly safe choices.
Hoxby and Avery separate the low-income high achievers into those whose ap-
plication behavior is similar to that of their high-income counterparts (“achieve-
ment-typical”) and those who apply to no selective institutions (“income-typical”). 
Income-typical students are not more disadvantaged than the achievement-typical 
students. However, in contrast to the achievement-typical students, who are of-
ten concentrated in poor districts of large cities, the income-typical students tend 
to come from districts too small to support selective public high schools,12 are 
not in a critical mass of fellow high achievers, and are unlikely to encounter a 
teacher, a counselor, or a student who has attended a selective college. Widely used 
policies to recruit such students, such as college admissions recruiting, campus 
visits, and college mentoring programs, are mostly ineffective with the income-
typical students.13 However, it can be argued that the selective colleges should not 
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be  expected to solve the problem of “under-matching” by themselves14 and that it 
is the responsibility of states, public schools, and higher education to identify and 
nurture these students.
Once students apply, “there is no statistically significant difference” in the prob-
ability of high-income and low-income students enrolling “or in their progress 
toward a degree.”15 So it is likely that high-achieving students who do not apply for 
flagship universities and other selective schools simply miss out on any learning 
and labor market benefits that would follow. Hoxby and Avery also make the point 
that on the basis of the data in their study, if a student is from an underrepresented 
minority, such as African American, Hispanic, or First Nations American, that “is 
not a good proxy for his or her being low-income.” Therefore, “if a college wants its 
student body to exhibit income diversity commensurate with the income diversity 
among high achievers,” it would not necessarily attain this goal simply by recruit-
ing students who are members of underrepresented minorities. This would create 
a student body diverse in terms of ethnicity but not necessarily as diverse in terms 
of income.16
In another large-scale study in 2013, in the United Kingdom, Vikki Boliver17 
finds continued and dramatic differences in social group access to elite universities: 
“Applicants from lower class backgrounds and from state schools remained much 
less likely to apply to Russell Group universities than their comparably qualified 
counterparts from higher class backgrounds and private schools.” Those “schooled 
in the state sector remain just half as likely to apply to a Russell Group university 
as those from private schools.”18 UK students must file applications before their 
final school results are known, which tends to increase what Hoxby and Avery call 
“undermatching.”19 Boliver refers to widespread perceptions among the underrep-
resented groups that prestige universities belong to the privately educated white 
upper-middle class. When education is seen to belong to someone else, aspirations 
and agency are automatically diminished.20 In addition, “Russell Group applicants 
from state schools and from Black and Asian ethnic backgrounds remained much 
less likely to receive offers of admission from Russell Group universities, in com-
parison with their equivalently qualified peers from private schools and the White 
ethnic group.” That is, students from underrepresented groups are less likely to 
get in when they have the same marks as students from overrepresented groups. 
As with Ivy League admissions in the United States, factors other than academic 
merit affect entry and render more unrepresentative the social makeup of the stu-
dent body in the elite subsector.21
STR ATIFICATION OF OPPORTUNITIES
As discussed in part 2, all national higher education systems are structured hi-
erarchically, based on formal and informal distinctions between institutions, 
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though the steepness of the hierarchy, the vertical stratification between institu-
tions, varies by country. As systems expand, institutions tend to become further 
differentiated between or within subsectors on the basis of unequal value. System 
structures—such as the American classification system that demarcates research-
intensive universities and elite liberal arts colleges from other institutions—act as 
a framing device in allocating people to opportunities. This operates as a second 
limitation to the potential for equality of opportunity, additional to and intersect-
ing with the inequality of starting position in families.
A number of recent studies find the positional structure of American higher 
education is being further stretched vertically. The difference between the value of 
higher education in a highly selective college and in a nonselective college is great-
er than before. This difference shows in the levels of resources that support the dif-
ferent kinds of institution, the levels of esteem in which the respective institutions 
are held, and the power of the credentials in later life. There seems to be more at 
stake in decisions about where students are placed. As in the national structure of 
income distribution, so in higher education: value is being concentrated at the top 
end, increasing demand for the leading institutions, alongside a hollowing out of 
value in and demand for access to middle-level institutions and growing problems 
of low demand or noncompletion at the bottom end. In 1996 Robert Frank and 
Philip Cook published a book on winner-take-all markets, markets in which a 
small number of players dominate the game, commanding much higher revenues 
than the overwhelming majority of players. They described elite American higher 
education as one such market.22 In 2011 Hal Hansen found that selectivity was 
becoming more intense in top-level institutions and declining below them. In re-
sources, there was a nearly ten-to-one, and still widening, differential between the 
highest and lowest ranking schools on annual per capita student-oriented resourc-
es: “spending on instruction, student services, academic support, and operation 
and maintenance of facilities.” The gap was mostly due to “spending growth by the 
top ten percent of schools . . . rather than dramatic changes in the rest.” There was 
also “a growing hierarchization and homogenization of schools’ student bodies.” 
The “educational and networking advantages that accrue from peer interaction at 
schools in the top ten percent” were rising, and those advantages were falling in 
other schools, indicating stratification of outcomes and value.23
The observations about increased vertical stretch and the concentration of sta-
tus and resources at the top were confirmed by Scott Davies and David Zarifa. 
They used Gini coefficients, Lorenz curves, and other measures of inequality to 
compare “the level of stratification in financial resources across four-year institu-
tions in Canada and the United States over a 35-year period (1971–2006).”24 Like 
Hansen, they found that the vertical stretch of higher education in both countries 
has increased. Davies and Zarifa report moderate to strong associations between 
resource concentration and selectivity in both the United States and Canada. 
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“ Resource-rich institutions are . . . likely to use their resources to attract higher-
ranked students through scholarships, financial aid, teaching quality, and gener-
al reputation. While these data cannot determine causal direction, they suggest 
that financial and cognitive resources co-vary across institutions in both coun-
tries.”25 Davies and Zarifa also found that in both countries, competitive markets 
are driving this increased vertical stretch, signified by resource concentration.26 
“Change in stratification may be triggered by policy environments that are sub-
jecting universities to greater competition for revenue, whether in the form of 
tuition-paying clients, fund-raising, or research grants, and that are offering less 
bountiful and reliable government support.”27 They note that policy makers in 
both countries want universities “to remake themselves into highly differentiated, 
competitive, responsive, and entrepreneurial hubs of activity” by competing for 
research funds, fund-raising, seeking corporate partnerships and building tuition 
revenues. “These pressures are particularly acute for public universities, for whom 
the “golden years” of large and untargeted government subsidies are receding into 
the past.”28 New survival strategies are emerging.
Established universities are competing ever-more tenaciously for “star” research-
ers. . . . Relative newcomers are devising strategies to move up the ranks. At lower 
levels in the hierarchy, institutions are seeking niches in vocational programming 
in order to survive, a process resembling the “anticipatory subordination” pursued 
earlier by community colleges. And, near the bottom reaches, for-profit and online 
colleges have emerged as major competitors for non-traditional students.29
The competition for status and resources is articulated through a tendency to 
cumulative advantage, a Matthew effect. Over time, top institutions leverage their 
advantages in resources and status to compound their relative position, all else 
equal. “Universities that are already older, established and wealthy enter new com-
petitions for resources with prominent alumni networks, sizeable endowments, fa-
vorable locations, and strategic corporate ties,” observe Davies and Zarifa. “These 
near-exclusive assets each offer an edge for attracting new corporate partnerships, 
lucrative research contracts, and donors with deep pockets.” Colleges unable to 
compete with the strongest “brands” often devise niche strategies or develop new 
products and new markets, occupying a subordinate niche that confirms system 
segmentation.30 One example is the market of working people who were school 
dropouts, which has been cultivated by the for-profits. This is happening in the 
flatter Canadian system as well as the United States. In Canada, “as elsewhere 
around the globe, Canadian policy makers are using market language to urge uni-
versities to expand, differentiate, compete and innovate. . . . Most provinces now 
permit private universities and colleges to operate, and some may push for a more 
explicitly tiered system. The leaders of top research universities have openly ex-
pressed their wishes to emulate elite U.S. schools.”31
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The study also found that the United States system is much more unequal than 
the Canadian system: “Along key measures such as total income and total expen-
ditures the U.S. system is strikingly more stratified. Some American coefficients 
more than double their Canadian counterparts. .  .  . The Canadian system has a 
modicum of parity across institutions.”32 (One exception is the degree of inequality 
in U.S. public universities in income from tuition and spending on scholarships, 
prizes, and student grants. In these areas, inequality in U.S. public universities is 
similar to the pattern in their Canadian equivalents.33) U.S. higher education is “a 
hierarchical system dominated by a small number of super-resourced, elite institu-
tions that are highly distinct from the masses.” In contrast, “Canadian distributions 
are clearly stratified, but are far less skewed and more normally distributed.” In the 
United States, “the private sector is much more skewed and contains a longer trail 
of upper outliers compared to the public sector.” The U.S. public sector is also 
clearly more stratified than the Canadian equivalent. Over time, “the U.S. figures 
show an increasing separation of upper outliers from the rest. . . . Elite institutions 
have not only maintained their advantages, but have pulled away from the pack.”34
Davies and Zarifa conclude that “these findings provide new and compelling 
evidence of increasing structural stratification in higher education. They are a like-
ly outcome of a combination of social forces, including new competitive strategies 
among universities, academic capitalism, the spreading influence of rankings, and 
greater concentrations of top-ranked students among universities, among others.”35 
The growing inequality of value between high-tier institutions and other institu-
tions in itself worsens inequality of social opportunity in education. Elite higher 
education is a prize largely out of reach of students from poor backgrounds. The 
relative value of the prize has grown. In zero-sum social competition, the more so-
cial value that is centered on the top institutions, the less value that is left to be car-
ried by mass higher education institutions, and the benefits of mass access start to 
empty out. It is only when the total sum of social opportunity is growing, as amid 
the high economic growth and more open class structure of 1960s, that enrollment 
in both elite and mass institutions seems to bring with it growing benefits.
In short, since Clark Kerr’s leadership in California, equality of opportunity has 
advanced in one respect and diminished in another. The expansion of participa-
tion in American higher education has coincided with the evolution of a steeper 
and more competitive educational hierarchy. On one hand, there is much greater 
social inclusion than in the 1960s and in that respect enhanced equality of op-
portunity. On the other hand, there is less equality of opportunity because of the 
exclusionary effects of stratification and the tendency for the value of two-year 
college diplomas to empty out. Greater social equality at the boundary between 
participation and nonparticipation has become combined with lessening social 
equality inside higher education. The first effect tends to mask the second, but in 
the longer run, the reduction of value in mass higher education—which, as shall 
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be discussed, affects both public institutions and for-profit private institutions—
tends to undermine participation itself. It reduces the desire to enter higher educa-
tion and weakens the rate at which students complete.
This tendency for value to concentrate at the top of higher education systems 
is not just an outcome of policy or rankings or the behaviors of entrepreneurial 
university presidents. It is partly a product of the growth of participation itself—or 
more specifically, the inevitable manner in which expansion interacts with the use 
of higher education by social groups with unequal resources. As noted in part 2, 
as participation grows, elite enrollments expand more slowly than total numbers. 
Ultimately, this is because the number of leading positions in society grows only 
slowly. The ratio increases between “client-seeking” mass higher education institu-
tions and “status-seeking” elite higher education institutions, as in the growth pro-
jections of the 1960 Master Plan. With the shrinkage in the proportion of student 
places with high value, social selection becomes more fiercely concentrated in the 
elite sector, in the winner-take-all effect, and also plays out in the feeder schools 
that are strongest in entry to the top universities. Only some families can readily 
play this game. The fact that American expansion in itself has not led to greater 
equality of opportunity is not particularly surprising. This is not a unique product 
of America’s highly unequal society and education. Though structural configura-
tions vary across all countries, the great bulk of the research on the growth of 
participation suggests that expansion has not been associated with a reduction in 
class (socioeconomic) inequalities in rates of access to or graduation from high-
value institutions unless policy forcibly intervenes.36 This is because everywhere, 
strong social groups work educational structures in their favor. In addition, in the 
United States after 1980, and more so after 2008, in the recovery from recession, 
the natural tendency of the socially stronger to become educationally stronger was 
exacerbated by the political economy.
As systems grow and reach universal levels of participation in schooling and 
later, in tertiary education, “qualitative differentiation replaces inequalities in the 
quantity of the education obtained.”37 First, the key moment of social selection 
moves up, from schooling to access to higher education or from first degree to 
second degree. Second, at this key moment, the population passing through un-
equally ranked institutions undergoes social sorting through such mechanisms 
as the capacity to pay tuition. These structures differentiate the population along 
unequal social lines. This is the nearest thing to an iron law in the sociology of 
education: whenever there is a structured hierarchy of value—for example, be-
tween state and private schools, between different tiers or types of institutions, 
between high costs and low cost institutions, or between fields of study—families 
with prior social advantages are best placed to compete for the places that carry 
the most positional advantages.38 This is the inexorable logic of competition. As 
Davies and Zarifa showed in their study of institutions, when the competitors are 
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unequal at the start of the game, the game favors those in the strongest starting 
position. Samuel Lucas states that “socioeconomically advantaged actors secure 
for themselves and their children some degree of advantage wherever advantages 
are commonly possible.”39 Therefore, “meaningful inequality reduction is elusive 
because qualitatively different types of education maintain consequential inequal-
ity, even at universal transitions.”40 In the words of Arum and colleagues, struc-
tural differentiation allows the elite status of those families “born into privilege” 
to be protected.41 Social differentiation is matched to structural differentiation in 
education, unless public policy intervenes to alter the matching process by spread-
ing resources, evening up the starting position of poorer families. This creates an 
obstacle to “would-be egalitarian reformers.”42
In any society, when socially advantaged groups are free to compete with all 
the political and economic resources at their disposal, they always play the struc-
tures to their further advantage. This not only shapes the pattern of social access 
to higher education, it also affects the pattern of outcomes in the graduate labor 
market. In general, as Triventi argues: “All else being equal, the higher the strati-
fication of higher education, the more important is the role of social background 
in the occupational attainment process.”43 However, this general rule can be modi-
fied by various factors. For example Borgen notes that when college credentials 
are relatively generic, as is the case in the United States and Norway, all else being 
equal, that makes the hierarchy of institutions more important as a distinguishing 
factor in sorting the graduate population.44 It is significant that the point applies to 
both the market-driven, highly stratified, and mixed-funded U.S. system and the 
publicly financed and relatively “flat” Norwegian system, indicating that it func-
tions as another general rule across systems. A third general rule relates to finan-
cial barriers to entry. Tuition systems tend to accentuate prior social differences, 
as do private higher education institutions, which are free to pick and choose their 
clientele:45 indeed, for some of these institutions, social selection is part of their 
mission. Note that the use of the income-contingent tuition loans mechanism (see 
the final chapter of this book), as in the United Kingdom and Australia, tends to 
soften the socioeconomic bias in tuition. Nevertheless, even free higher education 
would not resolve all problems of inequality. As Piketty remarks, “social and cul-
tural selection” can do the same work as financial selection.46
The various national case studies provided by Yossi Shavit, Richard Arum, 
and Adam Gamoram in their 2007 collection illustrate the interplay between sys-
tem structure and social opportunity.47 In relation to the United Kingdom, Sin 
Yi Cheung and Muriel Egerton state that although students from unskilled and 
semiskilled parental backgrounds have made access gains, these have largely been 
manifest in the second-tier institutions, and “class inequalities were especially 
persistent in the more selective forms of higher education,”48 which confirms the 
separate findings by Boliver.49 The independent private school sector in the United 
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Kingdom and stratification between state schools are primary in maintaining so-
cial inequality in access.50 In Israel, second-tier institutions are disproportionately 
occupied by less privileged students, allowing the universities “to maintain exclu-
sivity.”51 In South Korea also, expansion has been concentrated in lower-tier insti-
tutions.52 The study of Sweden makes the point that, as also demonstrated by Hox-
by and Avery, national populations are not only differentiated by structures; they 
also tend to self-differentiate through them, whether deliberately or inadvertently. 
In Sweden there has been a dramatic expansion of total tertiary participation but 
only a modest improvement in the social equality of odds of enrollment. “The 
reason for the limited effect is that new educational opportunities are to a large 
extent used by middle-class students with mediocre grades but high educational 
aspirations.”53 As in the United States, Swedes from disadvantaged backgrounds 
have lower sights in relation to both the propensity to enroll and the tier that they 
occupy.54 The Swedish case finds that “social forces” other than educational expan-
sion are more efficient in reducing social inequalities in educational attainment, 
including “developments towards greater equality of condition and reforms that 
made the Swedish educational system less stratified.”55 But a threshold level of trust 
and equality of respect is needed to establish and maintain such educational and 
social systems.56
In the same collection of papers, in their case study of the United States, Josipa 
Roksa and colleagues focus on the combination of firm segmentation in the clas-
sified higher education system and the “increased enrollments in lower status in-
stitutions.” The “solidification of institutional hierarchies has produced a highly 
stratified system.”57 Expansion plus relative growth in community colleges may 
increase inequality in degree-level higher education even as it improves equality 
in access below that level.58 “The benefits of attending community colleges remain 
contested. They enroll disproportionate numbers of working class, female, minor-
ity and older students and they are accessible in local areas. Only about one-third 
of traditional age community college students earn an associate or bachelor’s de-
gree within eight years of completing high school.” The channeling of enrollment 
into community colleges may hinder overall educational attainment by working 
class, female, minority and older students, “particularly the opportunities for 
earning bachelor’s degrees,”59 From the point of view of equality of opportunity, 
the most positive American development is that African Americans and women 
have mobilized and gained recognition as “protected groups” in the nation’s po-
litical discourse. They have made gains in access to higher education. Yet within 
these categories and also outside them, the poor and working class have not made 
equivalent gains in access.60
Roksa and colleagues confirm that while socioeconomic differences in total 
access have been fairly stable over the succeeding cohorts in their study, social 
stratification within higher education is increasing. In access to all four-year 
162    Bringing It All Back Home
institutions and selective institutions, the advantages associated with a high socio-
economic status (SES) background have been greater for recent cohorts. Whereas 
the influence of family background on educational opportunity decreased in the 
first half of the twentieth century, that trend stopped and reversed from the late 
1970s onwards.61 Again, it is apparent that the change towards increased inequality 
of opportunity coincided with the Reagan revolution’s alteration of the balance 
between the free play of market forces and the common social good secured by 
public policy.
STR ATIFICATION PLUS NET WORKS
Inequality of opportunity is not driven by structural forms alone, and does not 
have single causes. It involves agency, values, behavior, and relationships. In-
equality in education is manifest where a number of the factors discussed above—
family background, cultural capital, institutional stratification, social networking 
within elite structures, and networking between higher education and profes-
sional work—intersect with each other. Recent empirical studies explore these 
intersections.
In a series of papers, Lauren Rivera has summarized her doctoral research on 
the hiring practices of leading banks, consulting firms, and law firms in the North-
east United States.62 The work is also published in Pedigree: How Elite Students Get 
Elite Jobs (2015).63 Rivera argues that “understanding how elite employers recruit, 
assess, and select new hires can not only provide more nuanced understandings 
of the relationship between education and socioeconomic attainment but also in-
form broader debates about contemporary elite formation and reproduction.”64 
She observes the movement of socially elite students into high-income-earning, 
elite labor markets, highlighting the role of elite educational credentials, cultural 
capital, and social networks. The world of elite professional recruitment, in which 
starting salaries are in the top 10 percent of total household incomes in the United 
States,65 is far from equality of opportunity, or even educated merit as commonly 
understood.
Rivera’s research is largely based on 120 interviews with those who sort the 
short lists, conduct interviews, and make hiring decisions. This includes human 
resource management professionals and the corporate professionals, partners, 
and managing directors who work with those they hire. Though they made some 
use of grades to establish thresholds, and some evaluators saw high grades as a 
sign of the capacity to successfully manage stress,66 the firms studied by Rivera 
did not generally recruit on the basis of grades. Nor were their doors open to 
graduates from any walk of life. They recruited from selective colleges, but not just 
any selective college. Mostly they recruited solely from Harvard, Yale, Princeton, 
sometimes Stanford, and also Wharton at the MBA level. It was not the content 
of Ivy League education that they valued, but its prestige. They attributed superior 
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qualities to these graduates simply because they were selected into top universities, 
regardless of academic performance once there.
They largely believed that the status of a candidate’s educational affiliation was a re-
flection of his/her intellectual, social, and moral worth, attributing superior cogni-
tive and noncognitive abilities to students who attended super-elite (e.g., top four) 
institutions and assuming that those at merely “selective” (e.g., top twenty-five) 
schools had deficits in one or more of these areas.67
The second-level schools included Columbia and NYU,68 while “so-called ‘pub-
lic Ivies’ such as University of Michigan and Berkeley were not considered elite or 
even prestigious in the minds of evaluators (in contrast, these ‘state schools’ were 
frequently described pejoratively as ‘safety schools’ that were ‘just okay’).”69 Rivera 
finds that “participants overwhelmingly believed the prestige of one’s educational 
credentials was an indicator of underlying intelligence. Evaluators believed that 
educational prestige was a signal of general rather than job-specific skills, most 
notably the ability to learn quickly,”70 and possession of the necessary “polish.” 
Some evaluators also saw Ivy League graduates as likely to become “somebody” 
later in life, and hence more useful to the firm, whether working for it or not.71 
Rivera concludes that “these firms have created a stratified market for elite jobs 
based on institutional linkages between schools and employers that was previously 
thought to be minimal in the United States; one that serves to exclude the vast 
majority of degree holders nationally.” Hence, she states, “contrary to scholarship 
and public discourse depicting the possession of a college degree as the gateway 
to economic mobility in the United States, the monetary conversion value of a 
degree varies by the status of the institution conferring it.”72 Ivy League admission 
as such is not enough. “A super-elite university affiliation was typically insufficient 
on its own for succeeding in resume screens. Importing the logic of elite university 
admissions, firms performed a strong secondary screen on the status and intensity 
of candidates’ extracurricular activities, believing that leisure pursuits were valid 
markers of applicants’ social and moral worth.” In an era in which there is grow-
ing competition for places in higher education “the prestige requirements for elite 
jobs have intensified, and extracurricular activities now serve as a new credential 
of candidates’ social and moral character.”73
The focus on extracurricular credentials matched the use of a similar criterion 
in Ivy League selection. “Without significant and appropriate involvement in for-
malized leisure pursuits, candidates were unlikely to move to the interview stage.” 
Such activities were used more often and more consistently to evaluate candidates 
than more traditional signals such as “grades, standardized test scores, prior em-
ployer prestige, or prior work experience.” Candidates with such involvement were 
seen as “more interesting, enjoyable, and socially graceful people,” rather than 
“bookish,” solitary, or “nerdish,” and also possessed of “superior time-management 
skills.”74 The recruiters “tended to favor those sports that had a strong presence at 
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Ivy League schools as well as pay-to-play ‘club’ sports such as lacrosse, field hockey, 
tennis, squash, and crew over ones that tend to be more widely accessible and/
or are associated with more diverse player bases such as football, basketball, and 
soccer.”75 This disadvantages poorer students who make it into elite colleges and 
have not spent a lifetime in the pursuits of the white upper and upper-middle 
class. “They favored activities that were time- and resource-intensive because the 
investment such cultivation entailed indicated stronger evidence of “drive” and 
an orientation towards “achievement” and “success.” It was better to be a varsity 
college athlete, preferably a national or Olympic champion, rather than merely 
participating actively in sport, better to have “traveled the globe with a world-
renowned orchestra as opposed to playing with a school chamber group,” better to 
reach a Himalayan peak than engage in recreational hiking. “The former activities 
were evidence of ‘true accomplishment’ and dedication, whereas the latter were 
described as things that ‘anyone could do.’ ”76
Final decisions were made in interviews, where notions of “fit” and “chemistry” 
were reported to be very important, and shared colleges and extracurricular inter-
ests tended to structure the conversation.77 Rivera argues that these hiring prac-
tices, especially the narrow definition of prestige, do not reflect a close focus on 
efficiency and effectiveness—for example, little effort is made to gather data about 
the track record of candidates—but are about “similarity and culture.”78 Hiring is 
“a process of cultural matching between candidates, evaluators, and firms. Employ-
ers sought candidates who were not only competent but also culturally similar to 
themselves in terms of leisure pursuits, experiences, and self-presentation styles. 
Concerns about shared culture were highly salient to employers and often out-
weighed concerns about absolute productivity.”79 Cultural similarities operate as 
“more than just sources of liking; they are also fundamental bases on which we 
evaluate merit,” states Rivera.80 In a larger, more competitive, more stratified, and 
winner-take-all professional labor market, top-end recruitment is less about open 
and formal meritocratic competition and more about technologies that are used to 
assemble a coherent work group in which merit is reworked in terms of a common 
lifestyle, identity, and biography, without altogether losing its original connection 
with academic selection. Here merit is about reproduction of an elite tribe. “In es-
sence, they evaluated candidates in a way that validated their own identities and 
legitimized their own educational trajectories and conceptions of success.”81
In another paper, Rivera focuses on the limited impact of the diversity crite-
rion in the hiring practices of these elite firms. She notes “widespread cultural 
beliefs among decision makers that university prestige is an essential signal of 
merit but that diversity is not.”82 Though most of her interviewees believed that 
their hiring processes were “race-neutral,” blacks and Latinos were severely un-
derrepresented compared to their presence in the population at large. A perceived 
lack of cultural capital was key, even for applicants with Ivy League credentials. 
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“Evaluators described how they felt many black and Latino candidates fell short 
on the dimension of ‘polish,’ or communication skills required in these client-
facing jobs.”83
Likewise, in a qualitative study of students at the University of Oxford and at 
Sciences Po in Paris, Gerbrand Tholen and colleagues show how the students use 
networked connections to secure entry to the upper echelons of the graduate labor 
market. One student distinguished between “good” and “bad” networks. Good 
networks are grounded in smarts and academic merit; bad networks are solely 
about family and ambition. “If the networks can be associated with hard work, 
the advantages supplied by it are morally acceptable, and thus the role of the elite 
university stays hidden.”84 The merit principle is still normative to some degree, 
but now it operates within restricted circles and is invoked selectively, where it le-
gitimates elite trajectories, rather than underpinning whole-system organization. 
Once again we see the malleability of merit, the way it can be detached from formal 
processes at will and joined to various power structures and social arrangements. 
The idea of merit as ability plus hard work, once used to justify the displacement 
of leisured aristocrats, is now inscribed on the banners of a nouveau riche in for-
mation, becoming as wealthy in turn. Here, educational merit is not the enemy of 
class. It has been annexed by class.
Gregory Wolniak and colleagues find that “education attainment mediates the 
effects that individuals’ background characteristics have on their abilities to ob-
tain high-paying and prestigious jobs.” However, they suggest, “the mediating role 
of education attainment may differ by college major.” The greatest status advan-
tages go to graduates in fields “quantitative and scientifically oriented, fields that 
are more functionally linked to jobs, and fields that have traditionally been over-
represented by men.”85 Majors affect not just placement on the social ladder but the 
degree of mobility and flexibility in graduate work, including later movement up 
the ladder. Majors also interact with family background in varying ways. “Our re-
sults suggest that, when viewed along a continuum, college majors are more or less 
meritorious based on the net effects of socioeconomic background characteristics 
(particularly family income) in comparison to the net effects of education attain-
ment.” The majors for which “pre-college family income had the greatest direct 
effect on earnings were Math/Computer Science/Engineering, and Science. .  .  . 
Majors for which education attainment had the greatest direct effect were Busi-
ness, Science, and Education.” In the case of Education majors, “socioeconomic 
background characteristics have uniquely small effects, while education attain-
ment has a uniquely large effect on status.”86
In a study published in 2015, Nicolai Borgen used Norwegian administrative 
data to map the intersection between parental background, institutional stratifica-
tion, and career outcomes in creating unequal social outcomes through higher 
education. Borgen’s contribution was to show that the role of family background 
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is not momentary and partial—for example, operating at the point of access to 
higher education—but is holistic and continuous across the education and career 
continuum. He finds that students from advantaged families benefit most from 
elite colleges because they “are not only more likely to attend a high-quality col-
lege (the first filter), but are also more likely to convert their high-quality college 
education into success at the labor market (the second filter).”87 This double-filter 
idea also helps to unlock the scholarly debate between “positive selection” and 
“negative selection” in higher education.
In research on higher education and social stratification, the economic positive 
selection hypothesis, which is close to orthodox human capital theory, states that 
students from socially advantaged backgrounds participate at the highest rate be-
cause they benefit the most from higher education. The negative selection hypoth-
esis88 says that students from underrepresented social groups—in the American 
context, low SES, remote location, African American, Hispanic—gain the most 
from higher education, compared to their compatriots who do not participate, 
even though these groups participate at the lowest rate. They do not earn more in 
the labor market than socially advantaged students, but they earn much more than 
their compatriots who do not attend.89 The negative selection hypothesis helps to 
explain the continuing growth of participation in higher education at the margin 
in most countries, and it also explains why higher education is often unsatisfying 
for people from groups that habitually participate. They appear to gain less from 
it. “Advantaged young people place a uniformly high value on college,”90 but “the 
decision to go to college among children from high-status families is dictated less 
by rational choice and self-selection than it is among children from low-status 
families.”91 Advantaged students participate out of routine social expectations and 
cultural habits.
While this helps to explain why advantaged students, once enrolled, might focus 
on the positional value of higher education rather than its content, it is not enough 
to explain their consistently high rates of participation. Borgen concludes that the 
positive selection hypothesis applies (and only applies) when it is supplemented 
by the double-filter idea, which acknowledges both advantaged students’ need for 
credentials and their superior capacity to turn credentials into jobs. The negative 
selection hypothesis assumes that socially elite students can obtain jobs without 
educational credentials. “The sociological positive selection hypothesis,” however, 
“depicts a world where attending a high-quality college is a prerequisite for gain-
ing access to high-paid jobs, for both privileged and disadvantaged students.”92 At 
the same time, “students having few cultural and social resources to start off with 
have low labor market prospects and need to rely more on educational credentials 
than their privileged counterparts.”93 All young persons need credentials (though 
young people from very wealthiest families might be an exception, as chapter 21 
will discuss). The poor student needs elite credentials the most. For that student, 
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higher education can play an especially important role in social allocation and 
upward mobility. Yet on average, in the long run the poor student gains less in 
absolute terms from attending and graduating from elite higher education. Social 
disadvantage continues to play out at the point of entry to work and in the long-
term evolution of the subsequent career.
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In higher education across the world, and the American sector in particular, 
in the present era there is overwhelming emphasis on the economic benefits of 
higher education. It is the legacy of the optimistic human capital narrative that 
evolved in the 1960s. If Clark Kerr did not buy into the full implications of the 
economic narrative, with its notion that everything in life could be usefully mod-
eled in terms of scarcity and rational choice, in the first decade of the Master Plan 
he rode with the easy harmonization between educational, social, and economic 
outcomes that typified the time. Since then that easy harmonization has frac-
tured, but the emphasis on the expected economic benefits of higher education 
has increased—despite the nagging sense that for some, education does not de-
liver those benefits.
Research finds that graduates mostly continue to be optimistic about their 
prospects.1 This optimism is accentuated by higher education marketing, in which 
many institutions oversell themselves.2 In reality, graduate vocational prospects 
are often unclear—more so perhaps in the United States, where higher education 
is less closely coupled with the labor markets,3 than in some other countries, such 
as Germany with its tradition of early streaming into advanced vocational educa-
tion. While Martin Trow’s observation still stands, in that graduates are always 
better placed than nongraduates (with the exception of nongraduates from very 
wealthy backgrounds), American higher education is far from providing either 
certainty or financial security for all, whether at the two-year level, the four-year 
level, or above.4 Higher education is only one of the elements at play. The transi-
tion between higher education and work is complex. These are two different social 
sites with very distinctive requirements, rhythms, and drivers.
21
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Average graduate returns, in the form of salaries, occupational level, and rates 
of employment, are widely used as measures of educational outcomes, but this is 
often misleading. Averages hide from view dispersed graduate experiences. As the 
rate of participation expands, dispersion also advances. Snapshot comparisons of 
outcomes, especially in early graduate years, miss changes over time, which are by 
no means uniform across graduate populations and between fields of study. In the 
later years of the career, factors other than education, such as on-the-job learning, 
have a growing influence on outcomes. It becomes harder to trace the effects of 
education and almost impossible to separate the effects of schooling from those 
of higher education. Outcomes vary for graduates depending on whether the in-
stitutions they attended were selective or nonselective and on the different fields 
of study. Outcomes vary between different categories of graduates from the same 
program, with same educational achievements, and regardless of the quality of 
teaching and learning—though human capital theory implies that learned merit 
alone determines graduate productivity and earnings.
In addition, as the above discussion showed, social stratification and structures 
of education affect relations between higher education and the labor market at 
many points via a complex feedback process. So does geographical location. These 
problems have pushed the analytical framework of human capital theory to the 
breaking point.
D OES EDUCATION “CAUSE” EARNINGS?
Human capital theory assumes that education determines marginal productivity 
and that marginal productivity determines earnings. With some caveats, the value 
of investment in education is a function of lifetime earnings. It must be said that 
these are heroic assumptions. First, the determinants of productivity are a black 
box. As Hal Hansen remarks: “Human capital theory in its various forms rests al-
most entirely on financial returns to education, with virtually no direct empirical 
evidence on how schooling enhances productivity.”5 Second, the methodological 
individualism6 of human capital theory is a problem. It can be difficult or impossi-
ble to accurately attribute enhanced value to individuals who work in a combined 
workplace, as do most employees.7 Third, as the OECD emphasizes in Education 
at a Glance, 2014, “a host of education-related and context-related factors . . . af-
fect the returns to education.”8 Richard Arum and Josipa Roksa take the point 
further, arguing that “colleges have little control over wage outcomes.”9 There is a 
very considerable literature on factors that can affect earnings, additional to higher 
education.
As noted, graduate earnings are affected by social background beyond what is 
mediated by education,10 including family support in child development, such as 
whether children are read to at a young age.11 Different research studies have found 
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earnings to vary with family income,12 type of secondary school attended, social 
and family networks at the point of entry to higher education, family and parental 
influence and social networks in the choice of and the transition to work,13 social 
nesting and networks throughout the career,14 field of study, level of qualification, 
and the differential status and resources of higher education institutions. Earnings 
are affected by custom and hierarchy in professions and workplaces, by the system 
of wage determination, and by the industrial balance of power,15 as well as by the 
configurations and macro-fluctuations of national and regional economies. There 
is also the signaling role of credentials. For example, business graduates in the 
United States on average are relatively successful in the labor market in the early 
stages compared to graduates in most other fields of study, despite the relatively 
low levels of studying during the degree that characterize the business disciplines 
and the relatively low levels of graduate competency as measured in standardized 
tests. Arum and Roksa comment: “Some majors serve as better signals of employ-
ability than others, regardless of whether those degrees are underpinned by actual 
field-specific knowledge and skills.”16 Most human capital economists treat human 
capital narratives and signaling narratives as either-or explanations, but in the real 
world, human capital effects do not necessarily exclude signaling. The point is that 
more than human capital effects are at play.
Quantitative studies of the effects of higher education on earnings attempt to 
control statistically for other factors. After other factors are taken out, the residual 
education-earnings relationship often appears statistically as weak rather than 
strong. It is especially difficult to deal with selection effects, which can contami-
nate the relationship between education and outcomes. For example, Theodore 
Gerber and Sin Yi Cheung attempt to trace the effects of “college quality” on earn-
ings. Does attendance at a selective college tend to boost earnings? If so, by how 
much and why? “Attendance at a higher-quality institution could be associated 
with higher earnings because exogenous variables like cognitive ability or social 
background both increase the probability of attending a high-quality institution 
and exert positive effects on earnings independently of institutional quality,” they 
state. To the extent that additional earnings results from selection effects, “the as-
sociation between college quality and earnings is not causal because by implica-
tion graduates from high-quality institutions would have higher earnings even if 
they attended lower-quality institutions.”17
Personal characteristics such as determination and drive are also in play. At-
tempts to account for selection effects can generate results that vary sharply from 
study to study. There is no research consensus on the effects of institutional sta-
tus or selectivity on graduate outcomes. For example, the study by Scott Thomas 
and Liang Zhang concludes that “despite significant variation, . . . graduates from 
more prestigious, more selective, and higher academic quality colleges enjoy small 
but significant wage premiums relative to peers graduating from less academically 
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distinctive institutions, and this early advantage also increases over time—though 
earnings growth “varies significantly by the graduates’ major field of study, with 
Engineering and Business graduates doing well.18 These results are replicated in 
other studies. They accord with common sense. But common sense is not always 
right about social relations. Stacy Dale and Alan Krueger identify small returns 
to college selectivity but are bedeviled by selection effects.19 Hongbin Li and col-
leagues note that while some researchers identify significant returns to college se-
lectivity when selection effects are accounted for, other studies find the returns 
disappear.20 For new graduates in China, gross returns to elite colleges of 26.4 
percent diminish to 10.7 percent once ability, major, college location, individual 
characteristics, and family background are accounted for.21 These results, also, are 
assumption driven.
Gerber and Cheung are skeptical about the effects of elite institutions: “Recent 
studies that employ more sophisticated methods cast serious doubts on the argu-
ment that elite colleges yield a greater return than non-elite colleges. These studies 
each indicate that the apparent effect of elite college attendance results largely or 
completely from the effects of a complex set of variables that influence whether or 
not one attends an elite college in the first place.”22 They cite varied findings by field 
of study and gender, move between screening and human capital hypotheses, and 
conclude that the role of “college quality” in relation to selection effects remains a 
problem unresolved. “We need better data,” they state.23 The problem is that much 
of the variation between the findings of the different studies is not due to varia-
tions in material relationships in the real world under observation but is generated 
by differences in the handling of selection effects by the various researchers.
INC OME AND STATUS
A further limit of human capital theory is that earnings are not the only potential 
individual benefits of education and are not always the most important benefits,24 
especially for graduates from certain fields of study. As Arum and Roksa state: 
“Rewards to occupations are related not just to income but also to occupational 
status and prestige. In social settings, individuals are typically asked about what 
they do, not how much money they earn.”25 Research also shows that the role of 
factors such as gender, field of study, and the selectivity or status of the institu-
tion play out differently, depending on whether the graduate outcome is status or 
income. Studies that focus on the relationship between earnings and education 
alone tend to provide an impoverished picture. In her research of the medium-
term (thirteen-years out) outcome for graduates, Josipa Roksa finds that especially 
for graduates from prestige institutions and for those with generic degrees work-
ing in the public and nonprofit sectors, prospects of a managerial role are impor-
tant relative to earnings.26 Gender stratification also affects the respective roles of 
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incomes and status: “Graduates of female-dominated fields are disproportionately 
employed in public and nonprofit organizations which offer lower monetary re-
wards but facilitate access to professional and managerial positions. .  .  . College 
major and employment sector interact in ways that reduce income penalties and 
enhance the occupational location of graduates of female-dominated fields.”27
In addition, the passage of time can affect income outcomes and status out-
comes in contrasting ways. Comparative returns to the different fields of study in 
the early years differ from those in the later stages, such as ten or twenty years.28 
Elish Kelly, Philip O’Connell, and Emer Smyth note that the early returns to voca-
tional degrees in the field of teacher training are higher than to generic degrees.29 
Roksa and Tania Levey point out that studies of graduate returns that conclude in 
favor of occupational specificity tend to focus on early returns rather than long-
term trajectories. However, “occupationally specific degrees are beneficial at the 
point of entry into the labor market but have the lowest growth in occupational 
status over time.”30 Graduates that acquire general skills begin work with the lower 
status but report greatest subsequent growth in status, they state.31 Graduates from 
fields with high occupational specificity start with relatively high occupational sta-
tus but experience less growth in status than graduates majoring in fields with 
low occupational specificity. Earnings exhibit a similar pattern, though between 
the fields a larger gap remains in relation to earnings than in relation to status. 
However, in the comparison between graduates from fields with moderate occu-
pational specificity and those with low occupational specificity, low occupational 
specificity catches up in status and almost catches up in earnings.32
There are marked variations in findings about the effects of social background 
on both graduate status and graduate incomes. Gregory Wolniak and colleagues 
found that family incomes have “a positive and persistent effect on graduate sta-
tus, while parent’s education has relatively weak effects.33 On the other hand, in 
their study of graduates twelve years out, Roksa and Levey found that family back-
ground has no effect on occupational status.34 Findings also vary between coun-
tries, undermining generalizations. “Educational systems have different relation-
ships to the labor market in different societies,” states Roksa, noting differences 
in the nature and scale of state sector employment.35 In an eleven-country study, 
Moris Triventi argues that the effects of social background on occupational out-
comes vary by country in four areas: “(i) social selectivity of education system, 
(ii) level of higher education expansion, (iii) degree of institutional connections 
between higher education and labor market, and (iv) degree of institutional strati-
fication in higher education.”36 The probability of obtaining a degree from a lead-
ing university is always greatest for graduates both of whose parents have degrees, 
but of the countries in Triventi’s study, the effect is most marked in Norway and 
least in Spain. Triventi finds that overall, the effect of parental education is greater 
on graduate occupational status than on wages In addition, he finds that as with 
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parental education, institutional stratification is more likely to be associated with 
entering a high-prestige professional occupation than entering the most highly 
paid occupations.37
In research on social stratification in China, both David Goodman38 and Wei 
Zhao39 note that social status is especially important in the context of China, open-
ing the way to jobs and income, and also that status is closely associated with level 
of education. This does not mean education “causes” status/jobs/income in China 
any more than education “causes” earnings in the United States, because a com-
plex of other factors affect both. In China, wealth, political power, and status tend 
to reinforce each other,40 like Bourdieu’s different capitals, weakening intergen-
erational mobility.41These findings again emphasize that relations between higher 
education, graduate earnings, and graduate status are subject to national-cultural 
variations.
OECD data on earnings suggest that the respective roles of credential signaling 
and human capital capacity also might be nationally variable: in some countries, 
returns to qualifications exceed the returns to measurable skills, while in other 
countries, the ratio is reversed,42 though as noted, there are many other factors at 
play. A relative increase in the role of signaling may have implications for equality 
of opportunity. Wildhagen comments that if credentials operate as cultural mark-
ers rather than as reliable signs of distinct competences, they are open to manipu-
lation, so they become more valuable for some social groups than for others.43
NONLINEAR REL ATIONSHIPS
Though the human capital narrative implies that higher education and employ-
ment are in lock-step progression—and if it is not so, something is wrong with the 
graduate or with the education—in many cases this notion of linear progression 
is misleading. In the real world, the progression and the match between learning/
qualification and work/occupation are not always clear-cut, especially for gradu-
ates with generic degrees. A 1999 study by Barbara Schneider and David Stevenson 
found that only 44 percent of students had “aligned” educational ambitions, mean-
ing that they planned to complete the amount of education required by their in-
tended occupations.44 Not only do many students keep vocational options open, 
but many study for more reasons than just vocational planning, studying subjects 
that they are good at or they enjoy, while hoping that their future will work out. It 
is a strategy that embodies uncertainty. Nevertheless, because all graduates have a 
positional advantage in the labor market vis-á-vis nongraduates, their confidence 
is not wholly misplaced. John Robst notes, “The eventual match between degree 
field and occupation is uncertain when selecting a major.”45 He finds that 55 percent 
of respondents report a close relation between their work and their field of study, 
25 percent report that they are “somewhat related,” and 20 percent report they are 
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not related.46 However, this study has difficulty defining the work-relatedness of 
general degrees. Roksa and Levey observe that many first-degree graduates in the 
United States are not specialists.47
Many educational credentials have no obvious matches in the labor market. This 
includes the majority of high school graduates in general and academic tracks and 
a large portion of college graduates majoring in liberal arts and sciences. Conse-
quently, finding a job in one’s field of study is not only an individual dilemma, it 
is a process that reflects the relationship (or lack thereof) between the educational 
system and the labor market.48
Among specifically trained graduates, many work outside their field of train-
ing, a “mismatch” that often but not always generates income penalties.49 This is 
not deliberately perverse. It reflects the messy way that labor markets work. Many 
graduates take whatever job provides them with the best pay and career prospects, 
as it appears at the time of application and selection. At this point some gradu-
ates move away from the contents of their qualifications. For their part, employers 
select the “best” person for the position, and the specificity of training and quali-
fications is only one of the factors in play in determining who is “best.” Many jobs 
are general jobs capable of being filled by graduates from any field, so that level of 
education reached may be more significant than field of study. More remarkably, 
some highly specialized positions become filled by persons trained in a different 
field, because employers believe they can “do the job” (or because no specialist 
is readily available). Not only is selection influenced by time-place contingency, 
by the pool of local opportunities available, and the pool of potential applicants 
before the employer, but recent studies of job selection and graduate networking 
behaviors indicate that many factors influence selection, additional to qualifica-
tions or academic performance, including the educational institution attended, 
the graduate’s extracurricular activities as a student, subjective perceptions of “fit” 
between graduate and workplace, and personal ties.50 Job selection, like degree 
selection, often fails to follow any clear logic.
Students and graduates keep failing at being the homo economicus imagined 
by human capital theory. Jens Peter Thomsen and colleagues report that at the 
point of enrollment some students do not take forgone earnings into account.51 
John Robst found that at the point of decision, prospective students often know 
earnings only in their chosen occupation, not in related fields.52 Many students be-
lieve that contacts and networking are more important than skills or credentials.53 
Nicolai Borgen found that many students do not “self-select into colleges based on 
expected gain,”54 especially students from affluent backgrounds.
Nonetheless, although many educational behaviors are not linear human 
capital behaviors, and relations between higher education and work defy single-
cause explanations, this does not mean all statistically based inquiry in this do-
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main is futile. Aggregated studies are rarely as conclusive as researchers want 
and often fail to satisfy orthodox human capital theory, but such studies can 
still identify suggestive patterns, especially on the basis of differentiation of large 
populations and trends over time. It is often where the expected linear patterns 
break that the findings become most interesting, though they contradict the 
orthodox narratives.
For example, Paul Bingley, Miles Corak, and Niels Westergård-Nielsen re-
searched the intergenerational transmission of employers between fathers and 
sons, which is a common feature of all labor markets. They found that in both 
Canada and Denmark, 30–40 percent of young adults are at some point employed 
by a firm that also employed their fathers. Suggestively, they find that in both coun-
tries the transmission of employers is positively associated with paternal earnings, 
“rising distinctly and sharply at the very top of the father’s earnings distribution.”55 
At the top end of the income distribution also, Iftikhar Hussain, Sandra McNally, 
and Shqiponja Telhaj found that the income effects of attending a selective institu-
tion seem to inflate, and those returns seem to be increasing.56 Kelly and colleagues 
note that in the longer term, field of study differences in earnings tend to fade 
away, except in medicine.57 Borgen also identifies nonlinear economic returns to 
higher education. “Students who are most likely to attend a high-quality college 
benefit the most from attending such colleges, in line with the predictions of the 
positive selection hypotheses .  .  . but the findings support the positive selection 
hypotheses only at the upper half of the wage distribution.”58 The returns to college 
quality are five times larger at the 90th quantile compared to the 10th quantile. 
Borgen also notes that statistical averages mask “important heterogeneity across 
the wage distribution. The question is less whether college quality matters, but 
for whom and in what type of jobs.”59 Further, as in the work of Bingley and col-
leagues, Borgen notes that the family background effects are greatest at the top end 
of the wage distribution.60
Together, these findings are consistent with the data from Thomas Piketty, 
Emmanuel Saez, and others on the growing income inequality at the top of the 
distribution. Likewise, research by Thomas Lemieux over thirty years found that 
in the United States “within-group inequality grew substantially among college-
educated workers, but changed little for most other groups,” and that “the median, 
the tenth, and the ninetieth percentiles are remarkably stable for up to 12 years 
of education. Above 12 years of education, however, the return to education at 
the ninetieth percentile increases much more than the return to education at the 
tenth percentile, leading to a large increase in the 90–10 gap.” Lemieux concludes: 
“Changes in wage inequality are increasingly concentrated in the very top end of 
the wage distribution . . . . [and] postsecondary education plays a crucial role in ex-
plaining this phenomenon.”61 The empirical data are consistent with other studies, 
but Lemieux’s interpretation is more questionable. Is the measured concentration 
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at the top end of the income distribution an effect of higher education, as Lemieux 
suggests, or due to something else?
The fact that field-of-study differences weaken at the top of the income scale 
suggest that higher education loses rather than gains determining power at that 
level. Very-high-income-earning graduates often have social characteristics, such 
as wealthy family backgrounds, that also affect graduate outcomes. As Bingley and 
colleagues suggest, factors such as family connections and supermanager salaries 
affect high-income returns at the top end. This not only underlines the point that 
factors other than higher education are causal in what are conventionally called 
“graduate outcomes,” but it suggests that the ratio between the different causal ele-
ments is itself variable within the graduate population. The data imply that higher 
education has less effect on the employability, earnings, and status of high-income 
earners than it does on graduates in the middle of the social distribution. It also 
raises a historical question about the role of higher education in the surge of in-
equality since 1980.
IS  HIGHER EDUCATION RESPONSIBLE  
FOR INEQUALIT Y?
In the United States, as in the rest of the English-speaking world, the rapid 
growth of economic and social inequality is occurring in societies in which for-
mal participation in higher education is at or near an historic high. According to 
UNESCO data, in 2013 the gross tertiary enrolment ratio (GTER) in the United 
States was 89.1 percent, after reaching a historic highpoint of 95.3 percent in 
2011.62 If education produces human capital, which determines marginal pro-
ductivity, and marginal productivity determines rates of return (the assumptions 
at the core of human capital theory), then growing income inequality must be 
grounded in a corresponding growth of inequality of skills and productivity. 
Higher education must be responsible for the growth of inequality, especially 
given that most of the age group is now entering it. Yet in reality, observes Pik-
etty, higher education seems largely separated from the surge in top incomes.63 
“The theory of marginal productivity and of the race between education and 
technology is not very convincing, .  .  . The fact that income inequality in the 
United States in 2000–2010 attained a level far higher than that observed in the 
poor and emerging countries at various times in the past—for example, higher 
than in India or South Africa in 1920–1930, 1960–1970, and 2000–2010—also 
casts doubt on any explanation based on objective inequalities of productivity.” 
If inequality in individual human capital was driving inequality on this scale, “it 
would be bad news for U.S. educational institutions,” but while they “surely need 
to be improved and made more accessible,” they “probably do not deserve such 
extravagant blame.”64
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Piketty emphasizes that the theory of marginal productivity, human capital 
theory, cannot explain the large variations in graduate incomes over time, nor 
does it explain “the diversity of the wage distributions we observe in different 
countries at different times,”65 including countries that have similar higher educa-
tion systems. Likewise, Caroline Hanley finds that “rising inequality in the United 
States is driven by increased high-wage earning levels that cannot be adequately 
explained by economic productivity-based explanations.”66 This again confirms 
that there are factors other than higher education that affect graduate earnings, 
status, and employability. Taking this further, it can be argued that the social and 
economic meanings of higher education are primarily determined not by the qual-
ity of human capital it produces (that is only one part of the equation) but in the 
interactions between the higher education system and the constantly changing 
social, economic, and political context in which it takes place. The 1960 Master 
Plan shaped the future of education in California for the three decades. It was not a 
blueprint for remaking the whole of California society. In the potentials and limits 
of higher education, in the long run the contextual factors are decisive.
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In The Price of Inequality Joseph Stiglitz notes that while higher education cannot 
guarantee social success for students from poor backgrounds, in terms of social 
averages it continues to make a difference. Between 2000 and 2010, the average 
household income of American men with bachelor’s degrees fell by 1 percent, but 
the average income of those with high school diploma fell by more than a quarter.1 
“Among those with a college degree unemployment is 4.2 percent, among those with 
less than a high school diploma it is 12.9 percent.”2 Higher education provides better 
odds of social protection, as Martin Trow stated, even when it cannot always provide 
the leap upwards in society. However, whether it provides protection or advance, its 
benefits are largely confined to the richer half of the United States’ population.
THE DREAM IS  OVER
Figure 22.1 shows that at a national level, the long struggle to establish equality of 
opportunity to graduate from higher education has failed. The data combine selec-
tive and nonselective enrollment. In 2013, a near-universal 77 percent of persons 
in the top family income quartile in the United States had completed a bachelor’s 
degree by age 24 years. In this quartile, the graduation rate had almost doubled 
since 1970, increasing from 40 percent to 77 percent in 1970. In the bottom family 
income quartile, the graduation rate had again risen, but from 6 percent in 1970 
to only 9 percent in 2013. In the second bottom quartile, the graduation rate was 
17 percent in 2013.3 The overwhelming majority of the bottom half of the popula-
tion in income terms had not achieved graduation by age 24 years, but most top 
quartile people had done so.
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The 1960s dream is over. Higher education continues to make an important dif-
ference to some individual graduates, and this matters. At the same time there are 
other graduates whom higher education does not help, and some of them do worse 
than their parents. At the level of overall social aggregates and averages, not only 
does higher education fail to compensate for prior social inequalities, it helps to 
confirm, legitimate, and reproduce those inequalities into the next generation. In 
Degrees of Inequality, Suzanne Mettler states: “Over the past thirty years . . . our sys-
tem of higher education has gone from facilitating upward mobility to exacerbating 
social inequality.” Higher education fosters a society that “increasingly resembles a 
caste system: it takes Americans who grew up in different social strata and it widens 
the divisions between them and makes them more rigid.” It “stratifies Americans by 
income group rather than providing them with ladders of opportunity.”4
The issue is not just access but completion, which is increasingly affected by 
the rising costs of both public and private higher education. Stiglitz also notes 
that “poor kids who succeed academically are less likely to graduate from col-
lege than richer kids who do worse in school.”5 The other problem is the quality 
of graduation. If figure 22.1 contained data for graduates from selective colleges 
rather than graduates from all colleges, the socioeconomic stratification would be 
more extreme.
However, for most of the lower 50 percent families, selective colleges are not 
on the radar. In future, as social inequality grows further, their educational aspira-
tions will decline. Structural inequality of this magnitude, combining inequality in 
Figure 22.1. Social inequality in college degree attainment in the United States, 1970 and 
2013: Graduated with bachelor’s degree by age 24 years, by family income quartile.
Source: Author, using data from Pell Institute and PennAHEAD 2015, p. 31.
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society with unequal engagement in higher education, becomes self-reproducing. 
In its report on inequality in the United States, the OECD argues that when overall 
economic and social inequality are high, people from low SES backgrounds tend 
to invest less rather than more in education and skill development. Their aspira-
tions are low, supporting resources are low, and even if they graduate, the barriers 
to success are still formidable. Over time their relative position further deterio-
rates.6 The United States retains a very high rate of participation by international 
standards, but as part 2 showed, completion is weaker in comparative terms. 
Figure 22.2 illustrates the gap between participation at the two-year level or above 
and graduation at degree level.
Figure 22.2 shows that U.S. participation at tertiary education level is excep-
tionally high, reaching 95.3 percent of the age cohort in 2011. Yet because many of 
those students drop out before completion and others stop at two-year diploma 
level, in the year the participation peaked, the rate of graduation at degree level 
was only 38.9 percent. There was a 56.4 percent gap between the participation rate 
and the graduation rate at degree level. Given the data in figure 22.1, it is certain 
that the social composition of the gap between participation and degrees was 
heavily weighted to the bottom two quartiles. Given the deteriorating economic 
position of the bottom 50 percent in the United States, if the present trends con-
tinue into the future, the completion rate in higher education is more likely to 
fall than rise.
.
Figure 22.2. Comparison between gross tertiary enrolment ratio and gross graduation ratio 
at degree level, United States, 1999–2012.
Source: Author, using data from UNESCO 2015.
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FOR-PROFIT FAILURE
It is also now clear that where the public higher education sector falters and 
fails families from the bottom half of the income distribution, the commercial 
higher education sector cannot provide, not even when it is massively subsi-
dized by Washington. In the last two decades, the federal government applied 
public choice theory’s foundational assumption of “private good, public bad” 
to higher education policy and funding. Instead of boosting the declining posi-
tion of four-year and two-year public colleges—strengthening their educational 
potency, lengthening their programs, enhancing the confidence and abilities of 
their graduates, and inserting more backbone into the social value of their cre-
dentials—the federal government channeled a growing volume of total public 
subsidies for postsecondary education into the for-profit sector. For many fami-
lies in the lower 50 percent, the old dream about universal opportunity and social 
mobility through free public education became temporarily replaced by a new 
dream about loan investment in a brighter graduate future. The choice was clear, 
or at least the widely spread (and publicly subsidized) for-profit marketing made 
the choice seem clear. The public colleges were offering rising tuition, funding 
cutbacks, large classes, enrollment quotas, and high dropout rates. The for-profit 
dream promised graduate jobs, respect for its student-consumers, and support 
for them while studying. And like the high-priced mortgages that were oversold 
to low-income families before the 2008 crash, the for-profit version of the educa-
tional dream turned into a nightmare.
Between 1995 and 2010, the for-profit colleges were the fastest growing sub-
sector of American higher education. Their enrollment moved from 240,363 to 
peak at 2,018,397, multiplying by 8.4 times while the total postsecondary enroll-
ment multiplied by a factor of 1.57 (see figure 22.3). The for-profits cultivated a 
niche market of working people who had left school or college early and wanted 
to progress their careers with a diploma. Given America’s relatively high school 
dropout and postsecondary noncompletion rates, this is a large potential market. 
The for-profits also had growing recruitment opportunities among school leav-
ers shut out of public colleges. They marketed more aggressively than public and 
private nonprofit institutions, promising greater vocational certainty. They also 
rapidly expanded online modes of higher education. With state governments un-
able to adequately support public colleges, it seemed that many in government saw 
the for-profit sector as the new frontier for mass higher education in the future: 
more exciting, more customer responsive, more flexible, more innovative. Both its 
enrollment growth and high profitability seemed to confirm its market success. 
Between 1994 and 2003, the revenues of the Apollo Group, owner of the University 
of Phoenix, the largest private university in the United States, expanded from $12 
million to $1.34 billion.8
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The for-profit sector had not carved out the new territory in the wilderness 
entirely through its own effort. Its business model was totally dependent on fed-
eral subsidies. For example, in 2010 the Apollo Group received 88.7 percent of all 
its revenues from the federal government, including 85.3 percent from student 
loans and Pell Grants, and 3.4 percent from military educational programs.9 In 
2009 the for-profits enrolled 10 percent of postsecondary students but absorbed 
25 percent of all Pell Grant dollars,10 indicating both their success in fastening 
onto the most disadvantaged component of the population and their mastery 
of Washington. The for-profits were nurtured by supportive legislation and pro-
tected their position with a high-powered lobbying operation in both sides of 
the aisle. The Apollo Group donated $11 million in the 2007–2008 presidential 
election campaign. Remarkably, President George W. Bush made a lobbyist for 
the for-profit sector his Assistant Secretary for Post-Secondary Education.11 In 
addition, the finance sector lobbied successfully to make student loans nondis-
chargeable at bankruptcy, so for-profit providers were under little pressure from 
lenders to deliver on employability.12
This federally fed business model was so strong that in 2008, while the S&P index 
declined by 39 percent, the nine major for-profit companies saw 4 percent growth in 
their stocks. According to Mettler, the chair and CEO of Strayer University received 
$41.9 million in 2009–2010, twenty-six times more than the most highly compen-
















Figure 22.3. Enrollment in postsecondary institutions, and enrollment in for-profit institu-
tions, United States 1970–2012.
Source: Author, using data from NCES 2015.
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the salaries paid to for-profit executives, parallel to those received by “superman-
agers” in the finance sector, were not worth it? The total federal subsidy of for-prof-
its, estimated at $32 billion a year in 2012,14 guaranteed shareholder value.
However, the for-profit business model had an Achilles heel: the quantity and 
quality of outputs. With much of the revenue outlaid on recruitment or drawn 
back into the corporations, there was less for teaching and learning—Mettler es-
timates $2,659 per student, compared to $9,418 by public colleges and $15,289 by 
private nonprofits.15 Aggregate completion rates are difficult to obtain, but they are 
lower than in public colleges and probably below 20 percent in the first six years. 
Among bachelor’s-level graduates in 2008, average debts were $32,700 compared 
to $22,400 in public institutions, but for-profit graduates had higher unemploy-
ment rates than graduates from public institutions. For-profit graduates now ac-
count for nearly half of all loan defaults, a cost again borne by Washington.16 In its 
first term, the Obama administration attempted to tie continued federal subsidies 
to a satisfactory rate of graduate employment and loan repayment. In its original 
form, the bill would have forced half of all for-profit loan recipients to improve 
their outcomes or lose federal funding. The for-profit lobby spent $11 million in 
lobbying against the proposed changes, enlisting the support of all Republicans 
and many Democrats. The Administration was forced to water down the provi-
sions of the bill, so that in the outcome only one in twenty for-profit schools were 
affected.17 However, Obama continued to work on reining in the for-profits. It is 
apparent that the high-water mark of the industry has passed. It is difficult to jus-
tify public gifts on this scale, even in a country in which taxpayer-funded corpo-
rate bailouts are the new normal, inequality in education is seen as the fault of the 
family, and the common faith in upward social movement through educational 
merit might be fading.
So where do poor families go? The dream of upward mobility through public 
education has faded. The dream of upward mobility through vocationally smart 
private colleges has been a bigger, costlier, and more deceptive disappointment.
SO CIAL MOBILIT Y
What then is the extent of the remaining upward social mobility in American so-
ciety, and what role does higher education play in it? Societies with high inequality 
normally exhibit both high private returns to graduates compared to the returns 
to school leavers—as is the case in the United States and the United Kingdom at 
present—and also high intergenerational income elasticity.18 The latter refers to 
the extent to which relative parental incomes are reproduced in relative children’s 
incomes. The higher the level of intergenerational income elasticity, the lower the 
level of social mobility. Whereas a century ago social mobility was higher in the 
United States than in Europe, this is no longer the case. Miles Corak finds that the 
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United States and the United Kingdom have an intergenerational income elasticity 
of 0.4–0.5. This means that 40–50 percent of the difference in parental incomes is 
passed on to the children. The corresponding figures for Canada, Denmark, Nor-
way, and Finland are 0.15–0.2. Sweden and Germany are at about 0.3.19
Likewise, Thomas Piketty states that while it is more difficult to measure and 
compare intergenerational mobility than incomes at a given point of time, avail-
able data indicate that “intergenerational reproduction is lowest in the Nordic 
countries and highest in the United States (with a correlation coefficient two-thirds 
higher than Sweden). France, Germany, and Britain occupy a middle ground, less 
mobile than northern Europe but more mobile than the United States.”20 Stiglitz 
cites data showing that in Denmark, 25 percent of the children born into the bot-
tom one-fifth of households in income terms remain in that bottom fifth. In the 
United States, 42 percent of those born into the bottom fifth stay there, and nearly 
two-thirds stay in the bottom two-fifths. In the United States, a higher proportion 
are trapped in poverty.21
The OECD has prepared data that measure comparative intergenerational mo-
bility of enrollment in higher education.22 Note that these data focus on educational 
mobility rather than social mobility. (Note also that in the last generation most 
countries have greatly expanded the rate of participation in tertiary education but 
the social power of average degree status may have fallen, affecting the meaning 
of cross-generation comparison). Again, American intergenerational educational 
mobility is low compared to most other OECD countries. The OECD compares 
the odds of getting to tertiary education for two groups of students: those with one 
or both parents who attended tertiary education and those whose parents did not. 
In the United States, students from tertiary-educated families were 6.8 times as 
likely to access tertiary education as students from nontertiary families. This num-
ber is consistent with the income-based distribution of graduation in figure 22.1. 
Intergenerational mobility was almost as low in England in the United Kingdom 
(6.3). Only Poland and Italy (9.5) had lower mobility than United States and Unit-
ed Kingdom. Australia (4.3) was in the middle of the table, and Canada (2.6) had 
a high level of mobility. The Nordic ratios ranged from Finland (1.4) to Denmark 
(3.0). South Korea was at 1.1.23
Low social mobility is one thing, worsening social mobility is another. In a 2014 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, Raj Chetty and colleagues 
found that American children who enter the labor market today have much the 
same chance of moving up the income ladder relative to their parents as did chil-
dren born in the 1970s or 1980s. For children born between 1971 and 1986, they 
measured “intergenerational mobility based on the correlation between parent 
and child income percentile ranks,” while for more recent cohorts, they measured 
mobility “as the correlation between a child’s probability of attending college and 
her parents’ income rank.” They also calculated “transition probabilities, such as 
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a child’s chances of reaching the top quintile of the income distribution starting 
from the bottom quintile.” However, Chetty and colleagues noted that because 
inequality has increased, there is more at stake for each child in the “birth lottery” 
than before.24 This suggests that while Mettler was not as yet wholly correct in 
her statement about lessened social mobility, it is only a matter of time before the 
dramatic enhancement of American inequality translates into reduced American 
social mobility overall.
ALLO CATIVE POWER OF HIGHER EDUCATION
History underlines the point that higher education has the potential to contribute 
either to greater equality or greater inequality. Part 1 showed how higher educa-
tion was associated with rising equality of opportunity and social mobility in a 
society becoming more open, in the 1950s–1970s United States. Higher education 
has been also associated with economies and societies that are becoming more un-
equal and more closed, with higher education part of the closure, as in the United 
States today. This does not mean that higher education itself is the main driver of 
social and economic equality or inequality, whether inside the sector or beyond it.
History also suggests that the autonomous allocative power of higher educa-
tion, for good or ill, itself can vary in strength. The specific influence of higher 
education might be greater when opportunities are opening up than when they are 
closing down. It seems that the capacity of higher education to make a difference 
can be magnified by enabling government policies in conjunction with a social 
consensus about the value of education and equal opportunity, as in the case of the 
1960 Master Plan. There is another example of this positive, transformative role 
of higher education on a large scale, in a society very different from 1960s United 
States: China today. In China the party-state emphasizes higher education as an 
allocative mechanism. Education has been positioned as the source of opportunity 
and the positioning and selecting device for the fast-growing middle class. At the 
same time, China’s government uses higher education to strengthen its own posi-
tion. By providing educational and social opportunity on a larger scale, it hopes 
to strengthen its own political position, as was the more or less case with Gov-
ernor Pat Brown in California at the end of the 1950s. The limits to this strategy 
in China are the continuing deep divide between rural and urban areas25 and the 
likelihood that as the growth of the middle class slows down while higher educa-
tion continues to expand, the family payoffs from higher education will decline. 
Graduate unemployment is already a sensitive issue in China. China is having its 
1960s–1970s moment in higher education. Only the continuation of exceptional 
levels of economic growth can sustain that moment. There has been exceptional 
growth for almost forty years but everything ends eventually. It is unlikely that 
higher education in China will always be as powerful a factor in social sorting and 
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in governmental strategy. It is possible that the allocative power of higher educa-
tion in China is peaking now.
The Nordic countries maintain free access to institutions of uniformly good 
quality in education systems that are even more open and egalitarian than so-
ciety overall. No doubt this approach to education moderates the tendencies to 
labor-market and income inequality natural in societies with economic markets. 
However, the Nordic countries provide this kind of education system as part 
of an egalitarian social consensus about tax, transfers and social spending, and 
balanced industrial relations. Society shapes higher education rather more than 
higher education shapes society; it is social and political developments that made 
the educational reforms possible.26. Nordic education is a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for the Nordic egalitarianism that often fascinates other countries. 
Education alone has not made Nordic societies more equal over time, nor has it 
prevented them from becoming somewhat more unequal over the course of the 
last two decades.
In all societies, whether they are becoming more unequal or not, higher educa-
tion has fallen short of the full expectations created in the 1960s. The limits to the 
allocative power of education have been concealed by the narratives of educational 
merit and human capital in which responsibility for more equal social outcomes 
become displaced downwards from the level of social order and government pol-
icy to educational institutions and to graduates themselves. However, the lesson 
of the post-1960 period is that education ministers and university leaders should 
set aside the hubris that higher education is the principal maker of society. Both 
Clark Kerr and Martin Trow were careful to avoid this kind of claim. What hap-
pens with incomes, wealth, labor markets, taxation, spending, social programs, 
and urban and rural development is much more important overall. Calling society 
a “knowledge economy” or “innovation society” does not change this. Yet despite 
the lesson of history, the capacity of higher education to move whole societies is 
still fundamentally and frequently overstated. Piketty asks:
Did mass education lead to more rapid turnover of winners and losers for a given 
skill hierarchy? According to the available data, the answer seems to be no: the in-
tergenerational correlation of education and earned incomes, which measures the 
reproduction of the skill hierarchy over time, shows no greater trend toward greater 
mobility over the long run.27
This is right. All the same, old habits die hard: Piketty and Stiglitz, as well as 
the OECD, are among those who continue to overstate the social allocative power 
of higher education. They do not see education as responsible for the trend to 
income inequality, but they see education as the central driver of the solution.28 
This is equally implausible. Stiglitz, urging the reversal of the U.S. trends to higher 
tuition and decreased public support for public education, states that “opportunity 
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is shaped, more than anything else, by access to education.”29 Piketty is convinced 
that broad access to high-quality training and advanced education would be the 
most effective method of lifting lower-tier wages.30 The OECD argues that in cases 
of countries where inequality is reducing, such as Brazil, and countries with high 
growth without growing inequality, such as South Korea, education policy has 
been a principal driver. Oxfam makes a similar argument.31 In part the global agen-
cies focus on education for practical reasons. Education remains under govern-
ment control in most countries and more open to policy and regulation than the 
other levers that affect inequality. It is easier to change education than to increase 
corporate tax or more closely regulate the globally connected finance sector. Yet 
egalitarian reforms in education, even when underpinned by public spending, can 
have limited impact in the absence of changes to domains such as tax and trans-
fers, welfare, job creation, minimum wages, and executive pay regimes. And in any 
case, there is unlikely to be a sustained increase in public spending on education 
while tax constraints, large supermanager salary hikes, and financialization strate-
gies remain in place. Comparing a range of countries, Richard Wilkinson and Kate 
Pickett note that the level of public spending on education tends to be negatively 
correlated with the degree of income inequality.32 This cuts both ways. Income 
inequality and the prowealth tax regime reduce the social resources for education 
spending, and constraints on public investment in education narrow the scope for 
opportunity reproducing inequality.
If higher education is unable on its own to secure a significant redistribution of 
opportunity, what then can it achieve? What is the outer limit of its social alloca-
tive power and formative effect in the present setting? Higher education acting 
alone may not change the balance of social power, but it nevertheless touches the 
lives of more than twenty million American students a year. It also allocates social 
opportunities within that large group. First, as William Deresiewicz and Roger 
Geiger each argue in different ways, while American higher education provides lit-
tle upward mobility overall, it plays an important sorting role in the upper middle 
class. Elite higher education, public and private, fine-tunes the social destinations 
of those nestling between the top 0.1–5 percent of the family income distribution. 
Among them are some who will become supermanagers, carrying the MBAs that 
stamp them as meritocratic. Today’s more meritocratic form of inequality is partly 
tied to elite universities, as Rivera shows.33 Elite programs also partly separate stu-
dents and families in the upper-middle-class group from the more beleaguered 
American “middle-middle” class.34 Second, mass higher education in two-year 
and four-year institutions and the for-profits helps to differentiate the middle of 
the job market. Credential holders are more likely to secure full-time jobs and are 
better placed for self-employment. In the narrow upper-middle band, selective 
investments, entry, and outcomes are calculated with precision. In the larger and 
more inchoate middle zone below, the fact of participation is more important than 
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field, and credentials are more generic than precise. It is in these two middle layers 
of American society, which roughly correspond to elite and mass higher education 
respectively, that the principal allocative function of higher education continues 
to play out.
In relation to these two middle layers, American higher education is becom-
ing more socially regressive. In the absence of an absolute growth in opportu-
nities—or what has always been more unlikely, a redistribution that would re-
duce the opportunities of some families from the middle and/or upper layers of 
the SES distribution while promoting others from below—the competition into 
and within higher education must become increasingly intense, as middle-class 
families jostle for position and bring every possible asset to bear on the competi-
tion to secure advantage in the most selective colleges and programs. Positional 
competition in higher education will strengthen the families with the most assets, 
not weaken them. “The idea that unrestricted competition will put an end to in-
heritance and move towards a more meritocratic world is a dangerous illusion,” as 
Piketty remarks.35
Above and below those two middle layers of society, the allocative role of high-
er education is not as important as it is in the middle. American higher education 
has long been a device for defining, motivating, shaping and sorting the middle 
class. Figure 3.1 shows that for the majority of Americans located in the bottom 
two income quartiles, higher education’s role in social allocation is limited. The 
cost of tuition has risen at twice the rate of inflation since 1980,36 and unlike stu-
dents in Australia and the United Kingdom, U.S. students are not supported by 
income-contingent loans. They must take mortgage-style student loans with com-
mercial repayment regimes. When they enter the lower reaches of higher educa-
tion, they find they have more limited mobility and choices than many others.37 
For the most part, higher education does not offer them a precise vocation and still 
less a guaranteed career. Some stay out. Many do not complete. The lack of traction 
in community college and for-profit education coupled with rising private costs, 
the breakdown of access in California and elsewhere, and perhaps the aftermath 
of recession together may explain the recent fall in postsecondary enrollment in 
the United States. Total enrollment peaked at 21.016 million in 2010, falling by 
1.8 percent to 20.643 million in 2012. Student numbers fell by a quarter of million 
in both the public sector and the private for-profit sector.38 Public higher education 
is failing the poor. Private higher education is also failing the poor and its failure 
is more spectacular.
At the top of society, above the upper middle class, higher education is again 
less determining of social outcomes. In fact its social allocative power may be re-
ceding. Though apparent returns to higher education are maximized for affluent 
families, much more than higher education is at work in their strong career tra-
jectories and high wages. As private fortunes grow and inheritance returns to a 
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primary role, university will become less essential in achieving a place at the top, 
notwithstanding the continued need of some new supermanagers for meritocratic 
legitimation and networks and regardless of the continued prestige consumption 
and cultural sheltering functions of Ivy League degrees. Joseph Soares found that 
in 1988–2000, only 22 percent of the children of high-income professional families 
and 14 percent of children from other high-income families attended tier 1 institu-
tions. In fact, 19 percent of the children of all high-income professional families 
and 36 percent from other high-income families attended no college at all.39 These 
members of the social elite are decoupled from higher education. They have no 
stake in it as a social project.
However, while some young people from privileged backgrounds will be suc-
cessful in life whether they attend elite higher education institutions or not, for 
some other young people, from less affluent backgrounds, higher education makes 
a large difference. Though elite institutions remain upper-middle-class dominated 
and American higher education overall fails to redistribute opportunities on a so-
cial scale, it continues to create new prospects for students from low SES back-
grounds who lack family capital. Without higher education, these families would 
be worse off. The business world could not alone provide comparable social op-
portunities if higher education was withdrawn. The paradox is that the persons 
least likely to aspire to higher education, least likely to participate in it, and least 
able to translate graduation into high earnings and lifelong supportive networks 
gain on average the most from higher education relative to nonparticipants.40 Gei-
ger argues that higher education still offers poorer Americans their best opportu-
nity for upward mobility, though the odds are more uncertain than they were. A 
threshold problem, however, is that studying hard—which provides poor students 
with their best odds for upward social mobility through education—is increas-
ingly out of favor on American campuses.41
NONC O GNITIVE NET WORKS
Higher education is potent in transforming the lives and livelihoods of people 
from any background for the better, as Clark Kerr knew. However, the effect is not 
automatic and the student must become an active agent to secure it. Higher educa-
tion goes deeper and is more likely to be transformative when students immerse 
themselves in their programs, enabling the academic and professional disciplines 
to do their work of honing technique and cultivating the imagination. Inescapably, 
the extent to which higher education can build confident agency, generate intel-
lectual payoffs, and secure occupational ability is a function of how much work 
the student does. Study time does not affect the capacity of students to use higher 
education to build social status, position themselves for the future, and network 
to advantage. However, it directly determines the potential for cognitive benefits 
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and, through those benefits, more robust intellectual agency and higher measured 
performance. This is crucial for first-generation disadvantaged students, for whom 
the cognitive worlds of higher education are often largely new. The majority of 
affluent students bring with them cultural capital of tertiary-educated households. 
For the average first-generation student, all else being equal, higher education has 
more value to add.
However, data on student workloads and time use indicate that in the United 
States study time is falling and is low compared to most countries for which data 
are available. Arum and Roksa cite survey data showing that students in all Eu-
ropean countries except Slovakia spent more time in academic pursuits than did 
American students. A 2006 American study found that students spend thirteen 
hours a week studying and three times that amount in recreation.42 Arum and 
Roksa tracked 1,600 students in twenty-five different four-year colleges. They 
found that in the sophomore year, half of the students had no class requiring more 
than twenty pages of writing in the whole semester, and a third had no class that 
required more than forty pages of reading a week. Using generic academic com-
petency tests, the researchers find that after two years, 45 percent of students im-
proved by less than one percentage point on a standardized achievement scale. 
After four years, the average student had moved from the starting 50 percent to 
the 68 percent mark, and 30 percent of students still failed to improve by even 
1 percent. Nevertheless, these students had graduated successfully though gradu-
ates with higher competency-test scores tended to have lower unemployment. 
On average, students in high-selective institutions learned more than did others, 
though many had low-intensity reading and writing requirements.43
In Arum and Roksa’s study, seniors spent an average of twenty-six hours a week 
in all academic pursuits, including twelve hours of study outside classes. This com-
pared with forty total hours a week in the 1960s.44 Just as worrying as the lost time 
is the alleged displacement of intellectual rigor. This shows also in the widespread 
tendency to grade inflation. Despite the falloff in hours of academic work, aver-
age GPAs are rising in most colleges. Deresiewicz found that the energy of Yale 
students is absorbed by extracurricular learning rather than formative intellectual 
pursuits and argues that the treatment of students as consumers—“people to be 
pandered to instead of challenged”—compromises teaching and learning.45 Steven 
Pinker pins part of the blame for the decline in intellectual focus on the use of 
extracurricular criteria in determining entry into Ivy League institutions. He ar-
gues that “at most 10 percent” of Harvard students are selected on academic merit 
per se. The remainder are selected “holistically” on the basis of participation in 
athletics, arts, charity, community activism, or travel experiences. This feeds the 
“anti-intellectualism of Ivy League undergraduate education” with too much time 
spent on a frenetic round of extracurricular, social, and networking activities and 
not enough in study.46 As with Arum and Roksa, Pinker’s remedy is to step up 
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standardized generic competency testing, to impose the discipline of a cognitive 
regime and thereby bring institutions and faculty back to the academic mission. 
Though generic testing can provide some data on cognitive capabilities, it misses 
the larger part of intellectual formation, which takes place in knowledge regimes. 
If testing was institutionalized at every stage from school to work, the remedy 
would reduce intellectual development as much as enhance it. But the need that 
these scholars address—to find a way back to cognitive formation—is clear. In his 
account of the limitations of contemporary universities, Peter Murphy in Australia 
emphasizes the same point.47 It resonates with faculty everywhere.
In two book-length accounts, Academically Adrift and Aspiring Adults Adrift, 
Arum and Roksa offer an explanation for the retreat from intellectual formation. 
They point to a partial shift in the locus of authority on campus between faculty 
and students. Student assessment of teaching and curricula affects faculty standing 
and can shape careers. Rather than students being empowered as strong agents, 
however, they are being provided with a more comfortable life. The partial shift 
in the locus of authority is associated with less challenging teaching, lighter study 
loads, grade inflation, and increased plagiarism.48 It all erodes cognitive formation. 
The emphasis on student satisfaction is part of the almost universal shift to a cus-
tomer orientation in dealing with students, consistent with the idea of higher edu-
cation as an increasingly competitive market, and with the professionalization and 
expansion of campus services that foster student adjustment, activities, and suc-
cessful passage. Colleges focus on students’ “personal growth and well-being,” in-
cluding their participation in group relationships, rather than academic and moral 
development, which were the principal focuses at earlier times. Higher education 
institutions are “academically adrift but socially alive, active and attentive. Cor-
respondingly, students—and their families—also focus on networking and team-
based activities, including parties, believing that “it’s not what you know, it is who 
you know.”49 The core purpose of college becomes collapsed into student social life.
In Paying for the Party: How College Maintains Inequality, Elizabeth Armstrong 
and Laura Hamilton provide cases studies that illustrate the socially differential 
effects of the reduction of the main purpose of higher education from intellectual 
formation to social networking.50 At the flagship public university studied by Arm-
strong and Hamilton, the central role of the “Greeks” and a middle-class social life, 
sanctioned if not actively encouraged by the institution, weaken the prospects for 
disadvantaged students, unless they are strong enough to stand aside from the peer 
culture. Disadvantaged students benefit least from higher education as a position 
and network and mating game, in which material advantages and cultural cun-
ning tend to determine the outcome. These students stand to gain the most from 
higher education when it is practiced as hard work and cognitive formation and 
augments their knowledge, skill, confidence, and professional sensibilities. That 
higher education provides them with the best odds of moving up after graduation.
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Higher education is essentially a process of student self-formation.51 It always 
has been. All learning is a process of self-formation, albeit with most of it situ-
ated in relational social settings.52 Traditional pedagogy models higher education 
as other-formation, but a moment’s thought shows that its self-forming character 
is obvious: even didactic modes of learning work only when the techniques and 
knowledge they demand are absorbed by the student as an act of will and be-
come part of the mental apparatus. One of the irretrievable cultural changes since 
the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in 1964 is that students in higher educa-
tion have become openly positioned as self-determining adults. This is part of the 
larger modern shift to a self-determining individual form of freedom, which the 
student and counterculture movements that so plagued Clark Kerr at Berkeley 
helped to create. There is no intrinsic reason why student self-formation should 
be trapped within the antisocial form of individuality proposed by public choice 
theory. Individual freedom without sociability undermines its own conditions of 
existence. But replacing high-individualized consumption with shared individual 
consumption in social networks does not constitute much of a step forward either, 
though it is apparent why this has developed.
Essentially, the semisanctioned “party” lifestyle at college has emerged as a nec-
essary social compensation for the lacuna in individualist rational choice and pub-
lic choice theories, without jettisoning the consumer market approach to higher 
education. However, the better alternative is to move beyond the market para-
digm. In renovating approaches to public higher education, one task, difficult but 
necessary, is to shift the self-forming student out of consumption and into an in-
tellectual paradigm in which personal empowerment evolves not through choice 
of friends and leisure activity but through activities that are explicitly designed to 
hone mental capacity.
What higher education can do is maximize students’ cognitive and social ca-
pabilities, including their agency, confidence, knowledge, and imagination. “Net-
works” are further down the list of significant benefits. If universities and colleges 
are doomed to educate a society dominated by a new aristocracy of money in a 
political economy becoming more unequal, their best contribution to their public 
mission is to form a graduate population that is more intelligent, more informed, 
and more confident within a society in which socially nested human agency is 
broadly distributed. That kind of society is less likely to tolerate the loss of the 
commonweal and more likely to renew the forward-looking democratic spirit em-
bodied in the best hopes of the 1960s and the starting forms of the California Idea 
of higher education.
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The California Idea of higher education, as embodied in the 1960 Master Plan, the 
implementation of the Plan, and the societal consensus that supported it, was in 
some respects utopian. All the same, it was managed with skill and foresight and 
was sufficiently practical to record great achievements in both access and excel-
lence. Clark Kerr expected the Master Plan to last for only about twenty years. 
For that period it was unquestionably successful. Some of its benefits, especially 
those in the realm of excellence, lasted longer than that and continue to the pres-
ent day. As part 1 described, the University of California is an extraordinary re-
search university sector, little diminished despite the times, quintessentially public 
in the benefits of its research and as an engine of upward social mobility. On the 
campuses, the UC Office of the President is felt as an encumbrance and the size 
of its staff is often questioned, but the system model has been essential in holding 
these campuses to the public mission. In some other states, amid the pressures 
of the times, flagship public universities have moved closer to the missions and 
modus operandi of the leading private universities. But Berkeley, UCLA and UC 
San Diego have not started to converge with Stanford, Caltech, and the University 
of Southern California. If that has been the price of the encumbrance, it has been 
a price that is worth paying.
As part 1 indicated and part 3 explained in detail, the history of the access mis-
sion has not been as happy as that of the excellence mission. For the first 20–25 
years, the California Idea successfully underpinned open access to higher educa-
tion for all. This achievement was ahead of its time, though as part 2 showed, 
the world is now catching up. After that, the capacity of all public planning in 
California was conclusively undermined, first by Proposition 13 in 1978, then by 
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Ronald Reagan’s antitax and anti–public good policies after 1980 and the thirty-
five years of growing inequality that followed, and finally by the plutocratic and 
corporate capture of Congress, so that Washington poured subsidies into dysfunc-
tional for-profit colleges while the states could no longer fund the public commu-
nity college sector. The 2008 recession made it clear that within the present fiscal-
political framework, mass public higher education in California would never meet 
its basic public goals. The long bipartisan consensus on building higher education, 
in which Clark Kerr’s leadership in California and his years at the Carnegie Com-
mission after 1967 played a signal role, has now evaporated.1 The Obama admin-
istration sensed the problem but could not effectively address it, largely because 
the interests that controlled the Congress had no intrinsic commitment to either 
overcoming gridlock or rebuilding public higher education.
The underlying problem is in political philosophy and political culture. Once 
government ceases to be a repository of the general will and the taxation that sup-
ports it ceases to be an instrument of the collective good. Once government is seen 
as the enemy, less trustworthy than market actors, though they are responsible only 
to themselves, then society has set aside its principal means of reflexively improv-
ing itself. John Dewey argued vigorously against the cynical belief that the state, 
the public interest, is “a mask for private desires for power and position.”2 James 
Buchanan’s aphorism was that “strangers make market exchanges” and thereby 
bind a society together; Herbert Bowles’s equally pithy reply is that “markets make 
strangers.”3 Markets in education have advanced the scope for individual choice 
and initiative, but unregulated market forces in education tend to fragment the 
common educational infrastructure—and values—on which everyone depends. 
In the public choice society, everyone is in their private bunker with guns facing 
outwards in all directions, ready to blaze away when provoked. But public goods 
and private goods do not have to be locked into a zero-sum game in which they 
are set against each other. The key is to identify the public interest, and its condi-
tions, so it can be harmonized with individual rights and needs. We should expect 
the public and private good to be optimized together. Rather than abandoning the 
idea of mutual benefit, it is better to treat the public good as a source and condition 
of private good, thereby holding governments accountable for the extent to which 
they advance our lives and our freedoms.
The United States continues to lead the world in the high-research mission 
of universities. This is an essential resource in enhancing the engagement with 
China and the world, as discussed in part 2 of this book. Yet in other respects 
the United States is no longer the unquestioned higher education leader that it 
was when The Uses of the University was first published, in 1963. The Reagan-era 
policies and what came after put paid to that. America now may have as much 
to learn as to teach. Certain higher education systems abroad combine high lev-
els of initial enrollment, as in the United States, with high completion among all 
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social groups, research excellence in the universities, and mass teaching institu-
tions of good quality. The countries that are hitting excellence and equity goals 
simultaneously, much as the Master Plan imagined, include the Nordic countries, 
South Korea, and Taiwan. Significantly, these are also societies that rank highly 
in Forbes magazine’s surveys of good countries in which to do business, and they 
all have strong creative cultures in both arts and industry. In Denmark the highly 
trained creative sector (design, architecture, fashion, jewelry, furniture, cinema, 
research, and higher education itself) now constitutes about 10 percent of exports.4 
Korea also has a vibrant and productive design culture. Societies in which nearly 
all people are educated to a high level have a great pool of resources and ideas from 
which to draw. In this group of countries, there are varied rates of taxation, but 
without exception taxation is sufficient to support excellent and accessible higher 
education at near universal levels of social participation, and mass higher educa-
tion is of good quality. An equitable high-quality system of higher education does 
not necessarily depend on high levels of taxation if families share tuition cost, as 
in East Asia, and/or tuition is covered by income-contingent tuition loans (see 
“National Reform of Tuition” below). However, a public higher education policy 
cannot achieve excellence and equity goals together unless there is consensus on 
the mission of education as a servant of the public good, and this is sustained by 
public leadership in government and higher education and by broad agreement 
on public financing.
Clark Kerr understood that social leadership involves responsibility as well as 
opportunity. The public good consists in social structures in which elite families 
want to contribute to the good of all, so that the private freedoms and benefits are 
rendered universal. Higher education ought to be be one of the structures that 
enables that kind of public good, on the local, state, national, and global planes.
NATIONAL REFORM OF TUITION
California is often ahead of the country and the world. The trends of the time often 
emerge there first. California once led the nation in education but now trails the 
pack. The state’s malaise in public higher education speaks to a larger malaise in 
the public mission of American higher education. Perhaps California could lead 
the recovery.
The Dream is Over has pointed to the problem. It is not the purpose of the book 
to suggest political solutions to the malaise of public education, which will come, 
but only by evolving in organic fashion from within the states and communities 
that need solutions. However, it is clear that everything turns on the establishment 
of a new sense of the public good in education and social policy. The public good 
is something that Clark Kerr’s generation, coming out of depression and war, un-
derstood very well. It is now less well understood. It can be retrieved. As Joseph 
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Stiglitz states, “the real solution to the inequality crisis lies in focusing on commu-
nity rather than self-interest.”5
There is one change that might provide a way forward for American higher ed-
ucation. That is a wholesale change to tuition, the most contested aspect of higher 
education, using a scheme that was first developed outside the United States. Tu-
ition can be grounded in a less politicized and more stable system that preserves 
social access while improving educational resources. Tuition loans can be trans-
formed into a public good rather than a private burden. However, it must be done 
on a national basis. The solution is too big for any one state.
The problems are affordability, default, and the spiraling total cost of debt. The 
United States still uses commercial loans based on mortgage-style timed repay-
ments. Graduates who cannot generate loan repayments are in jeopardy. Gradu-
ates from poorer backgrounds are more likely to be in this position, as are women. 
This in turn tends to deter the future participation of others from those groups. 
The high level of default is ultimately carried by government, a considerable pub-
lic subsidy. What is needed is a tuition-loans regime that works across a range of 
tuition charges but has minimal deterrent effect at the point of entry, and minimal 
socioeconomic bias: that is, a regime in which no student from any background is 
deterred on financial grounds. The tuition-loans regime should use public subsi-
dies to support access rather than to compensate loans companies. To meet these 
objectives, a number of countries have moved or are moving to tuition-loans 
schemes based on income-contingent repayment arrangements, with repayment 
through taxation system. The United Kingdom adopted such as scheme in 2012. 
Australia has had one in place since 1988. Other countries include Hungary, South 
Korea, Thailand, and New Zealand.
In the United Kingdom in 2012 public university tuition was initially fixed at 
a maximum of £9000 per annum ($14,500). Almost all institutions charge at the 
maximum, which operates as a standard cost, though this is not essential to the 
scheme. Students pay tuition at the point of enrollment using government-backed 
loans, with the transaction taking place between institutions and government. Stu-
dents handle no money at this point. The loans are described as “income contin-
gent” because they are repaid through the tax system on a percentage-of-income 
basis. Repayment begins when income reaches a threshold level. Prior to that, the 
graduate carries the debt without the obligation to repay, though the debt slowly 
increases on the basis of subcommercial interest charges. In Australia, tuition debt 
is indexed to the cost of living; in the United Kingdom, interest is slightly higher. 
In both Australia and the United Kingdom, the threshold that triggers repayment 
is just below average full-time earnings. Most new graduates do not begin to pay 
immediately on graduation. Not all graduates repay their loans, particularly those 
who work for low rates of pay and those who spend long periods outside the work-
force. In the United Kingdom, all unpaid tuition debt is retired after thirty years, 
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while in Australia, it remains until death but is not passed on to the graduate’s 
heirs.
Instead of subsidizing income-contingent tuition loans by picking up the cost 
of default, the UK and Australian governments subsidize them via the subcom-
mercial rate of interest on tuition debt and the nonrepayment of part of the debt. 
In Australia, nonrepayment has been variously estimated at 25–40 percent of total 
student debts, no higher than the subsidies for default in the United States. In the 
United Kingdom, estimates have varied across a similar range, between 30 and 
45 percent.
Income-contingent loans have several advantages. First, the extent of public 
subsidy can be tweaked by altering the terms governing the loans, including the 
interest rate on debt, the income threshold for repayment, and the rate of repay-
ment (the percentage of income). Second, in the context of a modest level of total 
taxation revenue, income-contingent tuition loans enable the United Kingdom 
and Australia to expand enrollments knowing graduates will eventually pay the 
majority of the costs. Third, and most importantly, income-contingent loans re-
move socioeconomic and gender bias from tuition charges. At the point of en-
rollment of full-time students, the tuition regime functions like free education. 
Students continue to pay nothing until they graduate: completion is not deterred 
by accumulating tuition costs. Repayment through the tax system is less painful 
than commercial loan repayments. In the case of most graduates, the money is 
forwarded by employers to government, along with other income tax. The gradu-
ate does not make direct payments. On average, students from poor backgrounds 
pay less than affluent students, and women pay less than men. Students from af-
fluent backgrounds and men are more likely to repay their debts in full over the 
course of their lifetime. The level of tuition charges has been increased several 
times in Australia. Each time the change has been socially neutral; that is, there is 
no evidence that following the policy change, students from low socioeconomic 
status backgrounds were more deterred from enrolling than were others. The only 
category of students unduly affected by income-contingent loans are part-time 
working students who are required to repay during the year of study because their 
income triggers the repayment threshold. The part-time working student was also 
the most affected by the introduction of the £9000 income-contingent, loan-based 
tuition regime in the United Kingdom in 2012. This is a design flaw in the income-
contingent loans schemes in the United Kingdom and Australia that is yet to be 
addressed.
Income contingent tuition loans contribute markedly to the public good. They 
restore the basis for universal access. They enable high participation in higher edu-
cation with no direct cost and no social bias at the point of entry, and they provide 
a basis for affordable public education of good quality. Under this system, tuition 
can be increased to the level needed to sustain agreed quality without reducing 
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access at the point of enrollment, cutting into completion rates, or discriminating 
against poor students at any point. Better, income contingent tuition loans are 
economically progressive, in that wealthy families pay more on average than poor 
families. From the viewpoint of equality of opportunity, a scheme that provides for 
universal access and completion and discriminates economically in favor of those 
with least capacity to pay, who gain the most from participation in higher educa-
tion, is superior to the present American student-loans system.
Income-contingent loans can be confined to the public sector or offered to all 
students in all sectors. Income-contingent loans can be set at any chosen level 
of tuition charge, but it would be unwise to offer these loans without a ceiling, 
especially if the tuition-loans scheme was extended to private colleges. Unlimited 
subsidies would encourage higher education institutions to increase charges freely, 
knowing that government rather than the student would carry the initial cost and 
the cost of unpaid debt. The ceiling on subsidies can be varied by field of study, 
institutional type, or particular categories of students, such as poor students. Con-
ditions can be attached to eligibility of programs for the loans. It is a flexible policy 
instrument.6
Only the federal government could introduce income-contingent loans. It 
would need to absorb existing commercial loans. It is a transformation almost on 
the scale of health care reform, and like health care reform, it would invite fierce 
opposition from vested interests. But it would be the most important move the 
federal government could make to stabilize costs, bring tuition increases under 
control, and underwrite accessibility and affordability. From the point of view of 
federal government, it is a more affordable reform than free college education. 
Ultimately, graduates and government would share the cost. At the same time, 
income-contingent loans would not reduce the net resources available to public 
colleges, as free tuition would tend to do. Equally importantly, it ends the cycle of 
recurring state-induced fiscal crises in the public higher education sector. Federal-
ly driven income-contingent tuition loans could replace state subsidies altogether 
if that is what the two levels of government wanted. It would be the best move 
Washington could make, coupling sound public finance with equality of opportu-
nity in higher education.
AND FINALLY,  IN CALIFORNIA
Federal income-contingent tuition loans would help in California. By stabilizing 
tuition and access, enabling improved resources, and solving the state budget crisis, 
they would establish favorable conditions for going back to the drawing board. Un-
der such conditions, where would the California Idea go? That is for Californians 
to say, and not foreign scholars of higher education systems. Though clearly, there 
will be no new Master Plan until the state is again ready to take the long-term view.
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If so, what would Clark Kerr do? Of course, only he could say, but we can be 
certain that he would consider both excellence and access, and he would fasten 
onto the declining quality and affordability of mass higher education as a problem 
that must be addressed. He might want to extend the regulatory coverage of the 
new Plan to include the for-profit colleges operating on state soil, which are part 
of the postsecondary environment in the state and significant recipients of public 
money.
Kerr might also revisit the balance of enrollment and qualifications, within 
and between the higher education sectors. Two-year qualifications now lack 
weight in the labor markets. In most countries, the majority of higher education 
students are in three- or four-year programs. In some countries, most students 
are in doctoral universities, yet that is the case for only 12.5 percent of the age 
cohort in California. Arguably, the number of California universities with recog-
nized research capacity is too low given the size of the state population and the 
need for broadly distributed capacity in advanced technologies. California needs 
more four-year places and more graduates that have been exposed to a research 
university environment.
Four-year places can be increased by expanding the enrollment of the California 
State University and University of California campuses and by developing more 
community college programs at a four-year level.7 The research university experi-
ence could be broadened by creating new research and doctoral campuses in se-
lected CSU sites, not funded at the same level for research as is the UC but funded 
for research and doctoral training nevertheless. In the longer term, other CSU 
sites could merge with community colleges, thus creating four regulated sectors 
in the interdependent and mutually responsible and networked California system: 
two sets of doctoral universities, the public community colleges, and the private 
colleges.8 With the lower tiers upgraded, the vertical stratification of state public 
higher education would be less “steep,” the level of education in the lower tiers 
would be lifted, and the state’s research capacity would be increased. The 1960 
Master Plan would be modernized.
For those of us outside California, it would be satisfying to again see the state’s 
public higher education system moving forward. It would resonate around the 
world.
With that hope, it remains for this author to express his warm gratitude for the 
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